Federal Agent Reveals Why He Believes Epstein Left His Cell Alive | Ep. 309

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[UNKNOWN]: When a single woman get hit and then she recoil and go back into the room that she had after she was told what to do, it put me on a trajectory for the rest of my career.

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[UNKNOWN]: One of my first things I did after graduation was breaching the Venezuelan embassy to the United States.

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[UNKNOWN]: She'd be broken to a foreign embassy on American soil.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I'm one of two guys that were breachers that I think can say it out.

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[UNKNOWN]: We were in an advance about the Soleimani strike, made of repairs if there were or if there were opportunists who were going to start burning down embassies.

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[UNKNOWN]: We go for the next 10 or so minutes on a chase through the compound with MBS and Pompeo.

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[UNKNOWN]: How meant to chase the Crown

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[UNKNOWN]: We're there on the island for probably 20 minutes or less.

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[UNKNOWN]: The concrete structure in the side of the hill there where they threw my buddy Ben after they hauled time and kidnapped him.

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[UNKNOWN]: Two things happen at once.

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[UNKNOWN]: We start to get in boat procedure and then as that's happening they find Ben's legs and his hand behind his back and start throwing the push from the wall.

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[UNKNOWN]: This belief that he left that saw live is not a fringe 40 among victims.

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[UNKNOWN]: Can you lay out the documented anomalies that led you to that conclusion or or suspected conclusion?

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I'll cover some big ones.

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[UNKNOWN]: Ladies and gentlemen, as always, it's both an honor and a pleasure to welcome my next guest to the podcast.

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[UNKNOWN]: These are former special agent with the U.S.

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[UNKNOWN]: Diplomatic Security Service and an attorney, which is quite the mix, founder of Rescue Forensics and co-founder of Closed Horizon Ladies and Gentlemen, welcome to the stage, Ryan Dalton.

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[UNKNOWN]: Thanks for having me, Mike.

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[UNKNOWN]: Thanks for coming.

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[UNKNOWN]: Man, I've been excited about this for a long time for a host of reasons.

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[UNKNOWN]: One,

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[UNKNOWN]: Just your background with the diplomatic security stuff that I've not seen much of the things that you've done be put out there and there's quite a few, for my perspective, pretty wild stories and then of course obviously the Epstein component of it which we'll for sure get into but I just appreciate you taking the time to sit down and talk with us.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, thanks for having me on and excited for this too.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

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[UNKNOWN]: What's the last full book that you've read?

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[UNKNOWN]: last full book that I read.

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[UNKNOWN]: So I'm going to I'm going to book club.

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[UNKNOWN]: Oh, really.

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[UNKNOWN]: No, no, no, for us.

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[UNKNOWN]: And every year, the wives of the book club could to pick one book.

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[UNKNOWN]: And this last month, the wives picked a book called Yesteryear.

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[UNKNOWN]: It's probably not one that trotians would find super.

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[UNKNOWN]: It's not going to be the first choice.

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[UNKNOWN]: I'll put it that way.

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[UNKNOWN]: But the women get to pick every year in August.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

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[UNKNOWN]: And so I just finished that one.

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[UNKNOWN]: knows that's somewhere you just type into a rocker chat dbt summarizes books so you can act like you read it or you read it there's some guys that do that yeah you get the book report and you look at it and then yeah rocker that what is there a singular takeaway that that you took from it

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[UNKNOWN]: I think one of the main themes of the book was about our capacity for self-to-seet.

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[UNKNOWN]: The characters were morally complex, which was interesting, and there was a lot of what initially appeared like criticism of what they call the Tradwife movement, so the traditional existence, which

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[UNKNOWN]: is it conflict with modern existence in some ways?

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[UNKNOWN]: And the moral complexity of the characters was really interesting, and so I really credit the author for that.

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[UNKNOWN]: And throughout all of the different manifestations of these lives that people had, they all had a capacity for self-deceite, which is a recurring thing to the book, and it was pretty interesting.

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[UNKNOWN]: essentially lying to yourself about how jacked up you are that yeah but how jacked up you are and not even just even having the capacity for being honest to yourself yeah some people deliberately and consciously suppressed that part of themselves some people through their habits or choices or just normal things that they do in life did it and so you got to see how it was played out in a bunch of different people's lives that was interesting

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[UNKNOWN]: Is that a not so subtle hint by the wives to all their men take a heart to look at themselves?

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[UNKNOWN]: Maybe so, probably.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I missed they all met up in DC, the book clubs in the DC area.

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[UNKNOWN]: I didn't make it this year for the in-person debrief of that one.

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[UNKNOWN]: But I'd be interested to hear from in their own words why they chose it.

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[UNKNOWN]: Maybe that's part of it.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I would make that mandatory.

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[UNKNOWN]: When they submit, this is the book you guys are reading.

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[UNKNOWN]: They have to say why they're recommending it.

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[UNKNOWN]: yeah yeah they didn't give it this year last year was a book called The Arts by which was about World War II a very rebellious curator of a French art museum which was really good so they're doing two for two yeah that's good do you have a favorite quote

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[UNKNOWN]: I do.

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[UNKNOWN]: It's by the stoic Marcus Aurelius.

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[UNKNOWN]: He said, be like the promontory upon which the way is continually crash while they're a walled to sleep at your feet.

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[UNKNOWN]: So I like that quote because one of his big ideas is you're going to be hit by all kinds of things in life all the time, unexpected.

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[UNKNOWN]: bad things, traumatic things, good things, and if you can stand steadfast while all crushes at your feet, you're going to live a good life, otherwise like that one.

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[UNKNOWN]: It's amazing how timeless stoicism in general is, or maybe not even just timeless, but how applicable it is to modern day life, and give them how long ago it was, you know, written.

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[UNKNOWN]: It was your favorite thing to do growing up.

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[UNKNOWN]: Oh, how long do I have to be for this?

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[UNKNOWN]: Any age?

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[UNKNOWN]: The first thing that I really fell in love with was due to jutsu.

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[UNKNOWN]: No, shit.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, man.

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[UNKNOWN]: What year was that?

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[UNKNOWN]: I was 16.

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[UNKNOWN]: And I was, I played soccer until I was 16.

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[UNKNOWN]: And I was not great at soccer.

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[UNKNOWN]: I was okay.

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[UNKNOWN]: I didn't start.

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[UNKNOWN]: Played JV.

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[UNKNOWN]: You know, I was just kind of mediocre at it.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

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[UNKNOWN]: And I had this foot injury.

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[UNKNOWN]: and I couldn't move laterally.

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[UNKNOWN]: And so I thought, well, I could try this thing that I've seen before, called you just to hooked.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

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[UNKNOWN]: What year was that?

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[UNKNOWN]: That was 2004.

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[UNKNOWN]: Wow.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, that's a lot, and have you trained ever since then?

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[UNKNOWN]: I've trained in something either, jujitsu, judo, or kramagawa, or anime, so always on the mats.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, man, that's awesome.

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[UNKNOWN]: Kind of a mat rat.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, me as well.

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[UNKNOWN]: I've weigh less time, I guess.

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[UNKNOWN]: But man, that's really awesome.

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[UNKNOWN]: I'm sure we'll get back into that.

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[UNKNOWN]: Well, actually, I'll just ask you now.

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[UNKNOWN]: Have you ever used it in a real world capacity?

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[UNKNOWN]: I got into a a scrap in college one time and I used it.

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[UNKNOWN]: So I felt good that that actually works.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, um, can you describe the ruckus?

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, man.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

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[UNKNOWN]: So I was at a, I mean, it was,

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[UNKNOWN]: It was at a house party, and there was a guy that was just a real router, he was knocking people over, he was a big, fellow, two-man, he was like six-four, two-twenties of football player for the local school, he was knocking people over and was just not controllable.

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[UNKNOWN]: He was getting pretty wild.

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[UNKNOWN]: And he was in the backyard, and I had a conversation with this guy earlier in the night.

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[UNKNOWN]: He goes out in the backyard and he's yelling at these frac kids.

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[UNKNOWN]: They're like 150 pounds so can wet.

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[UNKNOWN]: You know, they're terrified of this guy.

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[UNKNOWN]: And I said, hey, Michael, let's up, man.

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[UNKNOWN]: And he stalks across the yard, the backyard, just in bull mode, right?

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[UNKNOWN]: Y'all in me now, like I've redirected his rage at me.

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[UNKNOWN]: He comes right at me and I realized that this is about to be a fight like I don't want to be one but it's gonna be a fight.

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[UNKNOWN]: He already pushed a girl over, people were trying to calm this guy down, get him home, the escalation was not working and so I don't know about a 23 actually and I don't know sorry 22 and so he gets from about our range.

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[UNKNOWN]: And I thought, yep, there's only one outcome here.

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[UNKNOWN]: And so I teep kicked him to back him up a little bit.

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[UNKNOWN]: And then he football tackles me into the fence.

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[UNKNOWN]: So I got double underhooks and got the spine and tripped him from the back leg.

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[UNKNOWN]: And then got Mount.

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[UNKNOWN]: And I got pulled off of him by his buddies, but just contained him.

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[UNKNOWN]: And it was very simple.

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[UNKNOWN]: He wasn't hurt.

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[UNKNOWN]: I wasn't hurt.

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[UNKNOWN]: No one got hurt.

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[UNKNOWN]: It's the beauty of Jiu Jitsu.

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[UNKNOWN]: right like he was a threat he was called some problems stopped it so that was probably the last time in the real world that I yeah I imagine he also realized that went way different than he was expecting yeah I was probably I don't know 20 pounds lighter than I am now that's probably I'd curly hair curly hair he probably didn't think it was gonna go like that so it felt good though just gave you a sense of confidence that it worked out by the night already

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[UNKNOWN]: But don't a bunch of MMA, so I wasn't worried about this guy.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, that's awesome.

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[UNKNOWN]: You're originally from Tennessee, and which is where you're still at.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, born and raised.

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[UNKNOWN]: Can you tell me a little bit about just your childhood, generally speaking?

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, man, born in Memphis, Tennessee, lived there until I moved away to work for the State Department.

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[UNKNOWN]: It's where I met my wife of 14 years, and I've got two nine-year-old twins, boy and girl, Harper and James, and, yeah, raised their, and met my wife in high school, but she had no time for me.

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[UNKNOWN]: She was super cute, and she didn't give me attention until we got into grad school.

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[UNKNOWN]: And then,

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[UNKNOWN]: We went to lunch in the rest of history, but Memphis has always been home, we briefly lived in Houston and then in DC and travel all over the world, but eventually came back to Memphis.

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[UNKNOWN]: What was the contributing factor parents employment lies that made you move and go all over the place?

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, so I didn't travel until I was with the State Department or the place.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I traveled a lot overseas, just personal interest in travel.

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[UNKNOWN]: So if you used to in DC, it was not during your trip.

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[UNKNOWN]: Correct.

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[UNKNOWN]: That's in our childhood.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I should have clarified.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, that was later on.

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[UNKNOWN]: But the rest of the time was in Memphis.

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[UNKNOWN]: Oh, okay.

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[UNKNOWN]: My mom's a nurse, my dad did different kinds of sales.

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[UNKNOWN]: So we were pretty stable in Memphis.

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[UNKNOWN]: Tell me about the late teens of kind of the transition into going to Mexico and doing the halfway.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

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[UNKNOWN]: Because like, did you graduate high school and then go do that?

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[UNKNOWN]: That's right.

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[UNKNOWN]: So when I was in high school, my church took a trip to Venezuela to support another partner church down there.

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[UNKNOWN]: So we went to Caracas and Barquise Meto.

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[UNKNOWN]: And the second year I went, there was this leader of the organization that was there, who was there temporarily.

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[UNKNOWN]: And she was running these trips, but her real vision was to support these women in Reinoza.

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[UNKNOWN]: And I was 17 at the time, and me and my friends heard the story of this person who was in her mid-20s, I think, and had this fascinating vision for helping these people in a place where no one would have anything to do with them.

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[UNKNOWN]: So, there's this red light district in Renoza that is just a few minutes from the border.

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[UNKNOWN]: And her vision was to go and help the women who are in this red light district who have largely been completely neglected by anyone in that community because they're in the sex trade.

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[UNKNOWN]: Now, that community would look at them as they're in prostitution.

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[UNKNOWN]: And they've chosen this and they're dirty in all these kinds of things that would make them want to have nothing to do with the women that were there.

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[UNKNOWN]: And so this woman or name was Kelly.

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[UNKNOWN]: she didn't feel that was right and she felt that they deserved dignity and hope and that we should actually go to those people rather than ignore them or discredit them.

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[UNKNOWN]: So she did and crazy story.

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[UNKNOWN]: She went to Rinoza by herself.

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[UNKNOWN]: and lived there and didn't even go into that red light district for nine months.

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[UNKNOWN]: She walked around the outside of the perimeter of this red light district by herself every day for nine months and prayed for the people inside.

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[UNKNOWN]: And so the guys at the gate or cartel, the guys on the inside or cartel, and they have a veneer of authenticity because they've got local police who are there that are keeping trouble from finding its way into this red light district.

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[UNKNOWN]: So, there's a lot of power and danger there, and she went by herself, no support, what's unmarried at the time, that her matter has been, and they lived there for some years afterwards and took out really dangerous, and her mission was to serve those women, that she was laser-focused on it.

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[UNKNOWN]: Well eventually these cartel guys, Sierra Walker, and they're like, hey, Gringa, what are you doing?

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[UNKNOWN]: What are you doing out here and they're cutting up with her a little bit, and so she gives her right back.

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[UNKNOWN]: She just cuts up with them a little bit, and she makes friends with these cartel guys.

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[UNKNOWN]: And then she eventually gets invited in and meets all these women and hangs out with them and gives them haircuts and does their nails and gives them pedicures and makes them feel like they have value and they're beautiful.

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[UNKNOWN]: And so she became super popular in there among everyone because the cartels it was beneficial for them.

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[UNKNOWN]: because the women weren't a pain to them anymore as much.

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[UNKNOWN]: They weren't upset.

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[UNKNOWN]: They weren't as frustrated or they weren't feeling a sense of pressure from these people who their morale was lifted because of Kelly and so they loved her.

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[UNKNOWN]: It was still very dangerous.

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[UNKNOWN]: I mean, these are MS-13.

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[UNKNOWN]: I think this is the game that controlled it, but they had their buddies in there from other rival gangs as well.

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[UNKNOWN]: Interestingly, the labor to build this halfway house and her vision was pretty expensive.

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[UNKNOWN]: You would think that's not the case, but for someone who doesn't have a lot of money it is.

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[UNKNOWN]: And so we kept in touch with her and she said, once she come down and help us build it.

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[UNKNOWN]: And so we would drive to Mexico on spring break or fall break or whenever.

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[UNKNOWN]: Phil Piccar, get my mom's Honda.

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[UNKNOWN]: and we drive 16 hours to Rinoza and spend my days poor and concrete in Rinoza.

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[UNKNOWN]: Tull per build this place at a night, she take us in there.

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[UNKNOWN]: and we'd sit at a bar in a cartel control bar with all these gang members around us and they are just loving her.

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[UNKNOWN]: She's the delight of this place and so we would get to experience you know, sort of the see the inside and we don't have a word for this.

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[UNKNOWN]: I didn't know to call this sex trafficking.

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[UNKNOWN]: I didn't understand the coercion element and the force and the fraud and the things that went into keeping those people there.

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[UNKNOWN]: It was a told later that I figured this out, but that was my first observation of the criminal underworld in sex trafficking.

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[UNKNOWN]: And do you think that there was maybe a subconscious seed planted that, you know, it's kind of that turns into the snapshot of your entire life, really, or especially what you're doing now, is that, does that stem from what you experience there?

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, without a doubt.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I don't think any of that is a coincidence.

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[UNKNOWN]: So, it put me on a trajectory for the rest of my career early.

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[UNKNOWN]: There was one note of you witnessing an assault in that window of time.

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[UNKNOWN]: Can you kind of walk us through that?

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, those weren't uncommon.

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[UNKNOWN]: So violence was used to course people into doing what they wanted.

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[UNKNOWN]: And so when a single woman get hit for, I don't know what she did, I have no idea, but observe this and then she recoil and go back into the room that she had after she was told what to do.

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[UNKNOWN]: It was in Spanish, I didn't know any Spanish at the time.

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[UNKNOWN]: But I observe this and thought, well, I don't fully understand what's happening here, but I think it's related to her having to continue to meet people that are coming in at night to pay to see her.

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[UNKNOWN]: So these were early observations that later on, I reflected on and thought, oh, okay, well, this was coercion through violence for the sex trade.

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[UNKNOWN]: and seeing it in real life will, it's very different than an academic approach to understanding it.

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[UNKNOWN]: You see it happen and think, okay, well, that's clearly wrong, but I'm not going to do about it.

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[UNKNOWN]: I can't do anything about it.

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[UNKNOWN]: So in that moment, what did you do?

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[UNKNOWN]: Nothing?

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[UNKNOWN]: No, nothing.

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[UNKNOWN]: You have no power there.

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[UNKNOWN]: That's their turf.

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[UNKNOWN]: But Kelly had a long-term vision for that place.

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[UNKNOWN]: and issue a successful.

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[UNKNOWN]: She succeeded in getting a lot of these women out of there with the agrient agreement of the cartels, which took incredible finessing.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I can imagine, I mean, that's a dangerous even attempt to metal and something like that.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, that's their money.

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[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

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[UNKNOWN]: So from that point in your life, until going into college and then ultimately the State Department, was that the catalyst that made you want to go into that line of work or if not what was?

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[UNKNOWN]: There were multiple moments where I encountered those.

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[UNKNOWN]: saw the same thing, saw young girls, really young girls, who were being sold for sex in Kathmandu.

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[UNKNOWN]: We had a guy approach us on the street and I knew enough about sex trafficking and at the time to understand what was being offered to me.

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[UNKNOWN]: We had a guy approach us on the street who said, hey, you want some message, no man, do you want to offer all these kinds of things, you said you want girls.

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[UNKNOWN]: And I thought, let's see what this is.

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[UNKNOWN]: He said, yeah, what do you have?

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[UNKNOWN]: He said, follow me.

19:11.127 --> 19:15.452
[UNKNOWN]: So my buddy looks at me and says, oh, we're going to go and I said, let's just see.

19:16.173 --> 19:25.544
[UNKNOWN]: So we follow this guy through these backstreets, a catman do, he brings us up these flights of stairs and we sit on this couch and we're sitting there just waiting to see what's going to happen.

19:25.564 --> 19:29.148
[UNKNOWN]: And in walks this, we're going to see what's going to happen.

19:29.348 --> 19:32.432
[UNKNOWN]: older lady who I later learned is called a madam.

19:32.512 --> 19:34.033
[UNKNOWN]: She's responsible for this brothel.

19:35.034 --> 19:40.160
[UNKNOWN]: And a door opens and hit her on girls walk out that you can just select from.

19:41.621 --> 19:43.724
[UNKNOWN]: And probably half of them were kids.

19:45.145 --> 19:45.806
[UNKNOWN]: It was that easy.

19:45.986 --> 19:48.349
[UNKNOWN]: It was in two seconds on a Napoli Street.

19:48.369 --> 19:51.091
[UNKNOWN]: You can say yes to someone that will take you to go find kids.

19:52.991 --> 19:59.153
[UNKNOWN]: And obviously, we just left, you know, we're, I think, sitting for us, right, but it wasn't hard to find.

19:59.293 --> 20:12.978
[UNKNOWN]: And so I reflect on this, and I pick up a book called Sex Traffking inside the Business of Modern Slavery about that specific part of the world in part, Nepal and India, right by a guy named Siddharth Kara, who's a brilliant economist.

20:14.178 --> 20:17.359
[UNKNOWN]: And he wrote on the economics of slavery.

20:19.735 --> 20:31.300
[UNKNOWN]: He covers it at the micro-economic level of the actual cost of running a sex trafficking operation, as well as the macro-economic implications on society, to fascinating book.

20:32.901 --> 20:35.382
[UNKNOWN]: So I had these experiences right one after another.

20:35.462 --> 20:37.563
[UNKNOWN]: I experienced a Nepal and then I pick up the book.

20:38.584 --> 20:46.047
[UNKNOWN]: And then from there I just went down a rabbit hole of really understanding this and seeing if this is something that I wanted to make a career about.

20:47.410 --> 20:51.354
[UNKNOWN]: How did that lead to college and then into the state department?

20:53.256 --> 20:58.542
[UNKNOWN]: I was an international relations major in a or my undergraduate thesis on sex trafficking.

21:00.104 --> 21:03.367
[UNKNOWN]: And then by this point, I had some people that I considered heroes.

21:04.348 --> 21:07.512
[UNKNOWN]: They spent a lot of their life trying to help people not be slaves.

21:09.329 --> 21:12.032
[UNKNOWN]: And one of them is a guy named Gary Hogan.

21:12.433 --> 21:14.535
[UNKNOWN]: He founded International Justice Mission.

21:15.936 --> 21:18.199
[UNKNOWN]: And then set off car both decide to be lawyers.

21:19.761 --> 21:22.904
[UNKNOWN]: And I thought it seems like a good thing to do.

21:22.924 --> 21:25.387
[UNKNOWN]: It seemed something I'm interested in, so into law school.

21:26.977 --> 21:34.082
[UNKNOWN]: So it seems like the kind of purpose of law school was to get further involved in that correct.

21:34.282 --> 21:34.782
[UNKNOWN]: Right.

21:35.423 --> 21:37.845
[UNKNOWN]: So you went through law school and then joined the State Department?

21:37.945 --> 21:38.225
[UNKNOWN]: I did.

21:38.685 --> 21:47.051
[UNKNOWN]: So I showed up on day one and they all asked, well why are you here and everyone comes in with these notions of what they want to be when they graduate one day.

21:47.531 --> 21:49.913
[UNKNOWN]: And those change over three years, as anyone's dreams do,

21:51.306 --> 22:01.151
[UNKNOWN]: But I had a law professor that gave me some good nature ribbing, and he said, OK, so you're here to work against the modern slave trade, is that right?

22:01.171 --> 22:05.573
[UNKNOWN]: And I said, yeah, so we'll see if that's the case in three years when we get to graduation.

22:05.653 --> 22:10.616
[UNKNOWN]: And he's there, and I come up to him and say, hey, professor, still here, man.

22:11.016 --> 22:12.577
[UNKNOWN]: Still doing it, you laughed.

22:14.805 --> 22:15.906
[UNKNOWN]: That was my vision all the way through.

22:17.026 --> 22:21.529
[UNKNOWN]: I sat out to use my law degree for that reason.

22:21.569 --> 22:24.470
[UNKNOWN]: Got a chance to do it a bit during law school as well.

22:24.670 --> 22:30.653
[UNKNOWN]: So, can you share the during law school kind of what you got involved in?

22:30.673 --> 22:37.096
[UNKNOWN]: Because that's fairly a typical lesson and that usually people wait until they have a law degree and maybe have some

22:37.856 --> 22:44.480
[UNKNOWN]: years under their belt before they're kind of getting involved in something that kind of dynamic.

22:44.940 --> 22:50.263
[UNKNOWN]: What was the driving force and how did it come to fruition while you're in law school?

22:50.923 --> 22:52.544
[UNKNOWN]: Also already getting involved.

22:53.204 --> 22:54.085
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I'm impatient.

22:55.225 --> 22:56.346
[UNKNOWN]: I'm not a patient person.

22:58.727 --> 22:59.628
[UNKNOWN]: My wife will tell you that.

23:00.268 --> 23:01.128
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I'm not patient.

23:01.629 --> 23:02.849
[UNKNOWN]: And it meant a lot to me.

23:02.869 --> 23:03.710
[UNKNOWN]: I would have challenged.

23:04.390 --> 23:05.291
[UNKNOWN]: and get bored easily.

23:05.651 --> 23:08.312
[UNKNOWN]: And so I wanted to just get into it.

23:08.873 --> 23:16.577
[UNKNOWN]: And you can't practice law without a law degree and passing the bar obviously, right?

23:17.357 --> 23:29.264
[UNKNOWN]: But what you can do is you can go to your legislator to, hey, I would like you to introduce these bills to strengthen our anti-trafficking laws in our state.

23:29.865 --> 23:32.926
[UNKNOWN]: As your constituent, this is important to me, would you consider this?

23:34.147 --> 23:39.949
[UNKNOWN]: So, there's this framework for this non-profit called shared open or national that had a I forget many points.

23:39.989 --> 23:50.992
[UNKNOWN]: It was like 40 point framework for what it means to really have it locked in at the state level for anti-trafficking a lot touches on a whole bunch of parts of the state code I said, let's go after this.

23:51.032 --> 23:52.033
[UNKNOWN]: Let's tackle this thing.

23:52.413 --> 23:55.934
[UNKNOWN]: Let's get the best score in all 50 states.

23:56.114 --> 23:56.854
[UNKNOWN]: Let's be number one.

23:57.294 --> 23:57.755
[UNKNOWN]: We're going to do it.

23:57.775 --> 23:58.595
[UNKNOWN]: Let's not do it halfway.

23:59.275 --> 24:00.675
[UNKNOWN]: What do you guys think, is that they're like, yeah.

24:01.296 --> 24:09.418
[UNKNOWN]: So I met this guy named Jim Kohli, and he's since past, but he then introduced me to a whole bunch of other people in the Tennessee General Assembly.

24:10.738 --> 24:14.700
[UNKNOWN]: Right-and-left, the public-and-democrat were about this, which was really cool.

24:14.720 --> 24:15.940
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, how often does that happen?

24:16.300 --> 24:16.980
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, hardly ever.

24:17.100 --> 24:17.940
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, it's very rare.

24:18.341 --> 24:22.862
[UNKNOWN]: But we had sponsors on both sides of the aisle,

24:23.542 --> 24:48.978
[UNKNOWN]: that we're about this and so we got very little pushback from anyone in the general assembly aside from vits and very nuanced things but there was a enormous amount of support for it which I attribute to our success and over the next four to five years we completely overhauled Tennessee's state anti-trafficking laws and now it's one of the if not still the highest scoring

24:50.977 --> 24:51.698
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, that's amazing.

24:52.558 --> 24:59.043
[UNKNOWN]: All right, so you get your law degree, you finish law school, you wind up in the state department.

24:59.083 --> 25:12.253
[UNKNOWN]: Now, I think most would maybe assume that if your goal is that is to go into, say, the FBI or something, more law enforcement oriented to kind of further this passion of yours.

25:12.273 --> 25:14.875
[UNKNOWN]: What made you pick the state department over doing something like that?

25:16.816 --> 25:17.857
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I applied.

25:19.729 --> 25:21.590
[UNKNOWN]: to a few at the same time.

25:21.670 --> 25:26.154
[UNKNOWN]: So I've played at the TBI, the agency, FBI, in the State Department.

25:26.594 --> 25:28.635
[UNKNOWN]: And I just said, I'm going to go ahead or fix me out first.

25:28.935 --> 25:30.016
[UNKNOWN]: Oh, OK.

25:30.096 --> 25:33.979
[UNKNOWN]: I didn't really have a goal other than, I wanted to try something different.

25:34.459 --> 25:37.682
[UNKNOWN]: At that point, I'd done law school, I'd work for non-profit.

25:38.162 --> 25:39.343
[UNKNOWN]: I did the, um,

25:39.943 --> 25:49.768
[UNKNOWN]: the company, the tech company rescue forensics, and then I thought I want to go into government for a while, get some new skills, try some new things, some of these investigate human trafficking, which would be great.

25:50.889 --> 26:01.414
[UNKNOWN]: Some of them are involved in it in policy, or there are some other jobs I looked at, but state picked me up first, and if I had to go back and do it over again, I would have done it this way 10 times out of 10.

26:02.475 --> 26:03.956
[UNKNOWN]: I loved that job.

26:04.216 --> 26:05.396
[UNKNOWN]: It was a great experience,

26:08.552 --> 26:21.261
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, can you walk us through the career generally speaking state department lines like what where you're first say duty station or assignment laws and kind of go through that?

26:22.002 --> 26:28.866
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, it's kind of an open secret in the federal government that the state department has a law enforcement security arm.

26:29.527 --> 26:34.150
[UNKNOWN]: Most people don't know this, they think, you know, there's FBI and there's Homeland Security.

26:35.311 --> 26:45.416
[UNKNOWN]: The dual max security service is a really cool place to work because you're dualized sworn as both a federal agent and a diplomat.

26:46.436 --> 26:58.802
[UNKNOWN]: So you're part of the foreign service and you're under the job code of the foreign service rather than in 1811 like you would be in the United States as a GS employee.

27:00.596 --> 27:06.341
[UNKNOWN]: And your first assignment is, with some exceptions, going to be domestic doing investigations.

27:07.001 --> 27:13.806
[UNKNOWN]: You're going to go and be assigned to a field office and you're going to do a split, depending on where you are of investigations and protection.

27:13.886 --> 27:21.032
[UNKNOWN]: So their mission is to protect persons property and information under the authority of the State Department.

27:21.092 --> 27:22.473
[UNKNOWN]: So that's embassy's consulates.

27:22.993 --> 27:24.214
[UNKNOWN]: That's diplomats.

27:24.435 --> 27:26.156
[UNKNOWN]: That's anyone under chief of mission authority.

27:27.057 --> 27:28.598
[UNKNOWN]: Foreign dignitaries, heads of states.

27:31.050 --> 27:34.451
[UNKNOWN]: But it also is protection of the travel documents of the passport and visas.

27:34.551 --> 27:38.352
[UNKNOWN]: And so any abuse of those falls into the authority of the State Department.

27:39.332 --> 27:46.034
[UNKNOWN]: So your first tour, you're going to be either jumping off to protection anywhere in the world.

27:46.054 --> 27:46.694
[UNKNOWN]: It can be local.

27:46.894 --> 27:51.035
[UNKNOWN]: So if you're in New York, you're going to do United Nations General Assembly, for example, Iran's coming to you.

27:51.515 --> 27:52.675
[UNKNOWN]: And so you're going to be on a detail.

27:52.835 --> 27:55.276
[UNKNOWN]: Like it's the Secret Service, a equivalent for the State Department.

27:55.296 --> 27:56.596
[UNKNOWN]: All right, you got the pig tail and all that.

28:01.614 --> 28:06.236
[UNKNOWN]: Field office that doesn't have as many protectees, you're going to be doing a lot more investigations.

28:06.316 --> 28:10.518
[UNKNOWN]: And so I was in the Houston, Texas Field office, and we did a lot of human trafficking investigations.

28:11.318 --> 28:13.679
[UNKNOWN]: What, that was your first assignment?

28:13.799 --> 28:14.200
[UNKNOWN]: It was.

28:15.480 --> 28:27.545
[UNKNOWN]: Before you get there, I am curious that the pipeline training lies, is it the standard, fletzy, federal kind of pipeline where you go there first, and then you do specialized state department stuff or do they have their own thing?

28:27.625 --> 28:30.667
[UNKNOWN]: That's right, yeah, you're down in Georgia, good old Georgia.

28:30.707 --> 28:30.907
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

28:31.327 --> 28:42.991
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, so you're done at Fletzzy, and do your initial training there, and then you go over to basic special agent school, so B-SAC, or basic special agent course, and it's fallen trains.

28:43.031 --> 28:54.135
[UNKNOWN]: That's where you go all the motorcade stuff, that's where you get all the protection, and you get investigations as well, how they want you to do it at state, but that's where you're going to get all of your real-bread butter for how to protect people.

28:54.355 --> 28:55.195
[UNKNOWN]: And how long is that?

28:55.916 --> 28:57.757
[UNKNOWN]: Three and a half months in it.

28:58.057 --> 29:00.378
[UNKNOWN]: I know you didn't go through the Secret Service pipeline.

29:00.398 --> 29:04.560
[UNKNOWN]: There's, I just had a guy on a few days ago that did that same thing.

29:04.580 --> 29:07.502
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, it sounds like a pretty paralleled path.

29:07.582 --> 29:14.805
[UNKNOWN]: Do you know kind of the difference between the State Department's course and the Secret Service course?

29:14.825 --> 29:17.227
[UNKNOWN]: Because it sounds like you cover almost the exact same stuff.

29:18.127 --> 29:23.972
[UNKNOWN]: I don't imagine there's a lot of overlap, there's principles of protection that are universal no matter who's or teaching them to.

29:24.352 --> 29:25.793
[UNKNOWN]: I'm sure there's tactical differences.

29:26.354 --> 29:30.337
[UNKNOWN]: I haven't been to their course, so I don't know, but I don't imagine there's a lot of similarities.

29:30.377 --> 29:30.597
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

29:32.198 --> 29:36.562
[UNKNOWN]: So going through that training to things, surprise you that you kind of weren't expecting.

29:41.753 --> 29:52.696
[UNKNOWN]: The thing that really surprised me is that you can show up day one at the field office and be on a jump seat out to a secretary detail and you can be the limo driver.

29:53.717 --> 30:02.860
[UNKNOWN]: So you can be week one coming out of academy and if they say, all right, listen, Mike, you're going tomorrow to Bogotá and you're going to protect the secretary.

30:02.880 --> 30:02.940
[UNKNOWN]: Oh.

30:03.620 --> 30:06.461
[UNKNOWN]: We're going to put you in the limo, you can be driving

30:07.784 --> 30:21.125
[UNKNOWN]: someone from the the highest levels of our government driving their armored vehicle and week one coming out of academy and that's uh... it's a heavy responsibility it is did that did that happen to you um... i drove for television

30:23.775 --> 30:25.958
[UNKNOWN]: I drove for some other people to a drove for the daily ones.

30:26.098 --> 30:26.438
[UNKNOWN]: What's that?

30:26.458 --> 30:28.141
[UNKNOWN]: The Xon former Xon.

30:28.161 --> 30:28.681
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

30:28.821 --> 30:29.662
[UNKNOWN]: No doubt.

30:29.763 --> 30:37.512
[UNKNOWN]: So, I was in different parts of the detail for others, but as a driver, I was a driver for television.

30:37.933 --> 30:38.273
[UNKNOWN]: He was in.

30:38.553 --> 30:39.515
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, that's wild.

30:39.535 --> 30:40.216
[UNKNOWN]: He's a funny guy.

30:40.336 --> 30:40.516
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

30:41.477 --> 31:07.370
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, a fun fact actually worked for Exxon, while he was the CEO for about a year when I first got out of the military, yeah, never met him, but he seemed like a pretty unique and pretty cool dude, but in that Houston office, kind of getting your dipping your toe into the first, you know, going from being an observer of these terrible things to now being in a position to do something about it.

31:08.330 --> 31:13.932
[UNKNOWN]: What's going through your mind and can you kind of walk us through some of the things that you did while you're at that office?

31:14.452 --> 31:27.696
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I showed up at the Houston Field Office and there's an agent there who was responsible for the human trafficking presence at the Houston human trafficking task force and Kate Langston.

31:28.515 --> 31:39.200
[UNKNOWN]: And I basically, that be lying to her and I said, hey, I understand you choose who gets to help you with these human trafficking investigations, I would love to raise my hand for this.

31:40.060 --> 31:49.584
[UNKNOWN]: And she said, great, come on, and so me and a couple other guys that were new out of academy got into some of the human trafficking investigations and the task force there.

31:50.527 --> 32:03.358
[UNKNOWN]: they are running and going and they are working these cases in their aggressive and so that was years ago but I got a chance to from really weak one be plugged into some interesting human trafficking cases.

32:03.818 --> 32:08.862
[UNKNOWN]: Are there any that stand out that you can share of kind of a full-blown success story?

32:09.222 --> 32:10.083
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, there's two.

32:11.024 --> 32:12.265
[UNKNOWN]: There's a labor trafficking one.

32:13.670 --> 32:17.531
[UNKNOWN]: There's this couple that lived in South Lake, so not far from here.

32:19.032 --> 32:34.297
[UNKNOWN]: And when they were Geneian nationals, and the husband was the son of a former Prime Minister, President, for yet which role, but he was the son of former leadership.

32:35.594 --> 32:36.355
[UNKNOWN]: in his home country.

32:36.716 --> 32:50.633
[UNKNOWN]: And they moved to South Lake, got the nice house in the suburbs, but before they did, they went and got this ten-year-old girl that they brought over from Africa to stay with them as...

32:51.814 --> 33:01.196
[UNKNOWN]: Effectively a slave she was not allowed to leave the house she worked all day every day seven days a week She was never paid she never went to school.

33:01.817 --> 33:14.940
[UNKNOWN]: They brought over when she was ten years old and she was there for I think it was 16 years And she was beaten with bolts physically beaten verbally abused She was kicked out of the house at times.

33:14.980 --> 33:15.960
[UNKNOWN]: I just sleep in a park and

33:17.244 --> 33:25.604
[UNKNOWN]: And most people don't expect that this would ever happen in the United States, much less in a nice suburban neighborhood in Texas.

33:27.895 --> 33:30.056
[UNKNOWN]: But neighbors eventually thought this is pretty weird.

33:30.797 --> 33:31.477
[UNKNOWN]: Who is this girl?

33:31.537 --> 33:33.018
[UNKNOWN]: Why is she not in school?

33:33.138 --> 33:35.579
[UNKNOWN]: Why is she here all the time?

33:35.599 --> 33:36.540
[UNKNOWN]: She always looks sad.

33:37.400 --> 33:41.382
[UNKNOWN]: And so they actually intervened and called the authorities.

33:41.442 --> 33:46.705
[UNKNOWN]: I think they called locals first and then it became federal.

33:47.585 --> 33:50.267
[UNKNOWN]: Because they were using visa documents to bring her over as a slave.

33:50.527 --> 33:53.309
[UNKNOWN]: So that's the state department access for investigation.

33:56.630 --> 34:02.775
[UNKNOWN]: person who is completely unaware of her rights, she doesn't have any idea who'd even asked for help.

34:04.376 --> 34:11.682
[UNKNOWN]: And eventually this couple is arrested and they're done seven years, I don't know if they're out now, I guess it was a while ago, they're probably close to it.

34:13.103 --> 34:20.329
[UNKNOWN]: They did seven years each, the husband and the wife for trafficking this young girl into basically labor slavery.

34:21.390 --> 34:22.291
[UNKNOWN]: What happened to the girl?

34:26.346 --> 34:27.988
[UNKNOWN]: Out comes go for someone like her.

34:31.091 --> 34:34.834
[UNKNOWN]: Last I knew I think that she had some good options ahead of her.

34:35.375 --> 34:36.596
[UNKNOWN]: She had a lot of restitution.

34:38.522 --> 34:42.845
[UNKNOWN]: I think it's like a quarter million dollars of restitution, and that's not going to set up for life.

34:42.985 --> 34:46.128
[UNKNOWN]: But as far as these things go, that's pretty good.

34:47.869 --> 34:55.215
[UNKNOWN]: And I think that she had a lot of really great resources that were set up for her after she got out.

34:55.295 --> 35:02.180
[UNKNOWN]: So, I mean, think about her position, she hasn't had any schooling, she doesn't know how to live in the modern world, she's not in the United States by herself.

35:06.143 --> 35:08.765
[UNKNOWN]: social workers who helped get her up to speed.

35:08.805 --> 35:13.008
[UNKNOWN]: And so last time I saw her was that the trial where she testified.

35:13.508 --> 35:14.429
[UNKNOWN]: Talk about courage, man.

35:14.649 --> 35:14.869
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

35:15.209 --> 35:18.912
[UNKNOWN]: What it takes to testify against people that did that to you.

35:19.452 --> 35:24.736
[UNKNOWN]: And then not knowing what's going to happen because if they're not convicted, you're going to have a bad time.

35:24.956 --> 35:25.236
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

35:25.336 --> 35:25.537
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

35:26.357 --> 35:30.300
[UNKNOWN]: Um, so obviously she wasn't returned to Africa, right?

35:34.269 --> 35:41.297
[UNKNOWN]: which was naturalized adopted, like, I don't know how the government would even sift through how to handle that.

35:41.477 --> 35:42.478
[UNKNOWN]: Do you know what happened?

35:42.858 --> 35:44.140
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know her immigration status.

35:44.160 --> 35:46.282
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know what happened since then.

35:46.302 --> 35:47.283
[UNKNOWN]: So this has been years ago.

35:47.303 --> 35:52.208
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know if she was given some kind of

35:54.941 --> 36:06.905
[UNKNOWN]: Immigration status that will allow her to continue to live here and recognize her victim status so that can happen But the last I spoke to her I think she continued to stay here in Texas, so

36:08.202 --> 36:23.467
[UNKNOWN]: I think the, where I guess I would ask is, is that fairly common for people in your position where you're working a case and, and there is a good outcome like that that you don't really, or not really allowed to keep track of kind of what happens afterwards?

36:24.247 --> 36:28.689
[UNKNOWN]: Part of it was I moved on to my next assignment and part of it is just proprietary.

36:30.289 --> 36:47.158
[UNKNOWN]: sort of appropriate as a federal agent keeping arms distance from, you know, people who are victims of a crime that your job is to investigate it and support them, but the actual support beyond that is not something that is part of your purview.

36:47.398 --> 36:51.000
[UNKNOWN]: So, we really did all we could to support her.

36:51.120 --> 36:54.742
[UNKNOWN]: I think the case agent that was responsible for this estate in touch with her,

36:55.702 --> 37:01.226
[UNKNOWN]: And I'd be interested actually to get an update on that, but yeah, I didn't stay in touch with her.

37:01.386 --> 37:07.191
[UNKNOWN]: So you mentioned, you know, people would wonder how that that's even possible.

37:07.211 --> 37:19.460
[UNKNOWN]: And I mean, I would take it a step further and that I'm curious if you have an answer to how that's even possible for it to happen here in the United States where it's essentially a retired diplomat, right?

37:20.340 --> 37:26.942
[UNKNOWN]: And, you know, there is a visa process, like how would they have even been able to accomplish that, do you know?

37:28.222 --> 37:30.363
[UNKNOWN]: Yes, so many people apply for visas every year.

37:30.803 --> 37:37.045
[UNKNOWN]: And if you do it in a way that creates trust for the State Department, they look at your application.

37:37.085 --> 37:38.485
[UNKNOWN]: I think, all right, everything here looks good.

37:39.166 --> 37:43.087
[UNKNOWN]: There's no follow-up beyond that unless you're an overstay.

37:43.747 --> 37:44.447
[UNKNOWN]: And that's what she was.

37:44.487 --> 37:45.668
[UNKNOWN]: So she was an overseas.

37:45.688 --> 37:47.509
[UNKNOWN]: She came over with a tourist visa and they just kept her here.

37:48.369 --> 37:51.991
[UNKNOWN]: So after that happens, there's no system to really keep track of her.

37:52.511 --> 37:56.373
[UNKNOWN]: You can't really go find her very easily, right?

37:56.393 --> 37:58.554
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, they could see that she's an overseas status.

37:58.914 --> 38:00.575
[UNKNOWN]: Here's her residence of record, right?

38:00.595 --> 38:01.515
[UNKNOWN]: They could do those kinds of things.

38:01.535 --> 38:05.057
[UNKNOWN]: But the system is overwhelmed with overseas.

38:05.891 --> 38:28.069
[UNKNOWN]: So from your perspective as somebody who's kind of gone through that whole process combating things like that, is there a solution, I know there's not a perfect or maybe even a good solution, but with something like, okay, if we know that the system is so overwhelmed that we can't even keep track of things like this from happening and or prevent them.

38:28.769 --> 38:36.638
[UNKNOWN]: maybe we should limit the amount of visas that are allowed so that we we only allow the ones that we can make sure that are being handled right is that realistic or not?

38:36.978 --> 38:37.879
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, it's a good question.

38:37.919 --> 38:38.500
[UNKNOWN]: It's scale.

38:38.820 --> 38:39.241
[UNKNOWN]: I think it.

38:40.468 --> 38:42.129
[UNKNOWN]: We have a responsibility to manage that.

38:42.309 --> 38:49.831
[UNKNOWN]: Our consular has a responsibility to make sure that we're only letting in people who are going to abide by the rules, right?

38:50.652 --> 38:53.153
[UNKNOWN]: And in this case, shed no idea.

38:53.173 --> 38:54.073
[UNKNOWN]: She's a child, right?

38:54.093 --> 38:57.854
[UNKNOWN]: But her sponsors, the broader over, are fully intended to not abide by the rules.

38:58.474 --> 38:59.115
[UNKNOWN]: I think there should be,

39:00.115 --> 39:13.283
[UNKNOWN]: a lot of more oversight of overstays because that's how this began she was an overstay and there's no oversight so she's allowed to be in this position for 16 years without anyone looking into it.

39:13.443 --> 39:15.484
[UNKNOWN]: Oh wow so she was 26 when this finally.

39:15.504 --> 39:18.266
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah she was an adult 16 years.

39:18.286 --> 39:23.789
[UNKNOWN]: She came over to she was like 9 or 10 you know in Africa sometimes birth years it's hard to to really know

39:27.931 --> 39:30.352
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, that's a disheartening to say at least.

39:30.493 --> 39:33.674
[UNKNOWN]: Do you know if it's if the system is any better now than it was then?

39:34.555 --> 39:34.895
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know.

39:35.115 --> 39:35.755
[UNKNOWN]: It's a good question.

39:35.815 --> 39:36.015
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

39:36.315 --> 39:37.216
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

39:37.956 --> 39:43.839
[UNKNOWN]: They do have a note about dark web fraud and a cryptocurrency thing and it was that in that same window of time as an agent there.

39:44.199 --> 39:44.860
[UNKNOWN]: It was, yeah.

39:44.900 --> 39:54.885
[UNKNOWN]: So I investigated the labor trafficking case, a really interesting sex trafficking case, and then we were also responsible for any kind of passport fraud.

39:55.685 --> 40:11.128
[UNKNOWN]: So there's a guy who was using US passports to open bank accounts, which is really common, because passport fraud is tough for banks to manage, at least it used to be, probably with AI and detection tools now.

40:11.428 --> 40:22.371
[UNKNOWN]: I imagine a lot easier to identify some of these markings, but when I was there in 2017, banks had a hard time with this, especially local credit unions.

40:23.111 --> 40:25.812
[UNKNOWN]: They just didn't have the sophistication to identify from a passport.

40:25.832 --> 40:30.895
[UNKNOWN]: Now a license or a birth certificate or something more universally used identity documents.

40:32.616 --> 40:34.317
[UNKNOWN]: Those are tougher, but passports.

40:35.468 --> 40:37.630
[UNKNOWN]: Criminals would get those through doing fraud all the time.

40:38.531 --> 40:40.173
[UNKNOWN]: So I was investigating this guy out of Atlanta.

40:40.853 --> 40:46.879
[UNKNOWN]: And we go do a warrant on his place, recover tons of stuff out of his apartment.

40:46.939 --> 40:50.843
[UNKNOWN]: He's doing credit card fraud in the hundreds of thousands of dollars a month.

40:51.244 --> 40:54.146
[UNKNOWN]: And so we get all this card readers.

40:54.186 --> 40:55.067
[UNKNOWN]: And we get all of this.

40:56.095 --> 40:57.837
[UNKNOWN]: physical documents which include passports.

40:59.218 --> 41:00.720
[UNKNOWN]: And I ask him where you get this stuff.

41:01.341 --> 41:03.002
[UNKNOWN]: And so he just comes clean.

41:03.183 --> 41:05.065
[UNKNOWN]: Some of these guys just come totally clean.

41:06.606 --> 41:08.829
[UNKNOWN]: And there's this marketplace where they sell passports online.

41:09.970 --> 41:11.552
[UNKNOWN]: So let's start investigating this marketplace.

41:12.613 --> 41:12.733
[UNKNOWN]: And

41:13.894 --> 41:26.817
[UNKNOWN]: These guys will actually manufacture passports or they'll give you a digital copy that you can use to furnish for opening bank accounts that will fool the actual detection tools that the banks are using.

41:27.837 --> 41:32.938
[UNKNOWN]: So I got into this marketplace and got into some of these connections and purchasers and people that were involved in this.

41:33.779 --> 41:40.940
[UNKNOWN]: And I'm running down these IP addresses and I get an IP address back that I do a subpoena on

41:44.241 --> 41:45.202
[UNKNOWN]: and look at the building address.

41:45.242 --> 41:47.163
[UNKNOWN]: I'm like, no way.

41:48.224 --> 41:50.005
[UNKNOWN]: Is this, is this right?

41:50.586 --> 41:54.348
[UNKNOWN]: And I double check it with the person who provided the speed and information.

41:55.209 --> 42:00.692
[UNKNOWN]: And I look at the address and I look at the, I look at Google Maps.

42:01.093 --> 42:03.795
[UNKNOWN]: And I'm at downtown in Houston in the federal building.

42:05.035 --> 42:08.918
[UNKNOWN]: And I go out from my little cubicle, I walk down the hallway, I go to the window.

42:09.138 --> 42:10.099
[UNKNOWN]: And I can see the building.

42:11.425 --> 42:14.827
[UNKNOWN]: that is the one that has the IP address in this investigation.

42:15.367 --> 42:17.448
[UNKNOWN]: It's visually in my line of sight.

42:18.448 --> 42:21.070
[UNKNOWN]: It's just right right there by complete happenstance.

42:22.570 --> 42:27.673
[UNKNOWN]: And we end up doing a warrant on the sky in the building who was a hacker.

42:29.096 --> 42:36.282
[UNKNOWN]: and extremist sophisticated guy really smart, but his apartment was in direct line of sight from next to my cubicle.

42:36.742 --> 42:42.607
[UNKNOWN]: So that was very courteous of him to do his crime, so close to our field office.

42:42.647 --> 42:45.709
[UNKNOWN]: Was he involved in dark web and crypto stuff too?

42:45.789 --> 42:54.096
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, he was a hacker, he was involved in dark web sites and using cryptocurrency in this passport marketplace.

42:54.993 --> 43:00.515
[UNKNOWN]: Did you do any other crypto investigations while you were in any of those positions?

43:00.736 --> 43:01.396
[UNKNOWN]: No, just this one.

43:01.416 --> 43:03.637
[UNKNOWN]: This is the only case that had cryptocurrency.

43:04.597 --> 43:08.119
[UNKNOWN]: Do you have a, I guess, a general perspective on it at this point?

43:08.139 --> 43:09.259
[UNKNOWN]: I know that was a while ago.

43:09.299 --> 43:12.341
[UNKNOWN]: And it was much more dark web-ish back then.

43:12.381 --> 43:21.005
[UNKNOWN]: And now it's been adopted by so many big private equity firms and banks and then whatever that it's kind of not the same in terms of how it started.

43:21.065 --> 43:23.986
[UNKNOWN]: But do you have any thoughts on it at this point?

43:26.216 --> 43:31.478
[UNKNOWN]: I'm interested in the tokenization of money.

43:33.099 --> 43:48.488
[UNKNOWN]: I'm afraid that it took this path from being used by criminals and people who want to hide money, launders, and then you can see big banks interest in it.

43:49.767 --> 43:58.149
[UNKNOWN]: and how they privately were very interested in cryptocurrency, but publicly we're talking about how bad it is and it's not going to go anywhere.

43:59.192 --> 44:19.783
[UNKNOWN]: So you can see in banking transactions where a major banking institution will have its CEO come out and on one day say cryptocurrency is just going to zero and the next day, they're buying tons of it at this count because the price just dropped by enough that they can instantly recoup on it.

44:20.383 --> 44:22.965
[UNKNOWN]: And so they play games with it in these banking institutions.

44:23.785 --> 44:25.506
[UNKNOWN]: What I'm afraid of is the tokenization

44:30.357 --> 44:42.808
[UNKNOWN]: which you can already see conversations happening about in some of these banking circles and these like the world economic forum and these people that are trying to control the world and using cryptocurrency and blockchain is the way to do it.

44:43.389 --> 44:49.154
[UNKNOWN]: Where everything is tokenized including your money and your 401k and your real estate.

44:50.135 --> 44:56.241
[UNKNOWN]: The level of control and surveillance is far exceeding where it is right now.

44:57.701 --> 45:01.363
[UNKNOWN]: I think that without disruption, that's the path that it's on.

45:01.663 --> 45:01.843
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

45:02.704 --> 45:03.784
[UNKNOWN]: Sleep is recovery.

45:04.004 --> 45:06.786
[UNKNOWN]: I don't care how clean your diet is or how hard you're training.

45:06.966 --> 45:10.408
[UNKNOWN]: If you're waking up stiff and unrested, you're leaving a lot on the table.

45:10.748 --> 45:12.989
[UNKNOWN]: I used to chalk that up to just how it was.

45:13.409 --> 45:17.652
[UNKNOWN]: Then he looks sent me one of their mattresses and things genuinely changed.

45:18.092 --> 45:24.035
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45:27.637 --> 45:32.859
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45:33.159 --> 45:39.102
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45:39.342 --> 45:46.725
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45:47.205 --> 45:50.887
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45:51.187 --> 45:54.588
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45:54.908 --> 45:59.470
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45:59.610 --> 46:01.871
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46:02.112 --> 46:07.294
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46:07.594 --> 46:09.875
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46:11.199 --> 46:11.939
[UNKNOWN]: I don't disagree.

46:11.979 --> 46:15.321
[UNKNOWN]: It's definitely a mixed feelings on it, I guess.

46:15.862 --> 46:23.466
[UNKNOWN]: To me, it seems like the way that it started conceptually, or in theory, there were parts of it that made sense.

46:23.486 --> 46:28.248
[UNKNOWN]: It was kind of a buffer between the man and everybody else, but now, like you said, it's

46:29.389 --> 46:48.912
[UNKNOWN]: you know they start talking about digital gold or the digital U.S. dollar and there's already you know digital currency and you're up in other parts of the world where they're digitizing their own former fiat currency into this new thing that just like you said I mean it's like what's stopping them from

46:50.213 --> 46:56.577
[UNKNOWN]: controlling it, taking it, seizing it, freezing it, you know, it's a pretty pretty alarming prospect for sure.

46:57.938 --> 47:02.281
[UNKNOWN]: You did mention a sex trafficking case in that first assignment too that was pretty interesting.

47:02.481 --> 47:08.265
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, this is pretty wild, so there's this guy in Houston who is a bounty hunter.

47:09.786 --> 47:13.208
[UNKNOWN]: He was called the H. Town Hunter, guy named Luis Rodriguez.

47:15.717 --> 47:23.282
[UNKNOWN]: and by day he was this bounty hunter he's going out and doing the actual job he's looking for guys and he's just going back up and throw back in jail.

47:24.043 --> 47:31.768
[UNKNOWN]: He's got a crew, they got weapons, they got their equipment, they got the look, he's you know, posturing on Instagram and he's trying to live the life right.

47:33.769 --> 47:46.493
[UNKNOWN]: and he's smart because he really tried to get in the good grace of the community throw these Thanksgiving food events where he could show up and go play and people generally like this guy.

47:46.674 --> 47:54.536
[UNKNOWN]: So he was popular in the sense that he tried to give back to his community his Hispanic guy and that was really important to him and that was part of his culture.

47:56.997 --> 48:04.541
[UNKNOWN]: Meanwhile, he is recruiting women from Columbia to come to Houston to work in strip clubs.

48:06.101 --> 48:17.547
[UNKNOWN]: So he's bringing these women in as many as he can to the Houston area and he's charging them the cost of coming over of feeding them, housing them of daily support for them.

48:18.247 --> 48:24.490
[UNKNOWN]: And they're getting these strip clubs and they're working and they're realizing the money that they make in the strip club is not enough to pay him back.

48:27.133 --> 48:27.654
[UNKNOWN]: So what do they do?

48:27.954 --> 48:32.939
[UNKNOWN]: Well, they start having sex with the guys that come to the strip club and making additional money.

48:33.840 --> 48:35.141
[UNKNOWN]: And then he's taking all of that money.

48:35.402 --> 48:40.146
[UNKNOWN]: And so he was clever in the sense that he's not outright directly coercing them.

48:40.327 --> 48:48.435
[UNKNOWN]: You must go and have sex with this number of guys and pay me back like a lot of pimps do in the US where they'll just be outright with it.

48:48.535 --> 48:49.476
[UNKNOWN]: This is what you got to do.

48:49.496 --> 48:50.177
[UNKNOWN]: You got to go work.

48:51.262 --> 49:01.729
[UNKNOWN]: Instead, he just said, hey, now you're going to come, you're going to live here, you're going to work in the club, you're going to have a great time, you're going to be with these girls, and they trusted him, because he had this veneer of authenticity as a bounty hunter.

49:01.769 --> 49:11.775
[UNKNOWN]: He wore the badge with the chain on it, right, like not real law enforcement, but he had this perception by these girls that he can be trusted because he has all these law enforcement connections.

49:13.024 --> 49:24.493
[UNKNOWN]: So they agree, they come to the US, they're working these clubs, they realize this, and then they are afraid, and so they start making additional money by meeting up with guys from the clubs, right?

49:25.582 --> 49:28.985
[UNKNOWN]: We does this for years, and he's as the visa process to bring them in.

49:29.065 --> 49:30.606
[UNKNOWN]: So this is visa fraud.

49:31.166 --> 49:34.769
[UNKNOWN]: His state of reason for bringing them in is different than it will tap me in actuality, actuality.

49:34.789 --> 49:35.249
[UNKNOWN]: It's crime.

49:35.590 --> 49:37.972
[UNKNOWN]: This falls into the definition of sex trafficking federally.

49:38.952 --> 49:43.716
[UNKNOWN]: So this case hits the human trafficking task force.

49:44.457 --> 49:46.298
[UNKNOWN]: And it was hit from a few angles.

49:46.418 --> 49:47.639
[UNKNOWN]: There's tax fraud involved.

49:47.659 --> 49:48.580
[UNKNOWN]: So IRS was there.

49:48.700 --> 49:49.661
[UNKNOWN]: Locals were involved.

49:50.121 --> 49:51.902
[UNKNOWN]: State Department and FBI.

49:53.163 --> 49:59.350
[UNKNOWN]: And the lead agent on this was, I mentioned earlier in Kate Langston, just extremely talented federal agent.

50:00.251 --> 50:06.418
[UNKNOWN]: And this bounty hunter man, he was like, he always was burdened as surveillance.

50:07.319 --> 50:08.740
[UNKNOWN]: And I don't think that we were that bad at it.

50:09.321 --> 50:10.462
[UNKNOWN]: I think that we were okay.

50:10.482 --> 50:11.123
[UNKNOWN]: It's surveillance.

50:11.143 --> 50:12.745
[UNKNOWN]: I think that we were...

50:14.398 --> 50:16.939
[UNKNOWN]: You know, hard to detect, but he was good.

50:17.280 --> 50:22.143
[UNKNOWN]: And he, he'd walk right up to someone's car, knock on the window, and be like, I see you guys.

50:22.543 --> 50:24.824
[UNKNOWN]: He was kind of at this barato about him.

50:26.365 --> 50:28.846
[UNKNOWN]: And so we thought, all right, well, we gotta rethink this a little bit.

50:30.047 --> 50:37.331
[UNKNOWN]: And when you're looking for someone, out of buddy who's a fugitive task force guy that I brought into this operation, I said Dave, it's him, it's Dave.

50:38.352 --> 50:38.932
[UNKNOWN]: What would you do?

50:39.753 --> 50:40.733
[UNKNOWN]: How'd you get him?

50:44.746 --> 50:50.068
[UNKNOWN]: All you gotta do is go to the girl that he's going to or the girl he came from.

50:50.228 --> 50:52.369
[UNKNOWN]: So his mom or his girlfriend, right?

50:52.529 --> 50:53.549
[UNKNOWN]: Men can't help themselves.

50:54.269 --> 50:54.949
[UNKNOWN]: They're gonna do this.

50:54.969 --> 50:55.850
[UNKNOWN]: They're gonna go to one of them.

50:56.330 --> 51:07.654
[UNKNOWN]: There's a much more cross way to say that, but that's the, that's the police way to say, you know, you find one of those women and they will lead you to your subject.

51:07.674 --> 51:08.894
[UNKNOWN]: And so he gets a war in out for him.

51:09.234 --> 51:10.435
[UNKNOWN]: He's always burdened surveillance.

51:11.535 --> 51:18.620
[UNKNOWN]: And we sat in front of that guy's house through some cold mornings with the cars off and with lenses looking at his mom's house.

51:20.141 --> 51:25.624
[UNKNOWN]: And eventually one day he shows up to see Mama and we wait from to come out.

51:25.644 --> 51:30.027
[UNKNOWN]: We notice how the locals, we get a couple more guys to come in and we come out.

51:30.047 --> 51:32.529
[UNKNOWN]: We start following him and he realizes he goofed.

51:33.569 --> 51:35.590
[UNKNOWN]: He realizes he went to see Mama and he had

51:38.000 --> 51:41.281
[UNKNOWN]: And so he starts to take off, and we're feds, we're not locals.

51:41.401 --> 51:46.563
[UNKNOWN]: And so they tell you in a academy, like look, we're in a training on felony stops, but you're not going to do these.

51:46.963 --> 51:54.345
[UNKNOWN]: This isn't going to happen, but sure enough, this is like, you know, first you're out of academy, and we're in this pursuit chase with

51:55.205 --> 51:55.945
[UNKNOWN]: this trafficer.

51:56.766 --> 51:58.287
[UNKNOWN]: So eventually we roll him up.

51:59.227 --> 52:03.069
[UNKNOWN]: He stops and I think he realizes that he bit off morning consumer going into pursuit.

52:03.470 --> 52:04.710
[UNKNOWN]: More locals are showing up.

52:04.950 --> 52:06.391
[UNKNOWN]: So he's got a much squad cars there.

52:06.851 --> 52:08.812
[UNKNOWN]: And we're in this Houston neighborhood and we get out.

52:08.892 --> 52:10.133
[UNKNOWN]: We roll him up with the cuffs on him.

52:11.474 --> 52:19.058
[UNKNOWN]: We put in the back seat of our car to take him down to the court house and for for booking and you know to process him over in the field office.

52:24.460 --> 52:28.603
[UNKNOWN]: Now, you guys are FBI, said no, restate department.

52:28.743 --> 52:32.706
[UNKNOWN]: He says, oh, so you're CIA, we just said no, man.

52:33.747 --> 52:34.628
[UNKNOWN]: Restate department.

52:36.449 --> 52:40.092
[UNKNOWN]: And he can't process that the state department has arrested him.

52:40.192 --> 52:41.052
[UNKNOWN]: He doesn't understand.

52:41.973 --> 52:42.854
[UNKNOWN]: He thinks it's going to be the FBI.

52:42.934 --> 52:45.716
[UNKNOWN]: It's going to be locals or Homeland Security asked your Homeland Security.

52:45.836 --> 52:47.737
[UNKNOWN]: No, we're state department.

52:48.298 --> 52:50.099
[UNKNOWN]: And so I don't ever get this.

52:50.679 --> 52:52.100
[UNKNOWN]: We roll up to the courthouse.

52:53.182 --> 52:57.205
[UNKNOWN]: process him in and the guy that works the gate at the courthouse.

52:58.006 --> 52:59.447
[UNKNOWN]: It was his first week.

53:00.207 --> 53:04.330
[UNKNOWN]: He had not had any of our cases come over for arrest since he got started.

53:04.831 --> 53:12.116
[UNKNOWN]: So it was a different guy that normally opens up the gate to let the trucks in to process the guys that are coming in to the courthouse.

53:12.136 --> 53:15.138
[UNKNOWN]: Taking more of the courthouse for the day.

53:15.579 --> 53:19.682
[UNKNOWN]: And so it's his first day and he doesn't know who DSS is.

53:21.140 --> 53:22.922
[UNKNOWN]: because we don't do a ton of investigations.

53:23.042 --> 53:39.759
[UNKNOWN]: The ones that they do are really serious often, but we don't do a ton of them like FBI because our primary role is protection, but we also protect these documents and this is just guy he just didn't know who DSS was.

53:40.320 --> 53:41.601
[UNKNOWN]: So we pulled up to the gate.

53:43.179 --> 54:09.457
[UNKNOWN]: uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh uh

54:10.438 --> 54:19.768
[UNKNOWN]: So, I'll just say it's a little known agency within the State Department, and so when criminals get rolled up, sometimes they don't even know who we are, and this was the case for him.

54:19.908 --> 54:27.096
[UNKNOWN]: But he got 15 years for bringing these girls into the U.S., and so they really brought the hammer down on him.

54:28.356 --> 54:39.023
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, that's encouraging to hear, do you know what the reason he was using for the visa application that was allowing him to bring all these girls in?

54:39.683 --> 54:46.087
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, don't remember the stated reason some of these guys would bring them over as models or girls that would work in restaurants.

54:46.227 --> 54:47.308
[UNKNOWN]: They'd be waitresses.

54:48.208 --> 54:52.371
[UNKNOWN]: They would have something that would allow them to work at the strip clubs, and it's still...

54:53.471 --> 54:58.874
[UNKNOWN]: look like on paper like oh she's a weightress or whatever and no one's asking more questions.

54:59.414 --> 55:01.395
[UNKNOWN]: Do you know what happened to all the girls that he had brought in?

55:02.996 --> 55:06.938
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know what happened to those girls under that there were a lot of them.

55:06.958 --> 55:10.920
[UNKNOWN]: We did a raid on a strip club when we were investigating him.

55:11.880 --> 55:15.282
[UNKNOWN]: You talk about gross plays when the strip club with the lights are on.

55:16.995 --> 55:19.657
[UNKNOWN]: And everyone's separated, the music is off.

55:19.697 --> 55:21.578
[UNKNOWN]: We come in, tell the DJ, hey, turn the music off.

55:22.298 --> 55:29.022
[UNKNOWN]: We're going to start figuring out who here is legally in the United States and if they're being exploited.

55:30.663 --> 55:32.064
[UNKNOWN]: Vive change is pretty quickly.

55:32.604 --> 55:36.607
[UNKNOWN]: Move all the guys that are there for their, they're like a Friday afternoon or something.

55:36.627 --> 55:37.627
[UNKNOWN]: All right, start off there weekend.

55:39.370 --> 55:40.530
[UNKNOWN]: move all them off to the side.

55:40.590 --> 55:46.573
[UNKNOWN]: We separate all the girls and then execute the warrant and go into the back and look at the records and pull those records.

55:46.613 --> 55:49.654
[UNKNOWN]: And a lot of those girls were abroad in from Columbia.

55:50.394 --> 55:58.237
[UNKNOWN]: And so I don't know if they were repatriated or if they were given some kind of victim status for getting a visa.

55:58.417 --> 55:59.078
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

55:59.098 --> 56:01.418
[UNKNOWN]: Was the grossest thing you found in the strip club raid?

56:02.999 --> 56:04.540
[UNKNOWN]: You know, there's not one thing that I found.

56:04.700 --> 56:05.120
[UNKNOWN]: It's just

56:06.589 --> 56:11.971
[UNKNOWN]: How, you know, I didn't go to strip clubs before, so this is my only real experience with one is this warrant that we did.

56:12.872 --> 56:24.956
[UNKNOWN]: But you see them in movies and things like that, and there's lights and music and smoke, and there's, you know, this party vibe, but you come in there and you turn off the light, you turn off the smoke, you separate the people you set them down.

56:25.397 --> 56:28.178
[UNKNOWN]: And there's this palpable sense of desperation.

56:30.039 --> 56:40.021
[UNKNOWN]: And it's this sense of desperation not only in the people that are there to be patrons, but also in the girls who are there, who are sitting there quiet, like they're not arrested or anything.

56:40.041 --> 56:54.704
[UNKNOWN]: They're not handcuffed, we're just separating everyone for safety, and set these girls down, and they're sitting on the stage, I never get the sense of seeing the lights on, and these half-naked people, and these guys, they're disgusting, they're just feeling kind of gross, just thinking, like, is this...

56:56.264 --> 57:07.192
[UNKNOWN]: This is really the kind of, you know, business that these guys when they came in thought that they were going to experience today in the answer is no, but then they got to see what it was like.

57:08.858 --> 57:09.478
[UNKNOWN]: in reality.

57:09.859 --> 57:11.099
[UNKNOWN]: And it's a very different place.

57:11.460 --> 57:11.700
[UNKNOWN]: Wow.

57:12.560 --> 57:14.361
[UNKNOWN]: That's a powerful powerful story.

57:14.621 --> 57:19.704
[UNKNOWN]: Um, as you wrapped up your, do you call him duty stations?

57:20.205 --> 57:21.105
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, duty station.

57:21.365 --> 57:25.768
[UNKNOWN]: So, um, as you wrap that up, then you went to, to the mobile security side.

57:25.848 --> 57:26.128
[UNKNOWN]: Correct.

57:26.168 --> 57:26.528
[UNKNOWN]: That's right.

57:27.189 --> 57:29.190
[UNKNOWN]: Um, walk us through that, uh, that path.

57:29.530 --> 57:43.233
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, so the Department of State has a tactical team called MSD Mobile Security Division, and this is composed of four to six Man teams who are a flyaway crisis response and tactical team for anything overseas.

57:43.933 --> 57:51.995
[UNKNOWN]: It's generally composed of former military guys guys that have done really well in their career and they're trusted for

57:53.535 --> 58:04.342
[UNKNOWN]: what will become specialized roles but that's not everybody you can try out if you make the trials you can pass so I didn't have a military background but I knew that that was a skill set that I wanted to have.

58:04.402 --> 58:16.910
[UNKNOWN]: I wanted to push myself and really try to learn some of these skills and make myself more valuable just as a person and it has been in a father but also for my role I thought that it'd be a

58:17.630 --> 58:41.898
[UNKNOWN]: We're the thing to try out for and so you've got to apply and you've got to go through a green it's called green team so it's a six month program that's All the hard skills and soft skills that you need to be part of a tactical team so it's all the stuff you'd expect it's shoot house It's You know, make sure you can hit your corner with your pistol with your rifle or carrying your breaching equipment working in four man teams movement through houses

58:43.199 --> 58:49.404
[UNKNOWN]: Driving, lots of driving, lots of motorcade operations, but this time you're the truck behind the motorcade.

58:49.525 --> 58:59.674
[UNKNOWN]: So motorcats of the lead, the protectees vehicle and the follow, and then if they're assigned a tactical truck, you're the truck behind it, and they're often a little bit off.

59:00.294 --> 59:03.157
[UNKNOWN]: So if they get hit, you're off the X, you can respond to the X.

59:04.530 --> 59:06.611
[UNKNOWN]: So you learn how to do all these things in this pipeline.

59:06.971 --> 59:08.852
[UNKNOWN]: And you also get soft skills.

59:09.052 --> 59:24.380
[UNKNOWN]: You get a next level of briefing skills and public speaking because you're going to be expected to present in potentially dangerous circumstances in embassy, maybe in evacuation, or maybe moving a protectee somewhere very dangerous.

59:24.941 --> 59:27.762
[UNKNOWN]: And there's a level of professionals in the polish expected.

59:27.782 --> 59:29.163
[UNKNOWN]: And so you get these hard and soft skills.

59:29.723 --> 59:31.444
[UNKNOWN]: And then if you pass at the end of it,

59:34.066 --> 59:46.399
[UNKNOWN]: And they evaluate you to make sure that your judgment is sound and your shooting is up to speed and your physical fitness and all the things that you'd expect of a team and then if you graduate you're assigned to a team and that's when you start your tour.

59:47.560 --> 59:51.584
[UNKNOWN]: it sounds pretty, pretty selective and I assume a lot of people don't don't make the cut.

59:52.244 --> 01:00:09.159
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, so they'll kick you out if some of these things don't fit in the guys that were, at the end of the day it's still the state department's not the military and so the assignments process is also managed by people who want you to succeed but the cadre is motivated for the highest level of

01:00:10.895 --> 01:00:17.801
[UNKNOWN]: student that they can pass to make sure that when they leave, they're going to put you in high-stake situations really quickly.

01:00:17.821 --> 01:00:36.095
[UNKNOWN]: And this is another thing that surprised me, is dimlinx security is not afraid to put you in a circumstance where you're both fully supported but also doing something that it can be your first week out of training both as a new agent or out of MSD green team where you're rolled up with the team and you can be doing something

01:00:39.097 --> 01:00:40.958
[UNKNOWN]: something that can be a little bit tense the week after.

01:00:41.358 --> 01:00:47.840
[UNKNOWN]: And they're going to make sure that you're on a team of guys that are experienced, but you can be anywhere the week after you graduate.

01:00:48.000 --> 01:00:48.580
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:00:49.301 --> 01:00:49.601
[UNKNOWN]: Wow.

01:00:49.701 --> 01:00:51.381
[UNKNOWN]: Where did you go right after you graduated?

01:00:52.062 --> 01:00:54.202
[UNKNOWN]: I don't remember my first trip after I graduated.

01:00:54.243 --> 01:00:55.143
[UNKNOWN]: I had a bunch of trips.

01:00:56.863 --> 01:01:03.006
[UNKNOWN]: One of my first things I did after graduation was breaching the Venezuelan embassy to the United States.

01:01:04.301 --> 01:01:13.066
[UNKNOWN]: So I show up to my unit and say, hey, congratulations, Dalton, you look to do all that CrossFit stuff through the breacher and I thought, cool, like, I get to be the breacher.

01:01:13.126 --> 01:01:15.768
[UNKNOWN]: I get to knock down doors and stuff.

01:01:15.988 --> 01:01:18.369
[UNKNOWN]: And I did mechanical breaching that explosive.

01:01:18.429 --> 01:01:22.031
[UNKNOWN]: So this is the halogen tool and your hammer and all that stuff, right?

01:01:22.932 --> 01:01:25.493
[UNKNOWN]: I think, great, I loved breaching and green team.

01:01:25.513 --> 01:01:26.333
[UNKNOWN]: That was super fun.

01:01:26.353 --> 01:01:27.694
[UNKNOWN]: I like to hit stuff, all right?

01:01:27.714 --> 01:01:28.935
[UNKNOWN]: I'm kind of a caveman like that.

01:01:28.975 --> 01:01:30.496
[UNKNOWN]: I get to hit a door with a big piece of metal.

01:01:31.767 --> 01:01:34.288
[UNKNOWN]: I did that my warrants, you know, I enjoyed doing that.

01:01:35.228 --> 01:01:38.309
[UNKNOWN]: So I took it as a, like, oh, they trust me to be the breacher.

01:01:38.809 --> 01:01:49.492
[UNKNOWN]: But reality, the breacher, you know this, has to carry your bolt cutters and the halagon tool and the hammer and you're carrying all this equipment all day long through the shoot house and through wherever you're trying to get to.

01:01:50.411 --> 01:01:52.653
[UNKNOWN]: And none of them wanted to do it, so they had me do it.

01:01:54.335 --> 01:02:01.823
[UNKNOWN]: But our first thing that we did out of the academy that, first one I can remember, is breaching the Venezuelan embassy to the United States.

01:02:03.084 --> 01:02:06.368
[UNKNOWN]: She'd be broken to a foreign embassy on American soil.

01:02:07.576 --> 01:02:15.442
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I'm one of two guys that were breachers that I think can say that like overtly, I'm sure that's done been done covertly before.

01:02:15.642 --> 01:02:21.547
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I'm sure spies and CIA and whoever have broken into foreign embassies covertly.

01:02:23.108 --> 01:02:25.010
[UNKNOWN]: As far as I can see overtly,

01:02:26.003 --> 01:02:31.644
[UNKNOWN]: me and another guy the only two that have been preachers on over emissions to breach an embassy.

01:02:31.884 --> 01:02:37.485
[UNKNOWN]: And some some would say that that's a violation of international law being a lawyer are they right?

01:02:38.465 --> 01:02:40.146
[UNKNOWN]: Depends on who side drawn.

01:02:40.286 --> 01:02:41.326
[UNKNOWN]: It doesn't at all is.

01:02:41.686 --> 01:02:42.846
[UNKNOWN]: Depends on who you're asking.

01:02:43.166 --> 01:02:43.346
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:02:43.946 --> 01:02:51.748
[UNKNOWN]: So I was the breacher and we we went to the Venezuela embassy because it was this diplomatic hot potato.

01:02:52.693 --> 01:02:54.334
[UNKNOWN]: where for weeks leading up to this.

01:02:55.134 --> 01:03:09.241
[UNKNOWN]: This group called the embassy protection collective is formed of codepink in these far left groups that were brought in by Maduro to stay inside the embassy during this contested election.

01:03:09.501 --> 01:03:10.962
[UNKNOWN]: So Venezuela election happens.

01:03:12.172 --> 01:03:27.787
[UNKNOWN]: and Maduro is perceived by the United States and the official foreign policy statement is, this was an illegitimate outcome Guido, John Guido is the legitimate leader of Venezuela.

01:03:28.308 --> 01:03:32.172
[UNKNOWN]: So the United States recognizes Guido as the guy who is,

01:03:33.893 --> 01:03:39.775
[UNKNOWN]: responsible for appointing the chief of mission charge affairs, whatever, for the visible embassy.

01:03:40.355 --> 01:03:47.297
[UNKNOWN]: But Maduro, before he left, had his people get people to fill up this embassy with protesters.

01:03:47.757 --> 01:03:49.038
[UNKNOWN]: This lasted for weeks.

01:03:49.918 --> 01:04:01.541
[UNKNOWN]: So they have people bringing in food that they're putting in buckets and hauling out the powers been shut off, the electricity and toilets and all that stuff aren't working great, but they're not coming out.

01:04:01.881 --> 01:04:02.741
[UNKNOWN]: They're staying in there.

01:04:03.021 --> 01:04:16.645
[UNKNOWN]: So the government now has this pot potato that gets tossed back and forth between the secret service and the Dilmaq security service and now you guys got to deal with this and now you guys got to deal with this, eventually state department says,

01:04:18.725 --> 01:04:20.125
[UNKNOWN]: We'll go ahead and get these protesters out.

01:04:20.446 --> 01:04:21.906
[UNKNOWN]: We'll go knock these guys out.

01:04:21.986 --> 01:04:26.187
[UNKNOWN]: And the meantime, there's people there every day that are protesting out front.

01:04:26.247 --> 01:04:27.187
[UNKNOWN]: So there's hundreds of people.

01:04:27.207 --> 01:04:28.948
[UNKNOWN]: There's protesters in counter-protesters.

01:04:30.368 --> 01:04:36.410
[UNKNOWN]: And we show up one morning early and hit the breach from two different access points.

01:04:36.870 --> 01:04:39.911
[UNKNOWN]: There's a door around back, and this is at the embassy in Georgetown.

01:04:40.551 --> 01:04:43.092
[UNKNOWN]: And so, they people see us walking up at the breaching equipment.

01:04:43.332 --> 01:04:44.172
[UNKNOWN]: It's not a secret.

01:04:44.292 --> 01:04:45.153
[UNKNOWN]: We're not coming in to AM.

01:04:47.354 --> 01:05:01.564
[UNKNOWN]: We have two teams that hit two different doors at the same time, and we know what to expect because the people on the inside are so proud of their barricades, that they film their barricades from the inside and put them up on TikTok.

01:05:03.484 --> 01:05:04.405
[UNKNOWN]: God bless the internet.

01:05:04.485 --> 01:05:05.506
[UNKNOWN]: God bless the internet.

01:05:05.526 --> 01:05:10.990
[UNKNOWN]: So our intelligence analysts call me up and are like, hey man, here's when you're ready to breach.

01:05:11.130 --> 01:05:12.611
[UNKNOWN]: Here's what's on the other side of this door.

01:05:12.911 --> 01:05:13.912
[UNKNOWN]: Here's what you can expect.

01:05:13.992 --> 01:05:21.358
[UNKNOWN]: And if you come across any kind of resistance, this is, well, visually we see on the outside of this door.

01:05:22.198 --> 01:05:25.581
[UNKNOWN]: So there weren't even smart enough to do any kind of misinformation or disinformation.

01:05:25.601 --> 01:05:27.182
[UNKNOWN]: It was just, here's my barricade.

01:05:27.282 --> 01:05:30.585
[UNKNOWN]: Look how good of a job we're doing barricading this embassy.

01:05:32.411 --> 01:05:41.533
[UNKNOWN]: sure enough we got a breach and we get the resistance expected on the other side of it and we worked through it and it's exactly as it looked like in those TikTok videos that they so graciously put up for us.

01:05:41.754 --> 01:05:51.716
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, given you your own intelligence, was there any any resistance beyond the barricade aspect of it like once you've breached then what happened?

01:05:52.176 --> 01:05:56.918
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah once we got in they see guys coming through with guns and we have to treat it pretty seriously and clear

01:05:58.678 --> 01:06:03.743
[UNKNOWN]: any other building that we're responsible for clearing how many of you are there.

01:06:04.304 --> 01:06:08.969
[UNKNOWN]: There were a lot of DS and a lot of locals and then there was secret service there.

01:06:08.989 --> 01:06:10.010
[UNKNOWN]: There were guys that perimeter.

01:06:10.450 --> 01:06:15.415
[UNKNOWN]: There were two clearing teams of five, I believe,

01:06:17.297 --> 01:06:36.757
[UNKNOWN]: initially who were responsible for clearing and then then there were people who were brought into hold once we'd clear a room so it was the teams of five and then agents that were positioned to hold so that we didn't have to back clear as much territory so we're a lot of us initially on the move-in but then once it was cleared out and

01:06:37.077 --> 01:06:40.199
[UNKNOWN]: everyone came in and took care of the place, but we didn't know it was going to be in there, right?

01:06:40.499 --> 01:06:47.643
[UNKNOWN]: You know, these protesters found closet full AKs and one of them decides that they want to, you know, really, or be a hero, so.

01:06:48.157 --> 01:06:51.958
[UNKNOWN]: Who's all protesters inside there weren't any actual embassy diplomats?

01:06:52.638 --> 01:06:59.461
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, so there were people that were still embassy staff, there were protesters, and we think that there were foreign spies that were in there as well.

01:06:59.601 --> 01:07:10.184
[UNKNOWN]: So there were people that were representing foreign media groups who were state-sponsored, which is just another way of saying that they're a spy.

01:07:16.406 --> 01:07:33.226
[UNKNOWN]: the ones that we were most concerned about because of narrative wandering, we don't want to do anything that would allow them to create a narrative that would harm the official U.S. position, right, and make sure that we're going in and treating these people with the respect they deserve as protesters, right?

01:07:34.187 --> 01:07:35.087
[UNKNOWN]: are not violent.

01:07:35.147 --> 01:07:36.668
[UNKNOWN]: They're not pointing guns at us, right?

01:07:36.688 --> 01:07:38.048
[UNKNOWN]: We just need them out of the building.

01:07:38.709 --> 01:07:45.451
[UNKNOWN]: And so we were sensitive to making sure that there was no narrative that could be created that we were violent or we heard anyone or because there's no reason too.

01:07:45.471 --> 01:07:46.852
[UNKNOWN]: There's no threat that was there.

01:07:47.392 --> 01:07:49.813
[UNKNOWN]: So there's no heavy resistance fighting life.

01:07:50.073 --> 01:07:51.673
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I didn't turn to scrapping at all.

01:07:51.713 --> 01:07:54.694
[UNKNOWN]: There was no kind of resistance that was there.

01:07:54.974 --> 01:07:58.636
[UNKNOWN]: So we got everyone out and then suddenly

01:08:02.886 --> 01:08:08.872
[UNKNOWN]: It seems like an odd pairing that there are, I assume, a duo placed diplomats in that building.

01:08:09.693 --> 01:08:11.355
[UNKNOWN]: Right, but also protestors.

01:08:12.215 --> 01:08:17.621
[UNKNOWN]: Right, at the same time, and pseudo-journalism, it just seems like a strange mix of.

01:08:19.012 --> 01:08:27.498
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know how productive any of that would be from an actual diplomat standpoint or maybe that wasn't the goal is just to be a pain in the ass.

01:08:27.919 --> 01:08:29.480
[UNKNOWN]: Yes, the goal is to be a pain in the ass.

01:08:29.780 --> 01:08:30.621
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:08:30.941 --> 01:08:33.863
[UNKNOWN]: With that same, I don't know, logic, I guess.

01:08:33.923 --> 01:08:38.247
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, when I first asked you is that a violation of international law,

01:08:38.987 --> 01:08:49.209
[UNKNOWN]: Putting issue on the other foot, let's say China decides that after the election, they don't recognize whoever won as the president.

01:08:49.289 --> 01:08:56.250
[UNKNOWN]: And so they, you know, raid a U.S. embassy in China and say, yeah, the president is actually not your president.

01:08:56.370 --> 01:09:00.511
[UNKNOWN]: It's this, this other guy, is that kind of the same thing?

01:09:00.551 --> 01:09:00.991
[UNKNOWN]: Same thing.

01:09:01.331 --> 01:09:01.551
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:09:01.991 --> 01:09:07.212
[UNKNOWN]: So the media, the media convention prohibits interference with diplomat relations,

01:09:08.587 --> 01:09:18.674
[UNKNOWN]: But it doesn't say that the person who is in charge has to be the person that is officially recognized.

01:09:18.814 --> 01:09:28.561
[UNKNOWN]: Meaning, in this case, the U.S. is positioned of Guido being the rightfully elected leader is at odds with the even as oil and position that Maduro is the leader.

01:09:29.101 --> 01:09:31.923
[UNKNOWN]: And the Vena Convention doesn't go into arbitrate this.

01:09:32.424 --> 01:09:36.587
[UNKNOWN]: It's just going to say, well, whoever is actually rightfully an authority, you can't go in break into their embassy.

01:09:37.287 --> 01:09:42.330
[UNKNOWN]: In this case, there were trespassers because of the U.S. is foreign policy position.

01:09:42.370 --> 01:09:44.591
[UNKNOWN]: Now, I don't hold a stronger opinion on this either way.

01:09:44.611 --> 01:09:56.418
[UNKNOWN]: I just know that my role was to go in and solve the security problem inside, but I came around the corner after making breach and carrying all my tools back out to the truck.

01:09:57.319 --> 01:09:58.960
[UNKNOWN]: And there's a row of cameras.

01:09:59.968 --> 01:10:23.957
[UNKNOWN]: probably 30 journalists with the long lenses and I don't know that they're on the corner and I come around the corner to put all my breaching equipment back in the truck and they just take tons of pictures of me and later on that day on tell us or it's got my face with all my breaching equipment in my full kit and coming out of the embassy and it says U.S. violets of being a convention in Spanish at the bottom of the captions so you didn't have a bottle of or face mask or anything.

01:10:23.977 --> 01:10:24.197
[UNKNOWN]: No.

01:10:24.377 --> 01:10:24.597
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:10:27.858 --> 01:10:30.060
[UNKNOWN]: It's probably not going to Venezuela in vacation any time.

01:10:30.100 --> 01:10:31.041
[UNKNOWN]: Well, maybe, maybe now.

01:10:31.101 --> 01:10:32.462
[UNKNOWN]: And maybe now, yeah, maybe now.

01:10:33.063 --> 01:10:36.025
[UNKNOWN]: All right, so that was kind of early on.

01:10:36.506 --> 01:10:39.348
[UNKNOWN]: How many years did you do the mobile security stuff?

01:10:39.428 --> 01:10:40.849
[UNKNOWN]: It's a three-year tour, two-year tour.

01:10:40.969 --> 01:10:41.630
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:10:41.710 --> 01:10:47.215
[UNKNOWN]: Any other operations during that three-year tour that worth mentioning?

01:10:47.750 --> 01:10:57.115
[UNKNOWN]: We did a lot of protection, we got some interesting moments around the Soleimani killing as well.

01:10:57.415 --> 01:11:10.843
[UNKNOWN]: So, Soleimani was killed, there was a fear by the State Department that there was going to be an Arab Spring 2.0, where at our embassies and consulants, they were just going to start shooting and burning and looting.

01:11:11.863 --> 01:11:17.548
[UNKNOWN]: Um, so they staged MSD teams as regional QRFs, which is pretty fun, right?

01:11:17.568 --> 01:11:27.317
[UNKNOWN]: Like, you know, I remember, uh, getting the call from my unit chief saying come into the office and come into the office and he says, hey, we're going to go in this meeting.

01:11:27.337 --> 01:11:31.801
[UNKNOWN]: We're going to talk about what's going to happen next 48 hours and then we're all going to get on playing this afternoon, go pack a bag.

01:11:33.452 --> 01:11:35.573
[UNKNOWN]: That was the fun part of working for the state.

01:11:35.833 --> 01:11:43.057
[UNKNOWN]: I loved that at any moment you could be flying to some corner of the world and you're getting to see US history and foreign policy happen firsthand.

01:11:43.577 --> 01:11:47.619
[UNKNOWN]: Just right, there is a front row seat and you get to protect Americans in the process.

01:11:47.719 --> 01:11:49.220
[UNKNOWN]: And so this was very meaningful.

01:11:50.020 --> 01:12:04.247
[UNKNOWN]: work for me and I loved it and so sure enough we get briefed on what's about to happen in the next 48 hours we learned advance about the Soleimani strike and we had back to be a QRF in Bahrain so the State Department's position was that

01:12:05.267 --> 01:12:24.230
[UNKNOWN]: This is dangerous because the Iranians could activate proxene networks and all these groups that are sympathetic to anti-US kinetic action and start attacking our embassies and consulates right and so we're picking up some things that make us feel a little bit weird about that

01:12:25.071 --> 01:12:45.266
[UNKNOWN]: So we ended up spending 30 days in Bahrain's, a QRF, waiting to see what's going to happen, and so this is a very common use of MSD because if they need to, MSD in the modern use of them operationally was born out of Benghazi, where those guys that were there with CIA contractors were also DS agents.

01:12:46.026 --> 01:12:50.950
[UNKNOWN]: And so I know some of those guys in their great dudes, and they were

01:12:53.870 --> 01:13:00.774
[UNKNOWN]: after that, these teams that were brought on both for every agent now, but also the ones that got their tactical school.

01:13:01.795 --> 01:13:04.217
[UNKNOWN]: Given the tools they need to survive, it's been Gaussian 2.0.

01:13:04.317 --> 01:13:12.882
[UNKNOWN]: We cannot lose ever again, another ambassador, cannot lose a protective, cannot lose anyone in chief of mission authority, right?

01:13:12.922 --> 01:13:13.562
[UNKNOWN]: That's their job.

01:13:15.492 --> 01:13:30.107
[UNKNOWN]: So we're sent on these QRF missions as different teams all throughout the Middle East and I think there's some in Northern Africa to prepare for what the Iranians were going to do after the death of Soleimani.

01:13:30.628 --> 01:13:30.788
[UNKNOWN]: Now.

01:13:32.169 --> 01:13:34.631
[UNKNOWN]: The Iranians play a long game, right?

01:13:34.671 --> 01:13:35.591
[UNKNOWN]: They're not reactive.

01:13:36.432 --> 01:13:42.195
[UNKNOWN]: We had to prepare as if there were or as if there were opportunists who were going to start burning down embassies.

01:13:43.456 --> 01:13:46.638
[UNKNOWN]: But the Iranians are patient, they'll wait 30 years and get us back.

01:13:48.339 --> 01:13:49.199
[UNKNOWN]: But that began a...

01:13:50.963 --> 01:13:58.505
[UNKNOWN]: another really another year to two years of protection for Pompeo because he orchestrated that.

01:13:58.605 --> 01:14:08.568
[UNKNOWN]: He built the architecture needed for everything that was done there, both in politically, but also involved in creating the outcome.

01:14:08.588 --> 01:14:13.609
[UNKNOWN]: And so that created an environment where he needed additional support.

01:14:13.729 --> 01:14:17.470
[UNKNOWN]: And so we followed him around the world in teams of four to five

01:14:21.792 --> 01:14:31.019
[UNKNOWN]: How do MDS agents kind of de-conflict with the standard MSC marine protocol security personnel?

01:14:31.660 --> 01:14:41.748
[UNKNOWN]: I know you mentioned QRF but so are you just going in the area and in case it goes horribly wrong you're there to in case of war break glass kind of go assist the marine should they need it kind of thing.

01:14:42.208 --> 01:14:42.828
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, that's right.

01:14:42.888 --> 01:14:46.729
[UNKNOWN]: So, you think about MC Security in terms of layers, right?

01:14:46.750 --> 01:14:59.514
[UNKNOWN]: There's the onion metaphor, and the Marines are the guys who are going to respond to the perimeter, for example, with clearing the outside, clearing the inside.

01:14:59.534 --> 01:15:02.475
[UNKNOWN]: I think they've got protocols and things that are dictated by RSO.

01:15:04.035 --> 01:15:10.438
[UNKNOWN]: So, RSO is like at the core of that onion at the middle of that onion, right?

01:15:10.458 --> 01:15:18.781
[UNKNOWN]: He's going to be the one who's going to be the person here, she is going to be the person who's conducting the symphony of protection inside the embassy.

01:15:19.541 --> 01:15:23.823
[UNKNOWN]: The Marines are the ones that are in response to those parameters and the outside of the perimeter.

01:15:23.843 --> 01:15:25.544
[UNKNOWN]: You've got the local guard force, right?

01:15:27.324 --> 01:15:31.366
[UNKNOWN]: These work hand in hand to make sure that if there's anybody

01:15:32.186 --> 01:15:35.628
[UNKNOWN]: outside or inside, they're the ones that are going to go find this or hit the trip wire.

01:15:36.949 --> 01:15:45.073
[UNKNOWN]: MSD works with RSO at their invitation, usually, there's other ways they can get out there, but usually at their invitation.

01:15:45.313 --> 01:15:47.754
[UNKNOWN]: And RSO stands for regional security officers.

01:15:47.774 --> 01:15:51.296
[UNKNOWN]: So this is the special agent and charge of security at embassy or consulate.

01:15:53.168 --> 01:16:03.836
[UNKNOWN]: and they're the ones that are going to be leading directly at DS agents, but fully responsible for the security program at the embassy and managing the Marine Guard programs as well.

01:16:03.976 --> 01:16:04.616
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, okay.

01:16:05.657 --> 01:16:16.405
[UNKNOWN]: With a couple years that you spent after that doing the Pompeo detail, were there any hairy incidences on that, or any close calls, or any actual things you had to respond to?

01:16:16.785 --> 01:16:19.748
[UNKNOWN]: We had one that was stressful at the time,

01:16:21.127 --> 01:16:22.688
[UNKNOWN]: It was kind of funny in hindsight.

01:16:23.589 --> 01:16:24.770
[UNKNOWN]: We were in Saudi Arabia.

01:16:25.110 --> 01:16:31.715
[UNKNOWN]: We were in, for you, which city we were, well, no, we were at MBS's palace.

01:16:33.096 --> 01:16:35.578
[UNKNOWN]: So this is around the time of the Khashoggi murder.

01:16:36.719 --> 01:16:40.382
[UNKNOWN]: And Pompeo goes over to have dinner with MBS.

01:16:41.730 --> 01:16:47.393
[UNKNOWN]: And the motorcade drops them off at this place for dinner.

01:16:47.953 --> 01:16:51.675
[UNKNOWN]: And there's a viscous circular drive where it makes this loop.

01:16:51.695 --> 01:16:56.857
[UNKNOWN]: Like you come in on one side and there's a circle at the end and you exit in the same place that you came out of.

01:16:57.317 --> 01:17:01.579
[UNKNOWN]: So the motorcade snakes its way in and drops off Pompeo at the very front.

01:17:02.079 --> 01:17:07.962
[UNKNOWN]: And the front of the motorcade, leading us through the palace compound, which is enormous.

01:17:09.443 --> 01:17:11.444
[UNKNOWN]: is MBS is BMW 7 series.

01:17:12.485 --> 01:17:26.395
[UNKNOWN]: So, you know, young guys got this like BMW up there and they go to dinner on their inside for a while and I'm just sitting in the truck just waiting to see, you know, what's gonna happen next where we're gonna take him just sit around outside, right?

01:17:27.856 --> 01:17:37.583
[UNKNOWN]: And we learn that Pompeo has spoken to the agent in charge of the detail and said, hey, I'm gonna go ride with MBS to the next location.

01:17:38.944 --> 01:17:41.966
[UNKNOWN]: And as you'd expect, there's some push back on this, right?

01:17:42.207 --> 01:17:45.750
[UNKNOWN]: This is the protectee, it's the sector, it's a what he says ultimately is going to win.

01:17:46.670 --> 01:17:48.792
[UNKNOWN]: But you never want to separate from your protectee.

01:17:49.012 --> 01:17:53.135
[UNKNOWN]: That's the number one rule you have always visibility on your protectee.

01:17:53.836 --> 01:18:01.222
[UNKNOWN]: You cannot get so far away from them that you lose contact, because then anything could happen to them and you're responsible.

01:18:02.819 --> 01:18:11.351
[UNKNOWN]: So, NBS invites Pompeo to write with him in his new seven series to the next location, which is somewhere on this large compound.

01:18:12.955 --> 01:18:21.878
[UNKNOWN]: And there's this expected, due to full resistance by the detailed leadership, which was denied, and you're told, nope, this is what's happening.

01:18:22.278 --> 01:18:34.202
[UNKNOWN]: So Pompeo walks around gets in MBSS 7 series, MBS fires that thing up and rips out of there like a bat out of hell.

01:18:34.222 --> 01:18:40.364
[UNKNOWN]: He takes that circle drive and just slams on the gas.

01:18:41.733 --> 01:18:42.214
[UNKNOWN]: and it's gone.

01:18:42.254 --> 01:18:48.199
[UNKNOWN]: Now these cars that we're in are up armored, they're heavy vehicles, up armored subs and land cruisers and all that.

01:18:48.880 --> 01:18:51.222
[UNKNOWN]: And so you can get up speed, but it's going to take you a second.

01:18:52.306 --> 01:19:07.099
[UNKNOWN]: So we go for the next ten or so minutes on a chase through the compound with MBS and Pompeo, who I'm sure are just cutting up and having a great time ditching the security and laughing about it.

01:19:07.159 --> 01:19:15.427
[UNKNOWN]: But having to chase the Crown Prince through his compound in a upward land cruiser at like 90 miles an hour was

01:19:17.328 --> 01:19:20.769
[UNKNOWN]: It wasn't scary, but it doesn't feel good to lose your protective even for a minute.

01:19:20.829 --> 01:19:24.710
[UNKNOWN]: So he was out of completely out of sight at different points during the...

01:19:24.730 --> 01:19:29.692
[UNKNOWN]: There were a couple points where he'd take a turn up down the road and I'd lose side of him.

01:19:29.952 --> 01:19:33.593
[UNKNOWN]: Right, now got the motorcade in front of me as well, and so even the lead cowardly side of him.

01:19:34.614 --> 01:19:36.074
[UNKNOWN]: Maybe you can't say or shouldn't.

01:19:36.654 --> 01:19:38.675
[UNKNOWN]: Do you guys not have any kind of tracking on him?

01:19:39.095 --> 01:19:41.696
[UNKNOWN]: Like, not on the tag, but I mean some sort of...

01:19:42.739 --> 01:19:43.560
[UNKNOWN]: this was his car.

01:19:44.121 --> 01:19:45.402
[UNKNOWN]: Oh, you need physically on the deck.

01:19:45.443 --> 01:19:46.424
[UNKNOWN]: Oh, no.

01:19:46.584 --> 01:19:49.388
[UNKNOWN]: No, I if there is that's above anything that I was told.

01:19:50.229 --> 01:19:51.270
[UNKNOWN]: That seemed like a no-brainer.

01:19:52.011 --> 01:19:55.155
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I would guess that there's something there.

01:19:55.175 --> 01:19:58.439
[UNKNOWN]: I if there ever was a I was never brought in on it.

01:20:00.111 --> 01:20:07.496
[UNKNOWN]: I'm also shocked that a dude's compound is big enough to get in a 10-minute car chase within the compound.

01:20:07.596 --> 01:20:08.457
[UNKNOWN]: How big is this thing?

01:20:08.637 --> 01:20:09.438
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, it was pretty big.

01:20:10.599 --> 01:20:12.800
[UNKNOWN]: The compound had long straightaways, too.

01:20:12.940 --> 01:20:14.542
[UNKNOWN]: And so he'd get up to speed on those.

01:20:14.922 --> 01:20:19.646
[UNKNOWN]: I looked down, I was going 90 miles an hour at one point in this armored vehicle, which is scary because you...

01:20:20.366 --> 01:20:22.289
[UNKNOWN]: Don't know how quickly the car in front he's going to slow.

01:20:22.309 --> 01:20:30.521
[UNKNOWN]: We're trained on this, but trying to catch a seven series is only going to happen if they let you and they did and he had his fun, I guess.

01:20:31.682 --> 01:20:34.587
[UNKNOWN]: Did you interact with Pompeo afterwards and?

01:20:35.688 --> 01:20:39.210
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, obviously he's not getting in trouble with you guys, but did you say anything to him?

01:20:39.310 --> 01:20:43.692
[UNKNOWN]: No, no, he just went on to his next meeting and he didn't say anything to you, like, yeah, nothing.

01:20:43.832 --> 01:20:48.335
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I was just the guy sitting in the back of the truck with the belt fed.

01:20:48.375 --> 01:20:53.317
[UNKNOWN]: I was not, I was not anyone special enough to direct him or I was getting car sick.

01:20:53.417 --> 01:20:55.358
[UNKNOWN]: I was not, I was just a truck monkey.

01:20:55.418 --> 01:20:57.059
[UNKNOWN]: So he's not talking to me.

01:20:57.099 --> 01:20:59.941
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know if him and the agent charge had any kind of, yeah.

01:21:00.481 --> 01:21:17.586
[UNKNOWN]: exchanges car chase wise i mean obviously it's a dangerous element of the job but one that's necessary especially in protective detail stuff throughout the state department training did you ever get to go on to any super school drive he just came to talk any super cool driving schools

01:21:18.666 --> 01:21:32.656
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I thought the introductory driving at the Academy was great because they put you in cars with highly capable accomplished drivers and some of the guys race professionally that they brought us over to.

01:21:32.737 --> 01:21:36.719
[UNKNOWN]: So when I went through, we went through the Bill Scott Raceway, which isn't West Virginia.

01:21:37.680 --> 01:21:53.166
[UNKNOWN]: And we got to do a lot of tactical driving there, but then also tactical driving with the defensive driving with our upper-mount vehicles, because you've got to be able to not allow anyone between you and the motorcade.

01:21:53.306 --> 01:22:02.269
[UNKNOWN]: And so you're just to close enough that you're very comfortable with trailing its speed to not allow a car length in between you, because that's how a V-bit gets in between a motorcade or something like that.

01:22:02.309 --> 01:22:03.510
[UNKNOWN]: That was the threat you prepared for.

01:22:04.430 --> 01:22:17.639
[UNKNOWN]: So, Bill Scott Rice, it was great, and then when I went through green team and NSD, we had some more driving, we had driving under nods, and some of these same courses, and then we had

01:22:20.244 --> 01:22:30.012
[UNKNOWN]: We had tactical offer and mobility courses that we would get cars stuck in the mud and driving out in the woods and swamps and all that stuff and that was great.

01:22:30.172 --> 01:22:30.393
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:22:30.853 --> 01:22:33.555
[UNKNOWN]: Any, was it kind of a rally school kind of environment?

01:22:33.675 --> 01:22:34.656
[UNKNOWN]: It was like a rally school.

01:22:34.696 --> 01:22:35.557
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, that's awesome.

01:22:36.518 --> 01:22:39.861
[UNKNOWN]: What's the coolest car you ever got to drive in that capacity?

01:22:40.712 --> 01:22:44.075
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know, we didn't get cool and say department doesn't get super cool cars.

01:22:44.095 --> 01:22:47.818
[UNKNOWN]: Like I know agency guys get this souped up, G wagons and stuff.

01:22:48.218 --> 01:22:49.819
[UNKNOWN]: We didn't get souped up, G wagons.

01:22:50.600 --> 01:22:51.320
[UNKNOWN]: I wish we did.

01:22:52.181 --> 01:22:56.304
[UNKNOWN]: We just had the LCs and they were now and then a Hilux would show up.

01:22:56.564 --> 01:22:58.486
[UNKNOWN]: How'd you get that Hilux in here, I think?

01:22:58.506 --> 01:23:01.268
[UNKNOWN]: I always respect the Hilux, it's indestructible.

01:23:01.328 --> 01:23:02.349
[UNKNOWN]: I wish they sold them here.

01:23:02.749 --> 01:23:03.750
[UNKNOWN]: I know you can't get them here.

01:23:03.770 --> 01:23:06.692
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, straight forward diesel motor is awesome, man.

01:23:08.793 --> 01:23:24.902
[UNKNOWN]: Did they, I mean, I assume that the state department vehicles are outfitted or retrofitted where they've got, you know, beefier, or enhanced suspensions and tires, and did they get into the weeds with you on that stuff, or is it just like, this is the car and here's how you drive it?

01:23:24.982 --> 01:23:27.043
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, they didn't, they didn't, they didn't, they didn't, they didn't, they didn't, they

01:23:27.912 --> 01:23:37.135
[UNKNOWN]: the way the vehicles are constructed, whether they're armored from the factory or upper armored, and then there's a bunch of classified information about the vehicles that you get talked to about as well.

01:23:37.155 --> 01:23:37.835
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, that's cool.

01:23:38.355 --> 01:23:41.136
[UNKNOWN]: No James Bond, oil, slicks, and smokescreen.

01:23:41.156 --> 01:23:42.216
[UNKNOWN]: No, none of that.

01:23:42.336 --> 01:23:45.177
[UNKNOWN]: No, it's the protection should be boring.

01:23:45.197 --> 01:23:45.737
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:23:45.757 --> 01:23:45.977
[UNKNOWN]: Right.

01:23:46.337 --> 01:23:48.858
[UNKNOWN]: If protection isn't boring, you're probably having a bad day.

01:23:49.485 --> 01:24:00.113
[UNKNOWN]: You mentioned a belt-fed, can you speak to the, I guess the handshake diplomatically of you guys being able to bring weapons into countries like that, like how does that work?

01:24:01.054 --> 01:24:06.658
[UNKNOWN]: It's different for every country and what they'll allow some countries are more permissive than others.

01:24:07.259 --> 01:24:10.281
[UNKNOWN]: There's handshake agreements as a great word for it.

01:24:11.002 --> 01:24:12.002
[UNKNOWN]: If someone

01:24:13.383 --> 01:24:24.050
[UNKNOWN]: From our country goes to a foreign country, and they are given protection by the locals or the host Military or whoever is going to do it.

01:24:24.991 --> 01:24:32.036
[UNKNOWN]: We honor this policy of reciprocation Where they come to our country and we lay out the red carpet for them and make sure that they're safe for me to be

01:24:33.239 --> 01:24:48.304
[UNKNOWN]: With that comes agreements about what's permissible in both of those environments, and that includes their weapons that they bring in the United States that includes weapons that we bring overseas or what we can check out from post, includes considerations of the actual threat level as well.

01:24:48.504 --> 01:25:01.328
[UNKNOWN]: So sometimes if there's a real threat level and you've got to pursue accordingly with what weapons are available and sometimes if there's not then you lower your risk profile and what you're carrying to accommodate what's actually perceived to be the problem.

01:25:01.522 --> 01:25:06.186
[UNKNOWN]: Was there ever times where the host nation would not allow you to bring anything in and you went anyway?

01:25:06.626 --> 01:25:07.106
[UNKNOWN]: All the time.

01:25:07.247 --> 01:25:07.547
[UNKNOWN]: Really?

01:25:07.847 --> 01:25:15.853
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, all the time that they will say, well, you cannot bring any weapons into this building, right?

01:25:15.873 --> 01:25:20.337
[UNKNOWN]: You go into some of the stands and you've got these security guys.

01:25:20.377 --> 01:25:23.259
[UNKNOWN]: No, no, we'll let our local security take care of it.

01:25:24.500 --> 01:25:27.182
[UNKNOWN]: And you look at the local security and you know what I'm talking about?

01:25:30.725 --> 01:25:30.985
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:25:31.306 --> 01:25:35.829
[UNKNOWN]: So there are guys that, you know, they're going to mussel you with their AK, right?

01:25:37.971 --> 01:25:43.135
[UNKNOWN]: They're wearing the garments that you couldn't even reload off your person if you needed to.

01:25:43.156 --> 01:25:47.139
[UNKNOWN]: They've got one mag, not something that's going to give you any kind of confidence.

01:25:47.980 --> 01:25:51.382
[UNKNOWN]: So what we could do is we would say, all right, listen,

01:25:52.604 --> 01:25:53.685
[UNKNOWN]: We won't bring any weapons in.

01:25:55.267 --> 01:25:57.589
[UNKNOWN]: We do need to have our protectee with security.

01:25:57.890 --> 01:26:00.453
[UNKNOWN]: We have to have an agent with our protectee.

01:26:00.993 --> 01:26:05.658
[UNKNOWN]: Tell you what, why don't we bring one agent to go with the protectee.

01:26:05.679 --> 01:26:07.741
[UNKNOWN]: In any case, there's a medical issue.

01:26:07.761 --> 01:26:09.303
[UNKNOWN]: We're going to bring our med guy.

01:26:09.683 --> 01:26:10.244
[UNKNOWN]: How's that sound?

01:26:10.264 --> 01:26:11.765
[UNKNOWN]: And they're like, okay, it sounds good.

01:26:12.386 --> 01:26:21.234
[UNKNOWN]: So we bring a med guy, and he's got his med bag, and you can check them both of them and just show underneath their suits so they don't have weapons, right?

01:26:21.254 --> 01:26:22.175
[UNKNOWN]: And they're like, okay, it sounds good.

01:26:22.616 --> 01:26:29.322
[UNKNOWN]: So we have a med bag, and that med bag, we have turnicins and splints, and all kinds of our trauma, eye facts, all that kind of stuff.

01:26:29.883 --> 01:26:31.524
[UNKNOWN]: But underneath all that, there'd be an MP5.

01:26:32.620 --> 01:26:38.164
[UNKNOWN]: I know it out, which probably can't get too super quick, but man, that still seems dicey.

01:26:38.285 --> 01:27:00.943
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, is there not, if I put myself in a guy like Pompeo shoes or somebody at that level where you're getting ready to go into a country and they say, no, you can't bring any weapons like if it was me, I would say, I'm not coming unless you let my guys bring what we want to bring in, like you decide, but we're not coming otherwise, like I feel like most of those countries would be like, okay, fine, you can bring it.

01:27:01.743 --> 01:27:06.404
[UNKNOWN]: Usually at the country level they're going to let you have pistols, and they're not going to put up a fight about that.

01:27:06.424 --> 01:27:09.645
[UNKNOWN]: They're going to let you have your clocks.

01:27:10.025 --> 01:27:20.348
[UNKNOWN]: Whether they let you have any kind of long rifle is going to matter based on what's the threat assessment and then what RSO is agreed to with host country and the ambassador.

01:27:20.568 --> 01:27:24.549
[UNKNOWN]: So they're going to make decisions about if you can carry a long rifle or not or have a long rifle.

01:27:26.409 --> 01:27:31.353
[UNKNOWN]: having side arms was almost I can't ever remember a time where they said you cannot bring any weapons.

01:27:31.813 --> 01:27:44.724
[UNKNOWN]: Now the new specific, if you're going to venue that's under the authority or control of the local forces, they're going to say you cannot bring any weapons into the President's Palace or something like that.

01:27:44.904 --> 01:27:51.229
[UNKNOWN]: And so there'd be some cases where they would fully abide by that and say Roger that, we're going to trust you guys on this one and we've got our guys outside with weapons.

01:27:51.889 --> 01:28:00.032
[UNKNOWN]: And there's sometimes where you look at it and think these guys are not going to be able to do anything if something goes sideways and so we're going to bring in the med bag.

01:28:00.252 --> 01:28:00.912
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, yeah.

01:28:02.152 --> 01:28:03.013
[UNKNOWN]: That's fascinating.

01:28:03.193 --> 01:28:06.114
[UNKNOWN]: Um, how do you do that for three years?

01:28:06.394 --> 01:28:07.674
[UNKNOWN]: I did, yeah.

01:28:07.814 --> 01:28:09.755
[UNKNOWN]: Did you leave the state department after that to her?

01:28:10.155 --> 01:28:10.395
[UNKNOWN]: I did.

01:28:10.515 --> 01:28:10.655
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:28:11.075 --> 01:28:15.416
[UNKNOWN]: What was the driving decision to to actually pull shocks and leave there?

01:28:16.657 --> 01:28:17.297
[UNKNOWN]: I never forget it.

01:28:17.577 --> 01:28:19.578
[UNKNOWN]: I was traveling a lot.

01:28:20.725 --> 01:28:33.452
[UNKNOWN]: And there was a day where the U.S. embassy to Baghdad was being attacked, and there were trying to breach the perimeter.

01:28:35.213 --> 01:28:37.594
[UNKNOWN]: And I remember laying in bed, and I think it was like,

01:28:39.134 --> 01:28:41.616
[UNKNOWN]: New Year's Eve around there is around this.

01:28:41.636 --> 01:28:46.441
[UNKNOWN]: I'm Soleimani killing a lot of unrest.

01:28:47.141 --> 01:28:58.712
[UNKNOWN]: I'm kind of waking up and brushing the slime eyes and looking at my phone and looking at what was happening in Baghdad and thinking, such for some team they're about to have to leave on New Year's.

01:28:58.832 --> 01:29:01.314
[UNKNOWN]: And as I'm looking at this clip of the

01:29:02.535 --> 01:29:26.308
[UNKNOWN]: embassy being attacked my unit chief shows up on my phone and calls me they go I guess I guess I'm one of these guys and so I'm packing my bag that afternoon leaving that afternoon and my son is three at the time and he just could not understand why dad's leaving again and I loved my time in MSD but also I really wanted to

01:29:27.580 --> 01:29:33.348
[UNKNOWN]: not be gone so much and there's options in the state department where you can, you know, you can go to post and you can have a stable home life.

01:29:33.368 --> 01:29:43.122
[UNKNOWN]: You can do a domestic tour where you're back at like a field office or headquarters assignment and so there's options for guys that want to do that, but also partly wanted to raise the kids around.

01:29:43.622 --> 01:29:46.943
[UNKNOWN]: the parents back home and our long-term goal is to move back home to Tennessee.

01:29:47.903 --> 01:29:50.384
[UNKNOWN]: I've gone through more protein powders than I can count.

01:29:50.564 --> 01:29:53.764
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01:29:54.404 --> 01:29:56.265
[UNKNOWN]: True nutrition is completely different.

01:29:56.525 --> 01:29:58.565
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01:29:58.945 --> 01:30:03.966
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01:30:04.367 --> 01:30:06.087
[UNKNOWN]: No other brand lets you do that.

01:30:06.507 --> 01:30:10.609
[UNKNOWN]: Right now, I'm training Jiu Jitsu consistently and recovery is everything.

01:30:10.829 --> 01:30:24.774
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01:30:24.974 --> 01:30:26.995
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01:30:27.455 --> 01:30:36.539
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01:30:49.524 --> 01:30:54.386
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01:30:54.846 --> 01:31:12.716
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01:31:13.977 --> 01:31:25.942
[UNKNOWN]: Um, what was the plan as far as, I mean, I certainly understand the balancing of family life, but did you have a, this is what's next and this is how I'm actually going to provide for my family set up before you actually got out.

01:31:26.442 --> 01:31:28.883
[UNKNOWN]: I did, yeah, before I jumped, uh, I had a,

01:31:29.843 --> 01:31:44.895
[UNKNOWN]: a friend who was the CEO of a company that I went on to work for, and I knew him back from the rescue forensics days when we had the technology that helped investigators find human traffickers before it was at the State Department.

01:31:44.915 --> 01:31:46.436
[UNKNOWN]: We sold the company to this company.

01:31:47.376 --> 01:31:57.143
[UNKNOWN]: And so I ran this company for a while before I went to state and then after I left state I went and worked for that company and they had a contract with the rewards for justice program at the Department of State.

01:31:57.623 --> 01:31:59.404
[UNKNOWN]: And he said, hey man, you're probably good fit for this.

01:31:59.924 --> 01:32:02.366
[UNKNOWN]: This is something that is right in your real house.

01:32:02.466 --> 01:32:07.129
[UNKNOWN]: It has an investigative focus to it, but it's also still the state department.

01:32:07.229 --> 01:32:11.412
[UNKNOWN]: And you come back working as a contractor for a state program.

01:32:11.632 --> 01:32:12.993
[UNKNOWN]: And so it turned out to be a really good fit.

01:32:13.253 --> 01:32:14.594
[UNKNOWN]: oh nice.

01:32:15.975 --> 01:32:29.084
[UNKNOWN]: We glossed over intentionally the company that you did while you were in school and whatever because I wanted to just kind of lead right into the state department stuff because that's so related to kind of more what you're doing now.

01:32:29.684 --> 01:32:38.010
[UNKNOWN]: We can take a couple of steps back and just kind of encapsulate the company that you owned as a college student and what you guys did.

01:32:38.770 --> 01:32:51.117
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, so I did this, just right outside of law school, created a company that did human trafficking intelligence as the best way to describe it, it's open source intelligence, for human trafficking.

01:32:52.798 --> 01:33:02.183
[UNKNOWN]: And at the time, there were a lot of websites like Backpage and Craigslist, they were advertising commercial sex ads and the investigators that we would work with,

01:33:04.103 --> 01:33:14.325
[UNKNOWN]: During the times that we were trying to increase state statutes, we worked a lot of law enforcement kept being frustrated by how little access information they had.

01:33:14.805 --> 01:33:27.308
[UNKNOWN]: I worked with my co-founder who is sort of the savant technologically, and we realized that we could collect millions of these commercial sex advertisements and layer on analytics and show how to find traffic kits.

01:33:28.511 --> 01:33:29.251
[UNKNOWN]: And it worked really well.

01:33:29.772 --> 01:33:35.915
[UNKNOWN]: We were able to in the early days of machine learning and large data analysis, use it.

01:33:36.316 --> 01:33:40.858
[UNKNOWN]: Those technologies to find a traffic kid, and so we built a company around that license that's a law enforcement.

01:33:41.058 --> 01:33:41.979
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, that's incredible.

01:33:42.779 --> 01:33:46.441
[UNKNOWN]: How do you spot a traffic kid in a classified ad like that?

01:33:47.662 --> 01:33:49.263
[UNKNOWN]: Sometimes it's as easy as looking at the picture.

01:33:49.523 --> 01:33:55.867
[UNKNOWN]: You can look at a picture and look at some kid with baby fat and young face and can't prove it,

01:33:57.788 --> 01:34:01.249
[UNKNOWN]: pretty sure that that kid's not old enough just with your own eyes.

01:34:02.310 --> 01:34:12.094
[UNKNOWN]: Other times it's harder because these traffickers are smart and they make these girls look older, both to a very law enforcement and to get clients who are thinking they're paying for an adult.

01:34:13.174 --> 01:34:17.376
[UNKNOWN]: And so they'll put makeup on these girls and do their hair nails and all that stuff.

01:34:18.797 --> 01:34:32.848
[UNKNOWN]: So, you've got to use advanced strategies to make sense of large amounts of information and identify patterns within that data set to see if those kids or people are involved with a trafficking network.

01:34:33.288 --> 01:34:35.069
[UNKNOWN]: And this was in the early days of...

01:34:36.010 --> 01:34:43.773
[UNKNOWN]: large data models and using technology to make sense of data sets that you can scrape and understand.

01:34:44.213 --> 01:34:46.514
[UNKNOWN]: And so what investigators would do is they would have a phone number.

01:34:47.054 --> 01:34:56.817
[UNKNOWN]: And they could see that if I plug in this phone number into the software that we built, it's going to appear in six different states, and it's also going to show up in Colombian ads.

01:34:58.558 --> 01:35:02.079
[UNKNOWN]: And not only is it shown up in six different states, it's showing up with these three or four other ads.

01:35:02.939 --> 01:35:10.364
[UNKNOWN]: And then this add description of this person has coded language in it indicating that they're a minor.

01:35:11.465 --> 01:35:13.326
[UNKNOWN]: And so that was not previously possible.

01:35:13.906 --> 01:35:16.468
[UNKNOWN]: It was not technologically innovative.

01:35:16.688 --> 01:35:18.169
[UNKNOWN]: It had never been applied to this problem set.

01:35:18.769 --> 01:35:20.530
[UNKNOWN]: So we were the first to apply it to this problem set.

01:35:20.811 --> 01:35:23.632
[UNKNOWN]: And then others have gone on to do this in,

01:35:24.837 --> 01:35:27.418
[UNKNOWN]: incredible ways make McKinley with the liver fund does this now.

01:35:27.638 --> 01:35:40.184
[UNKNOWN]: I know Nick you've had on the show and so with modern technology you can do this in a way that is far more sophisticated but we did it early and it worked really well and we were able to help law enforcement or cover a lot of kids.

01:35:40.665 --> 01:35:43.206
[UNKNOWN]: Can you walk us through one victim that you found?

01:35:43.786 --> 01:35:44.987
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah I'll give you my first one.

01:35:46.007 --> 01:35:50.510
[UNKNOWN]: So we worked on this nights and weekends because we believed in it and thought, we, we know this is going to work.

01:35:50.690 --> 01:35:57.655
[UNKNOWN]: If we can give this to one investigator who takes it seriously, we know it's going to work.

01:35:57.695 --> 01:36:05.841
[UNKNOWN]: And we spent a lot of time building the technology on this hypothesis that if we give this to the right person who knows what they're looking for, they can help get kids out.

01:36:07.202 --> 01:36:11.405
[UNKNOWN]: And I'll never get getting a call from this Texas Department of Public Safety Guy, one of their investigators.

01:36:15.745 --> 01:36:17.067
[UNKNOWN]: country board man, good dude.

01:36:17.647 --> 01:36:20.371
[UNKNOWN]: Calls me say, hey, I've been using Rescue Forensics.

01:36:20.631 --> 01:36:21.752
[UNKNOWN]: It's got some good news for you.

01:36:22.353 --> 01:36:26.137
[UNKNOWN]: So by this point, MPD's using it, local FBI's using it.

01:36:26.878 --> 01:36:29.582
[UNKNOWN]: A bunch of investigators and Texas are using it on these pilot programs.

01:36:30.913 --> 01:36:35.097
[UNKNOWN]: And we show them how to use it, name, begin to integrate to their investigations.

01:36:35.738 --> 01:36:36.979
[UNKNOWN]: So yeah, I got some good news for you.

01:36:37.940 --> 01:36:40.863
[UNKNOWN]: Turns out he does this investigation where he plugs in this phone number.

01:36:40.883 --> 01:36:52.335
[UNKNOWN]: He sees these six different profiles all using the same phone number with different girls moving between Emorillo, San Antonio, and how one third city always forget the third city.

01:36:52.375 --> 01:36:53.176
[UNKNOWN]: But they're moving in this.

01:36:54.470 --> 01:37:03.457
[UNKNOWN]: pattern, where they're just going to a new city, getting a hotel, staying there for a few days, jumping into the next city, and repeating, right now, it's standing anywhere for two particular long.

01:37:04.178 --> 01:37:15.286
[UNKNOWN]: You can't see that information with just what you get back from the subpoenas, easily because of the format they give it to you, and it's deliberately designed by these companies to make it difficult for you to find that.

01:37:15.606 --> 01:37:19.870
[UNKNOWN]: So we service it quickly for them, and he was like, hey, yeah, we followed these girls and

01:37:24.333 --> 01:37:25.774
[UNKNOWN]: was 16 years old.

01:37:26.794 --> 01:37:29.675
[UNKNOWN]: She was a trafficking victim and she was compelled into the sex trade.

01:37:30.196 --> 01:37:35.058
[UNKNOWN]: And I was just thrilled that it worked, but just felt this sense of

01:37:36.695 --> 01:37:44.500
[UNKNOWN]: It's been emotionally overwhelmed by how much time you put into something in the theory that it's going to work and not knowing if it's ever going to actually have the outcome that you want.

01:37:44.540 --> 01:37:48.563
[UNKNOWN]: And then somebody says, yeah, we did it and we recovered a kid using technology.

01:37:48.963 --> 01:37:59.690
[UNKNOWN]: And that was the first time that I felt a real sense of technology can be used to help these investigators find kids that are going to be set free from traffickers and that was exciting.

01:37:59.950 --> 01:38:01.171
[UNKNOWN]: that's awesome.

01:38:01.931 --> 01:38:21.238
[UNKNOWN]: For the say civil liberties critic who may say that that software or or process is essentially building surveillance on consenting adults is the is the response to that it's the connecting of dots that ensures that there is something nefarious that separates those

01:38:22.659 --> 01:38:24.460
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, so we got criticisms early.

01:38:24.640 --> 01:38:26.340
[UNKNOWN]: We were accepted into why combinator.

01:38:26.420 --> 01:38:29.161
[UNKNOWN]: It's this start-up accelerator that brought us in.

01:38:29.201 --> 01:38:30.182
[UNKNOWN]: They funded us early.

01:38:30.822 --> 01:38:31.902
[UNKNOWN]: Believe in what we were doing.

01:38:32.243 --> 01:38:33.343
[UNKNOWN]: And grateful to them for that.

01:38:33.923 --> 01:38:37.024
[UNKNOWN]: They gave us a break that set us up for success in a major way.

01:38:38.045 --> 01:38:38.925
[UNKNOWN]: And so they accept us.

01:38:39.025 --> 01:38:46.248
[UNKNOWN]: And then they call us into this meeting with the investors, and they present to this concern.

01:38:47.833 --> 01:38:58.659
[UNKNOWN]: And they said, hey, there are some people who have raised this concern later on, come to discover that these are sex workers who have brought this concern because we're scraping their data at scale.

01:39:00.060 --> 01:39:03.082
[UNKNOWN]: And my response was, well, this is publicly available information.

01:39:03.622 --> 01:39:06.024
[UNKNOWN]: They've put this out onto the internet.

01:39:06.964 --> 01:39:10.987
[UNKNOWN]: And they've chosen to make this available to anyone who looks for it.

01:39:13.293 --> 01:39:17.115
[UNKNOWN]: We just gather that information and put it into one place for law enforcement.

01:39:18.376 --> 01:39:32.105
[UNKNOWN]: The other piece of this is, I have no desire to get involved in the controversy over politically and ideologically the morality of sex work.

01:39:32.125 --> 01:39:34.786
[UNKNOWN]: That was something that we deliberately avoided.

01:39:34.866 --> 01:39:37.008
[UNKNOWN]: That was something that we all right said.

01:39:37.468 --> 01:39:41.511
[UNKNOWN]: That is not a conversation that we're going to inject ourselves into at all because it doesn't affect our mission.

01:39:42.832 --> 01:39:50.111
[UNKNOWN]: However, people who put these ads up are soliciting people for crime.

01:39:51.294 --> 01:39:52.096
[UNKNOWN]: It's still criminal.

01:39:53.365 --> 01:40:00.127
[UNKNOWN]: Regardless of whether you think that people who are consending adults should be able to pay for sex, doesn't matter to me, I don't care.

01:40:00.927 --> 01:40:03.668
[UNKNOWN]: That's not some of them injecting myself, and you know, my own opinions about this.

01:40:04.688 --> 01:40:14.391
[UNKNOWN]: But I'm not going to, as the person that's building this company going to get involved in that controversy, but I will say is, it's still a crime to do that.

01:40:14.691 --> 01:40:16.132
[UNKNOWN]: Regardless of whether you think it's right or wrong,

01:40:18.033 --> 01:40:27.083
[UNKNOWN]: Putting up an ad for commercial sex work is still again full on every jurisdiction except for these very specific cases in Nevada as far as I know that's still the case

01:40:28.685 --> 01:40:35.608
[UNKNOWN]: not only that, but the investigators that are using this software are not using it for rolling up sex workers.

01:40:36.128 --> 01:40:43.050
[UNKNOWN]: That's not with these human trafficking and eye-cack and all these internet crumbs against children, what they're using this software for at all.

01:40:43.170 --> 01:40:45.231
[UNKNOWN]: That's not something that we built it for either.

01:40:45.291 --> 01:40:49.733
[UNKNOWN]: And so this seemed to give them a sense of assurances that that's what would you use for, and that was all true.

01:40:50.013 --> 01:40:51.333
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:40:51.353 --> 01:40:53.574
[UNKNOWN]: And those are all valid and great points for

01:40:56.849 --> 01:41:09.556
[UNKNOWN]: you do that you go through the state department gig and then you kind of come back to that to a certain extent rewards for justice is a do you say that they bought the the company originally

01:41:10.355 --> 01:41:16.937
[UNKNOWN]: So the company that I worked for, the leader got a separate contract with rewards for justice, these were unrelated work items.

01:41:17.857 --> 01:41:19.017
[UNKNOWN]: But you knew them from that.

01:41:19.157 --> 01:41:20.057
[UNKNOWN]: I didn't know them from that.

01:41:20.097 --> 01:41:27.599
[UNKNOWN]: So they bought Rescue Forensics and they integrated into a DARPA program called Dig that was doing the same thing for commercial sex ads.

01:41:27.779 --> 01:41:28.899
[UNKNOWN]: OK.

01:41:29.479 --> 01:41:33.760
[UNKNOWN]: So rewards for justice, you're freshly out of state department.

01:41:33.800 --> 01:41:39.682
[UNKNOWN]: You go back to a world that, I don't want to say you're completely familiar with because it's obviously a different thing.

01:41:41.586 --> 01:41:47.905
[UNKNOWN]: A defense company supporting the State Department talked to us about Roards for Justice and kind of what the just of it is.

01:41:48.382 --> 01:41:55.367
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, or words for justice is the State Department's reward program for sort of the Who's who of the bad guy world.

01:41:56.047 --> 01:41:58.549
[UNKNOWN]: So there's this council program.

01:41:58.829 --> 01:41:59.229
[UNKNOWN]: What's that?

01:41:59.309 --> 01:42:00.110
[UNKNOWN]: So snitch program.

01:42:00.150 --> 01:42:01.071
[UNKNOWN]: Is a snitch program?

01:42:01.211 --> 01:42:01.471
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:42:01.491 --> 01:42:02.932
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, it's exactly right.

01:42:02.992 --> 01:42:04.473
[UNKNOWN]: They don't call it that, but that's what it is.

01:42:05.534 --> 01:42:08.596
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, you get snitches that get riches.

01:42:08.856 --> 01:42:09.076
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:42:09.236 --> 01:42:09.957
[UNKNOWN]: They get paid.

01:42:11.406 --> 01:42:18.995
[UNKNOWN]: So the rewards for justice program exists to find these bad guys using the oldest tool in the book, which is money.

01:42:21.017 --> 01:42:25.142
[UNKNOWN]: And they've paid out something like $250 million since the program started.

01:42:26.263 --> 01:42:29.487
[UNKNOWN]: So they'll pay out if they're really good with their want.

01:42:30.567 --> 01:42:32.288
[UNKNOWN]: And it's an extremely effective program.

01:42:33.169 --> 01:42:41.176
[UNKNOWN]: So they'll decide who is on the program and who's being advertised for through this group called the Interagency Rewards Committee.

01:42:42.537 --> 01:42:51.944
[UNKNOWN]: And they all get together and they all decide these are the people that we're willing to sponsor a reward for, these are the bad guys, these are the events, these are the missing Americans, these are

01:42:53.310 --> 01:43:04.993
[UNKNOWN]: the things that the Bayerhood of the Bayerhood bombing, who was involved in Benghazi, where as I'll beg to, all those kinds of national security priorities are consents down to individuals and events that were ward decorated for.

01:43:05.673 --> 01:43:13.215
[UNKNOWN]: Historically, this was done through advertising, using conventional methods like matchbooks and posters.

01:43:14.015 --> 01:43:19.857
[UNKNOWN]: They drop a whole bunch of these in an area where the bad guy is and where the mouth would spread around eventually, someone would call

01:43:22.220 --> 01:43:36.315
[UNKNOWN]: and this company that I worked for modernized this program by creating a channel of access for the source that doesn't put them at risk, like a conventional one would.

01:43:36.335 --> 01:43:37.235
[UNKNOWN]: So they don't have to go anymore.

01:43:37.876 --> 01:43:39.578
[UNKNOWN]: Excuse me, to meet someone at a

01:43:41.618 --> 01:43:53.667
[UNKNOWN]: Like a location in the field or a embassy or consulate and put themselves at risk, they can pick up the device that's in their pocket, their phone, and they can message what they know over signal what's at telegram.

01:43:54.247 --> 01:44:04.494
[UNKNOWN]: We've used in the past others as well, but it's accessible and so they can send their living room and they can send documents and videos and pictures and statements and everything they need to to substantiate their claim.

01:44:05.893 --> 01:44:08.214
[UNKNOWN]: And then rewards for justice will process that.

01:44:08.274 --> 01:44:16.937
[UNKNOWN]: So the company that worked for was responsible for processing all of that information and then taking that over to RFJ.

01:44:16.957 --> 01:44:25.861
[UNKNOWN]: And then they could make a decision about working with the partner that's sponsored that individual for the reward to see if this information has value.

01:44:25.881 --> 01:44:26.701
[UNKNOWN]: And if it does run it down.

01:44:27.612 --> 01:44:30.294
[UNKNOWN]: Can you walk us through kind of a soup to nuts?

01:44:30.414 --> 01:44:36.760
[UNKNOWN]: Real world case where from start to finish it, it worked and did what it was intended to do?

01:44:38.161 --> 01:44:40.423
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, so I think we have a best example.

01:44:43.726 --> 01:44:52.033
[UNKNOWN]: Trying to think of a modern one, a historical one, that they like to give a lot of attention to as the rums of use, of case.

01:44:53.395 --> 01:45:07.316
[UNKNOWN]: So the arms of use if was a recovery thing out of Pakistan, and that is one of the historical ones that is most cited as a success for a worker justice, there's other one, there was for $30 million, I think that was

01:45:08.472 --> 01:45:09.933
[UNKNOWN]: forget who that was.

01:45:09.973 --> 01:45:17.396
[UNKNOWN]: But those same brothers, I think there's was like 10 million a day and Kusei for it is his name.

01:45:17.576 --> 01:45:18.556
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, Kusei.

01:45:18.656 --> 01:45:19.037
[UNKNOWN]: Kusei.

01:45:19.057 --> 01:45:20.437
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, so there was was for 10 million.

01:45:20.457 --> 01:45:23.959
[UNKNOWN]: So anyway, so it's super not so the tip comes in.

01:45:25.460 --> 01:45:28.262
[UNKNOWN]: and it is triaged initially.

01:45:28.642 --> 01:45:39.710
[UNKNOWN]: So historically, this was through conventional methods now, it's done through technology that can look at that information and begin to assign it to someone who can assess it in that language.

01:45:40.150 --> 01:45:46.955
[UNKNOWN]: So we'll advertise when I was there in whatever language that the target is speaking.

01:45:47.015 --> 01:45:49.377
[UNKNOWN]: So if they speak Arabic or Urdu or Pashtu or whatever it is,

01:45:50.684 --> 01:45:55.786
[UNKNOWN]: But the ads go out over channels that people will see them in those places.

01:45:56.206 --> 01:46:12.811
[UNKNOWN]: So there will have used meta ads or Google ads, really any kind of social media, organic or paid platform to put ads into that information environment where someone who has an knowledge of that could see it and so you can advertise 20 miles around Baghdad for example.

01:46:19.476 --> 01:46:30.402
[UNKNOWN]: will be scrolling the internet or scrolling Facebook or scrolling Instagram or X or whatever and they'll see there's a reward for five million dollars or ten million dollars for someone that they have information on.

01:46:30.942 --> 01:46:32.163
[UNKNOWN]: And maybe they only have a piece of it.

01:46:32.223 --> 01:46:34.024
[UNKNOWN]: Maybe they only know his plate number.

01:46:34.084 --> 01:46:35.244
[UNKNOWN]: Maybe they only know his driver.

01:46:35.584 --> 01:46:35.985
[UNKNOWN]: Maybe they're...

01:46:36.945 --> 01:46:41.510
[UNKNOWN]: cousin is his driver or he goes to Moscow in these days or whatever it is.

01:46:41.530 --> 01:46:52.583
[UNKNOWN]: Maybe it's a hacker and they know that okay well they use this alias publicly but privately they use this alias and they may have a piece of it or they may have the whole thing They may hear his bed down location.

01:46:52.663 --> 01:46:55.106
[UNKNOWN]: This is where he is right now right you get those two

01:46:56.952 --> 01:46:58.152
[UNKNOWN]: And they message in with what they know.

01:46:58.472 --> 01:47:02.513
[UNKNOWN]: Now, sometimes it's just high, and they want to see if someone's there, right?

01:47:02.533 --> 01:47:04.194
[UNKNOWN]: They test the waters a little bit.

01:47:04.994 --> 01:47:06.794
[UNKNOWN]: And sometimes they just data dump right away.

01:47:06.854 --> 01:47:08.054
[UNKNOWN]: Here's everything that I know.

01:47:09.515 --> 01:47:10.455
[UNKNOWN]: Then that's processed.

01:47:11.275 --> 01:47:15.016
[UNKNOWN]: And then you take a look and see if this is legitimate information.

01:47:15.536 --> 01:47:20.317
[UNKNOWN]: And you've got trained people who have experience in managing sources and information.

01:47:20.677 --> 01:47:24.258
[UNKNOWN]: They take a look at that information and they consult with the person who speaks the language.

01:47:25.078 --> 01:47:27.319
[UNKNOWN]: to really make sense of it with the cultural nuance involved.

01:47:27.799 --> 01:47:29.740
[UNKNOWN]: How are you going to say something else?

01:47:29.760 --> 01:47:36.343
[UNKNOWN]: Oh, no, just that then that is further embedded using systems that would allow you to verify that information.

01:47:36.823 --> 01:47:44.426
[UNKNOWN]: It sounds like the predominant use in these cases are foreign and terrorism related, is that the bulk of the program.

01:47:44.706 --> 01:47:46.347
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, they're all foreign.

01:47:46.367 --> 01:47:48.008
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, it's all foreign.

01:47:48.668 --> 01:47:49.508
[UNKNOWN]: That's not true.

01:47:49.528 --> 01:47:50.289
[UNKNOWN]: There's some that were

01:47:51.690 --> 01:47:57.115
[UNKNOWN]: like interference in U.S. elections, an example of one that's like domestic policy, but for interference.

01:47:57.356 --> 01:47:57.616
[UNKNOWN]: Okay.

01:47:57.796 --> 01:47:58.076
[UNKNOWN]: All right.

01:47:58.096 --> 01:47:59.718
[UNKNOWN]: So you've got the ones like those as well.

01:48:00.599 --> 01:48:07.025
[UNKNOWN]: Could you put a ballpark on BS versus actual 99% BS or more 99.9% BS?

01:48:07.085 --> 01:48:07.986
[UNKNOWN]: So within that 1% or less,

01:48:15.219 --> 01:48:23.709
[UNKNOWN]: is that ones that are legitimate and actually go all the way through a payout or just that they're actionable enough to be useful.

01:48:24.850 --> 01:48:26.873
[UNKNOWN]: So I'm going to be legitimate, but not

01:48:30.288 --> 01:48:52.677
[UNKNOWN]: me the threshold for a payout so how the payout is made depends on a bunch of factors and that's a classified process for how those conversations happen in which ones deserve payouts but not all of them are going to be able to meet that threshold but can still be valuable enough that they give you a little piece of something that allows you to cross-verify against maybe what someone else is saying.

01:48:53.658 --> 01:48:57.259
[UNKNOWN]: So there's a lot of noise and you get to filter out all the noise and get to

01:48:59.618 --> 01:49:10.749
[UNKNOWN]: Is it cynical of me to assume that since the U.S. government is playing a role that they are like an insurance adjuster and are going to find every reason not to do the payout?

01:49:11.610 --> 01:49:13.211
[UNKNOWN]: You've expect that with the government.

01:49:14.973 --> 01:49:21.518
[UNKNOWN]: there's some people who have a bone to pick with RFJ because they believe that in my experience, that was not the case.

01:49:22.379 --> 01:49:28.784
[UNKNOWN]: In my experience they were motivated to make palettes because palettes built credibility for the program.

01:49:29.585 --> 01:49:29.765
[UNKNOWN]: Right.

01:49:29.805 --> 01:49:35.990
[UNKNOWN]: It's not like an insurance adjuster that at the end of the year has to look at their bottom line and see what their profitability isn't a point to a board of directors.

01:49:36.450 --> 01:49:39.353
[UNKNOWN]: Then the year RFJ has to look at the credibility of their program and say,

01:49:39.853 --> 01:49:56.009
[UNKNOWN]: Are we paying out to people who have materially advanced the truth about this individual that led to an outcome, this information led to an actual outcome and if it did, if we don't pay that person, it erodes the trustworthiness of the program and people are going to come to us anymore.

01:49:56.750 --> 01:49:58.272
[UNKNOWN]: And so they've got a counterbalance that against

01:49:59.718 --> 01:50:09.085
[UNKNOWN]: whatever else is happening in the world in the U.S. whether they trust the U.S. or not at all, because there are a arm of the U.S. government, publicly representing themselves is people who can change the lives.

01:50:09.105 --> 01:50:12.728
[UNKNOWN]: Let me give $5 million to someone in Pakistan.

01:50:12.768 --> 01:50:16.190
[UNKNOWN]: And if I'm going to do a change in my life, it's sure going to change the lives of someone overseas.

01:50:16.270 --> 01:50:24.937
[UNKNOWN]: So in my experience, they wanted to make payouts, and they were eager to pay all people who truly actually gave information that led to a bad guy.

01:50:26.097 --> 01:50:28.178
[UNKNOWN]: biggest check you've ever seen reward wise.

01:50:28.258 --> 01:50:29.998
[UNKNOWN]: The biggest one ever was 30 million.

01:50:30.038 --> 01:50:30.238
[UNKNOWN]: Wow.

01:50:30.518 --> 01:50:31.459
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:50:32.279 --> 01:50:33.339
[UNKNOWN]: Maybe this is too vague.

01:50:33.379 --> 01:50:37.280
[UNKNOWN]: But what can't the government offer a reward for in that capacity?

01:50:38.861 --> 01:50:42.162
[UNKNOWN]: Anything that the energy agency rewards committee doesn't want to put forward?

01:50:43.433 --> 01:50:45.696
[UNKNOWN]: So it's almost like a statement of work being put forward.

01:50:46.176 --> 01:50:58.369
[UNKNOWN]: It's select individuals, events and groups that are targeted and anything that's not agreed on by that organization, that collection of all the who's who in the national security world is not going to get put out.

01:50:58.469 --> 01:51:00.591
[UNKNOWN]: But it's a phenomenal model for getting to truth.

01:51:00.931 --> 01:51:01.092
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:51:02.313 --> 01:51:17.965
[UNKNOWN]: So, with the U.S. government essentially paying for secrets over what's happened, signal, I've heard a lot of maybe it's room or mill stuff, but that even what's happened, signal at this point are basically compromised because they're owned by meta and whoever do you have a perspective on that?

01:51:17.985 --> 01:51:27.433
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, can they or do they circumvent that and just the government access as those platforms now anyway without having to reward somebody?

01:51:28.011 --> 01:51:35.900
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I've heard that, you know, I've heard that there's back doors in the signal, obviously Meta owns WhatsApp, so they've got the full queue to the kingdom on that.

01:51:37.702 --> 01:51:40.726
[UNKNOWN]: With source handling, there's a risk reward to trade off, right?

01:51:40.766 --> 01:51:43.729
[UNKNOWN]: Security and speed always have these trade offs to them.

01:51:45.139 --> 01:52:07.129
[UNKNOWN]: If they have something that is truly sensitive, we had a tour tip line, so it went through the onion router over the dark web and went to a drop box that was a secure drop, so it went through layers of obfuscation for the IP address and anonymize that through a classifier, basically a handle that was given to them, died in a 5-liter on.

01:52:07.869 --> 01:52:14.114
[UNKNOWN]: So, there are channels that they can go through that are extremely secure as best as you can for anything over the internet.

01:52:14.814 --> 01:52:15.014
[UNKNOWN]: Right?

01:52:15.074 --> 01:52:15.955
[UNKNOWN]: Anything other than that?

01:52:16.095 --> 01:52:20.658
[UNKNOWN]: If it's not a state actor, they're probably not going to get access to it.

01:52:20.999 --> 01:52:22.940
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, okay.

01:52:23.620 --> 01:52:24.221
[UNKNOWN]: Generally, the case.

01:52:24.976 --> 01:52:31.200
[UNKNOWN]: So, Rords for Justice, then, did it turn into or did you leave there and start closed horizon or how did that transition happen?

01:52:31.380 --> 01:52:36.343
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, so I left Memphis, as I left D.C. move back home during COVID.

01:52:37.503 --> 01:52:41.746
[UNKNOWN]: So, COVID was still going on and the company's posture was, we were remote first.

01:52:42.346 --> 01:52:51.111
[UNKNOWN]: So, move back home in my family, start a couple other businesses that keep the lights on and close to horizon became a passion project after the Epstein files were released.

01:52:52.199 --> 01:53:01.377
[UNKNOWN]: And my co-founder and I, who worked at Awards for Justice, realized that this model for getting to truth is something that everyone should have access to.

01:53:02.098 --> 01:53:04.643
[UNKNOWN]: And so our flagship campaign is the Epstein campaign.

01:53:05.932 --> 01:53:11.778
[UNKNOWN]: How would you categorize or maybe summarize your mission statement for that company?

01:53:12.338 --> 01:53:12.478
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:53:12.498 --> 01:53:24.769
[UNKNOWN]: Closerized mission is to make truth accessible to people who are trying to find secure and secret information that others want to hidden.

01:53:26.209 --> 01:53:35.355
[UNKNOWN]: is there any guardrails on that or it's just anyone across the board and any capacity if they want to find the truth in any entity or whatever.

01:53:35.596 --> 01:53:36.636
[UNKNOWN]: There are some guardrails.

01:53:36.756 --> 01:53:39.278
[UNKNOWN]: It applies to anyone who wants to find the answer to any question.

01:53:39.418 --> 01:53:43.781
[UNKNOWN]: So the biggest guardrails is we don't accept classified information.

01:53:44.321 --> 01:53:45.582
[UNKNOWN]: We don't want people creating campaigns.

01:53:45.642 --> 01:53:47.463
[UNKNOWN]: It's also a class of information breaking the law.

01:53:48.584 --> 01:53:52.687
[UNKNOWN]: Anything that is like an unlawful premise for the creation of their campaign.

01:53:54.230 --> 01:54:01.115
[UNKNOWN]: But aside from some limited guard rails, it's built for anyone to be able to create a campaign about anything that's important to them.

01:54:01.135 --> 01:54:04.838
[UNKNOWN]: And it doesn't have to be some big conspiracy like the Epstein issue.

01:54:04.858 --> 01:54:08.721
[UNKNOWN]: It can be something like who poisoned the hundred-year-old oak tree in the town square.

01:54:09.281 --> 01:54:11.703
[UNKNOWN]: If you put out a reward for it, eventually someone's going to come forward.

01:54:11.763 --> 01:54:22.111
[UNKNOWN]: And so the intent is to make secrets so expensive to keep that eventually someone betrays the actual person who did the thing and comes forward with the information you get paid.

01:54:22.788 --> 01:54:34.428
[UNKNOWN]: And so from a, I guess almost a thesis or the mechanics of how it works, standpoint is it relegated to corporations, it's private individuals, it means there anything that's off limits.

01:54:35.241 --> 01:54:36.482
[UNKNOWN]: Anyway, we can create one.

01:54:36.502 --> 01:54:43.146
[UNKNOWN]: We have some requirements on the website for what's permissible and what's not.

01:54:43.166 --> 01:54:45.488
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, if it's too out there, it's some real crazy.

01:54:45.508 --> 01:54:46.548
[UNKNOWN]: We're not going to prove it.

01:54:48.229 --> 01:54:49.330
[UNKNOWN]: It means got to be real crazy.

01:54:49.510 --> 01:54:55.534
[UNKNOWN]: But it's built for people to connect two sides of an information marketplace.

01:54:56.034 --> 01:55:03.316
[UNKNOWN]: The person who wants the answer to the question and the person who has the knowledge, because it really anything can be faked with AI these days.

01:55:03.436 --> 01:55:08.237
[UNKNOWN]: You can fake video, you can fake pictures, you can fake documents, anything can be faked.

01:55:08.317 --> 01:55:19.460
[UNKNOWN]: And so the best way to get the truth of something is to connect the person who directly observed whatever the issue is or holds something that

01:55:26.121 --> 01:55:29.782
[UNKNOWN]: This is a reward program at a micro scale, right?

01:55:29.842 --> 01:55:33.403
[UNKNOWN]: So these aren't going to be like 10, 30 million dollar reward payouts like in the government.

01:55:33.903 --> 01:55:35.223
[UNKNOWN]: But the model is very effective.

01:55:35.343 --> 01:55:39.284
[UNKNOWN]: It's effective at surfacing what's true and paying people for it.

01:55:39.444 --> 01:55:47.245
[UNKNOWN]: And so it's crowd funded like you'd expect to go fund me where people that care about this put their money in and say this matters a lot to us.

01:55:47.305 --> 01:55:55.507
[UNKNOWN]: And so that's what we're doing with the Epstein campaign where we've got a growing reward pool that eventually will become too expensive for someone to stay silent.

01:55:55.847 --> 01:56:08.838
[UNKNOWN]: Okay, so I guess just like the last company can you walk us through kind of the start to finish of how how a case or how up I don't know what you'd call it a transaction a crowd fund me whatever how it works.

01:56:09.158 --> 01:56:11.761
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, so Someone has a question that's important to them.

01:56:12.101 --> 01:56:12.741
[UNKNOWN]: I want to know

01:56:14.839 --> 01:56:26.430
[UNKNOWN]: Who lied and do diligence for this big deal that I did or I want to know who kidnapped fluffy, right, or I want to know who poisoned the oak tree in the town square.

01:56:26.510 --> 01:56:28.452
[UNKNOWN]: I want to know who, you know,

01:56:31.693 --> 01:56:39.619
[UNKNOWN]: did something that I don't have the answer for that is causing a real negative effect in my life and in my community.

01:56:40.679 --> 01:56:42.000
[UNKNOWN]: And so they create a campaign about that.

01:56:42.741 --> 01:56:56.630
[UNKNOWN]: And why the campaign exists and what the reward requirements are for that information, that even documents the videos that they need pictures, testimonial information, whatever the requirements are to fulfill the answering of that question.

01:56:57.111 --> 01:56:59.973
[UNKNOWN]: Same way we did it for awards for justice, exact same process.

01:57:01.286 --> 01:57:06.831
[UNKNOWN]: The campaign's created, it goes through a review process to make sure that this is a legitimate campaign by a legitimate creator.

01:57:07.192 --> 01:57:16.600
[UNKNOWN]: The creator goes through KYC, so we have to know who's soliciting money and so by law we have to create a, know your customer process where they just have to be identified as, okay, this is a real person.

01:57:16.620 --> 01:57:17.742
[UNKNOWN]: This isn't some kind of fraud.

01:57:19.223 --> 01:57:20.784
[UNKNOWN]: And then they advertise it into their community.

01:57:21.045 --> 01:57:25.509
[UNKNOWN]: So if they have followers on socials, if they have, you know, their,

01:57:27.231 --> 01:57:31.235
[UNKNOWN]: friends and family, their Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, whatever.

01:57:31.656 --> 01:57:35.781
[UNKNOWN]: They promoted out to their community and if that matters to that community, if people look attribute to it.

01:57:36.221 --> 01:57:38.243
[UNKNOWN]: Just like you'd see and go find me.

01:57:38.704 --> 01:57:41.808
[UNKNOWN]: Over time, they're reward pool for that information grows as well as

01:57:42.388 --> 01:57:52.816
[UNKNOWN]: The knowledge that there's a reward for that information and someone eventually learns about it and comes forward and says, okay, like I know who lied about due diligence in this deal or I know who did this thing whatever it is.

01:57:53.436 --> 01:58:05.325
[UNKNOWN]: And if you can then prove that information right down verify it, report to law enforcement, whatever you need to do to further verify that information as this is correct, this is true, then they're eligible for the reward pool.

01:58:06.125 --> 01:58:12.851
[UNKNOWN]: in terms of to say, you know, what stops somebody from just making up a tip to try to get money is that verification process.

01:58:13.011 --> 01:58:13.472
[UNKNOWN]: That's right.

01:58:13.512 --> 01:58:13.812
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:58:13.832 --> 01:58:18.016
[UNKNOWN]: So people will try to abuse it just like they did at awards for justice.

01:58:18.036 --> 01:58:22.400
[UNKNOWN]: And it's incumbent upon the person that's built the campaign to actually verify the information.

01:58:22.420 --> 01:58:27.364
[UNKNOWN]: So investigators, watchdogs, nonprofits, corporate compliance, people that are

01:58:28.245 --> 01:58:39.179
[UNKNOWN]: a custom to dealing with competing pieces of information and determining what's true was used those tools to or even just private citizens will verify that information and determine if it's true.

01:58:40.961 --> 01:58:46.448
[UNKNOWN]: In terms of preventing or it's not even preventing because I think you kind of already mentioned that.

01:58:46.488 --> 01:58:46.608
[UNKNOWN]: But

01:58:47.349 --> 01:59:06.141
[UNKNOWN]: Is there an issue bandwidth-wise with people not necessarily making something up, but let's say they have a grievance against their boss, against a neighbor, against the mayor of whatever public figure in a town that they're kind of creating amount not of a molehill kind of thing to try to stir something like this up.

01:59:06.201 --> 01:59:08.363
[UNKNOWN]: Is that a problem you guys run into similarly?

01:59:08.623 --> 01:59:09.744
[UNKNOWN]: We've not come across that yet.

01:59:10.204 --> 01:59:11.405
[UNKNOWN]: Okay.

01:59:11.745 --> 01:59:13.706
[UNKNOWN]: Who decides when something is proven?

01:59:13.766 --> 01:59:14.707
[UNKNOWN]: Is that you or is it?

01:59:15.567 --> 01:59:18.688
[UNKNOWN]: Is there a board of directors or how does that work for our campaigns?

01:59:18.988 --> 01:59:21.709
[UNKNOWN]: It's us for other people who make their own campaigns.

01:59:21.749 --> 01:59:22.069
[UNKNOWN]: It's them.

01:59:22.649 --> 01:59:22.889
[UNKNOWN]: Okay.

01:59:23.409 --> 01:59:29.031
[UNKNOWN]: So essentially they have problem X, they build a campaign, it gets accepted.

01:59:30.251 --> 01:59:33.812
[UNKNOWN]: What is it a QR code or something where you can donate or however it works?

01:59:34.072 --> 01:59:34.872
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

01:59:35.192 --> 01:59:42.534
[UNKNOWN]: Let's say a pot of money of say $10,000, then at that point the person who built the campaign is the one who's going to decide.

01:59:43.214 --> 01:59:44.255
[UNKNOWN]: Yes, I got the answer.

01:59:44.275 --> 01:59:45.756
[UNKNOWN]: The road is going to go to this person.

01:59:45.796 --> 01:59:46.016
[UNKNOWN]: Right.

01:59:46.196 --> 01:59:56.322
[UNKNOWN]: And if they don't succeed for whatever reason, they can have a fallback where they can select a 501c3 from a list of verified 501c3s by the IRS.

01:59:56.362 --> 01:59:57.183
[UNKNOWN]: So we tie that in.

01:59:58.472 --> 02:00:22.334
[UNKNOWN]: natively to the platform, they can go select, I want all of this money to go to, you know, lost dogs or whatever the nonprofit is, a picker, nonprofit, and so that the people who are giving to this, either get resolution of the question that means a lot to them, or at the end of the day, the money goes to a nonprofit to question doesn't get answered at a certain point, does that also happen?

02:00:22.674 --> 02:00:23.215
[UNKNOWN]: That can happen.

02:00:23.435 --> 02:00:23.735
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:00:23.756 --> 02:00:25.418
[UNKNOWN]: So if it doesn't get answered, the same rules apply.

02:00:25.438 --> 02:00:30.384
[UNKNOWN]: They'll set a time limit on it so there can be five years, ten years, one year, whatever it is.

02:00:30.864 --> 02:00:38.273
[UNKNOWN]: If it doesn't get answered within that time, they can choose to extend it and then notify all of their backers or they can choose to accept it.

02:00:38.373 --> 02:00:40.716
[UNKNOWN]: Maybe they're not going to get that answer and they pay it out to the non-profit.

02:00:41.757 --> 02:00:56.160
[UNKNOWN]: Is there either a concern or maybe a way to prevent an elaborate hoax where maybe several people are working together to do something that seems like a big problem, but it isn't to stir up this thing.

02:00:56.180 --> 02:01:08.922
[UNKNOWN]: I know that seems like typical criminal behavior where it's like if you put that amount of effort into something positive, you'd be successful, but I'm routinely dumbfounded at the amount of effort people will put into scamming or, you know,

02:01:09.642 --> 02:01:12.925
[UNKNOWN]: disillusioning or what have you if you run into that or is that a concern?

02:01:13.065 --> 02:01:13.706
[UNKNOWN]: We haven't yet.

02:01:13.766 --> 02:01:15.067
[UNKNOWN]: We're always concerned about that.

02:01:15.607 --> 02:01:24.035
[UNKNOWN]: We always want to make sure that people are not using misinformation and disinformation to scam someone out of something.

02:01:24.075 --> 02:01:25.556
[UNKNOWN]: So that hasn't happened yet.

02:01:26.137 --> 02:01:31.021
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, we have also KYC protocols for when someone receives the money.

02:01:31.421 --> 02:01:35.025
[UNKNOWN]: So not until payout, do you have to give any kind of identifying information?

02:01:35.225 --> 02:01:35.405
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:01:35.745 --> 02:01:35.965
[UNKNOWN]: So.

02:01:36.866 --> 02:01:41.909
[UNKNOWN]: Once you do a pal, though, you have to submit information that it can't be done anonymously.

02:01:41.929 --> 02:01:57.137
[UNKNOWN]: So if someone does fraud, the system is pretty difficult to trick, you're going to have to go through legitimate, like banking grade verification protocols to make sure that you're the really who you say you are.

02:01:58.306 --> 02:02:08.290
[UNKNOWN]: You mentioned that this was born out of the Epstein thing and that something that you've gone down that rabbit hole more than almost anyone, if not anyone.

02:02:09.070 --> 02:02:16.753
[UNKNOWN]: Can you kind of walk us through, I guess, how that's initially started and where it's led you to investigation lies?

02:02:17.114 --> 02:02:17.434
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:02:18.890 --> 02:02:25.813
[UNKNOWN]: You didn't expect this, you know, in 2019 when he died, I just intuitively felt something was off.

02:02:25.833 --> 02:02:26.594
[UNKNOWN]: Allegedly died.

02:02:26.714 --> 02:02:27.254
[UNKNOWN]: Allegedly.

02:02:27.354 --> 02:02:28.194
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:02:28.915 --> 02:02:29.235
[UNKNOWN]: That's right.

02:02:29.255 --> 02:02:33.177
[UNKNOWN]: When he allegedly died, 2019, I just felt something didn't sit right.

02:02:33.197 --> 02:02:33.777
[UNKNOWN]: Did you feel that?

02:02:34.057 --> 02:02:34.397
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:02:34.437 --> 02:02:41.121
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, I talked about it on National TV has a lot of people have seen, so for sure, I think most people did.

02:02:41.181 --> 02:02:43.802
[UNKNOWN]: You know, most people I think saw that and said, man, something's not right.

02:02:44.527 --> 02:02:46.449
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I didn't feel, I didn't just didn't feel right.

02:02:46.469 --> 02:02:48.230
[UNKNOWN]: I love that clip on Fox News, by the way.

02:02:49.512 --> 02:02:49.832
[UNKNOWN]: It's great.

02:02:49.852 --> 02:02:52.595
[UNKNOWN]: And you said, Epstein didn't kill himself.

02:02:52.615 --> 02:02:58.960
[UNKNOWN]: And this became the slogan of everyone who didn't believe the official story.

02:02:59.741 --> 02:03:00.702
[UNKNOWN]: And I believe that as well.

02:03:00.802 --> 02:03:01.523
[UNKNOWN]: I looked at that.

02:03:04.057 --> 02:03:15.945
[UNKNOWN]: analysis by the medical examiner hired by Epstein's brother who said that his death is more consistent with strangulation and thought, oh yeah, he for sure was murdered.

02:03:15.965 --> 02:03:32.597
[UNKNOWN]: There's no way that he committed suicide and fell hook line and sinker for a false narrative from early on, it was presented one of two options, either he killed himself or he was murdered, there was the only two, and either case he's dead.

02:03:34.767 --> 02:03:41.290
[UNKNOWN]: I fell hook line sinker for this deliberately crafted false narrative of choosing one of these two.

02:03:42.150 --> 02:03:54.095
[UNKNOWN]: And I can get into why, but I believe that was constructed, it was deliberate, but eventually when the files were released, the first group of them, I started to dig into them.

02:03:54.315 --> 02:03:59.878
[UNKNOWN]: By the time the second group had released, I looked at them enough that I realized that the evidence

02:04:01.621 --> 02:04:06.788
[UNKNOWN]: shows strongly that the most likely scenario that happened was that you left that saw live.

02:04:06.808 --> 02:04:07.869
[UNKNOWN]: There's only three options.

02:04:08.870 --> 02:04:13.076
[UNKNOWN]: Either he killed himself, he was murdered, or he left that saw alive.

02:04:13.436 --> 02:04:19.704
[UNKNOWN]: And of the three him leaving that saw live is that one of the few his problems because that's what the story of the files tell.

02:04:20.090 --> 02:04:26.878
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, can you lay out the documented anomalies that led you to that conclusion or suspected conclusion?

02:04:27.518 --> 02:04:29.000
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I'll cover some big ones.

02:04:30.141 --> 02:04:33.965
[UNKNOWN]: We have them laid out, claimed by claim at Epstein isn't dead.org.

02:04:34.586 --> 02:04:37.850
[UNKNOWN]: So there's 22 or 24 I think we all in there now.

02:04:39.456 --> 02:05:05.371
[UNKNOWN]: We're very careful not to speculate and what we've done is we lay out the claim and the source for all of these because it's a big claim and so you got to make sure you're doing it in a responsible way and we source these directly from the files themselves anywhere that the files have shown one of these claims we document it very carefully so I give you a first one and I want to what your thoughts are about this this is important for

02:05:06.532 --> 02:05:07.312
[UNKNOWN]: the context.

02:05:07.512 --> 02:05:10.414
[UNKNOWN]: So I'm going to show these to the camera as I pass them over to Mike.

02:05:10.974 --> 02:05:11.794
[UNKNOWN]: Who's that in that picture?

02:05:13.415 --> 02:05:17.997
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, it sure looks like Jeffrey Epstein, but this is Robert Marius.

02:05:18.837 --> 02:05:20.237
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:05:20.257 --> 02:05:22.698
[UNKNOWN]: This is an Austrian passport.

02:05:24.879 --> 02:05:25.359
[UNKNOWN]: You see this?

02:05:25.760 --> 02:05:26.480
[UNKNOWN]: I've never seen this.

02:05:26.560 --> 02:05:26.740
[UNKNOWN]: No.

02:05:27.540 --> 02:05:34.503
[UNKNOWN]: So this is an Austrian passport with Epstein's face on it and the alias are Robert Marius.

02:05:36.595 --> 02:05:41.544
[UNKNOWN]: This is a valid travel document that had exit an interest stamp on it.

02:05:42.105 --> 02:05:46.673
[UNKNOWN]: And so this is a real passport, like it was issued by Austria, because that's something that can be proven.

02:05:47.289 --> 02:05:58.052
[UNKNOWN]: I can't prove that it was issued by Austria, I can't prove that it was used as a travel document that was accepted at entry exit points in the countries that validated it in the stamps and the passport.

02:05:58.612 --> 02:06:02.753
[UNKNOWN]: So whether it was furnished by someone else or furnished by Austria, I don't know, but it was used.

02:06:03.293 --> 02:06:07.634
[UNKNOWN]: Do you know what port of entries are stamped in it?

02:06:08.254 --> 02:06:09.714
[UNKNOWN]: Yes, let's even recall them from memory.

02:06:09.734 --> 02:06:10.514
[UNKNOWN]: They're on the website.

02:06:10.574 --> 02:06:11.895
[UNKNOWN]: I think it's Saudi Arabia, France.

02:06:14.108 --> 02:06:14.628
[UNKNOWN]: There's one more.

02:06:14.648 --> 02:06:15.748
[UNKNOWN]: We have them listed on there.

02:06:15.768 --> 02:06:19.830
[UNKNOWN]: There's three that he traveled to.

02:06:20.170 --> 02:06:30.032
[UNKNOWN]: And this was discovered in his safe in New York during the execution of the search warrant on his Manhattan property.

02:06:33.373 --> 02:06:34.734
[UNKNOWN]: Is this in the IG report?

02:06:35.154 --> 02:06:35.954
[UNKNOWN]: This is in the files.

02:06:35.974 --> 02:06:36.754
[UNKNOWN]: That's in the files.

02:06:36.834 --> 02:06:37.154
[UNKNOWN]: Yes.

02:06:37.194 --> 02:06:40.175
[UNKNOWN]: The IG report only covers what happened in the Metropolitan Correctional Center

02:06:43.041 --> 02:06:48.687
[UNKNOWN]: And so this is what I mean when I talk about the story that the files themselves tell I include the OIG report in that.

02:06:50.089 --> 02:06:54.333
[UNKNOWN]: This is a very interesting piece of information that first connected him to

02:06:57.172 --> 02:07:00.633
[UNKNOWN]: Some group that can get him a passport under an alias.

02:07:01.413 --> 02:07:02.153
[UNKNOWN]: So who can do that?

02:07:02.273 --> 02:07:12.676
[UNKNOWN]: Well, consular, if you submit fake, or sorry, not fake, fraudulent information, as, and I guess, Austrian citizen, right?

02:07:13.156 --> 02:07:23.258
[UNKNOWN]: The Austrian consular gets this application, and he's got fraudulent information on an Austrian passport application.

02:07:24.735 --> 02:07:29.898
[UNKNOWN]: or it could be furnished by intelligent service who creates things like this.

02:07:30.118 --> 02:07:31.559
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:07:32.300 --> 02:07:45.048
[UNKNOWN]: I can't make out what what it says in terms of the subject, but where it says Saudi Arabia on the inside of it, is that his noted place of birth from this standpoint, or

02:07:45.968 --> 02:07:49.410
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I think that's his residence.

02:07:50.270 --> 02:07:57.633
[UNKNOWN]: So it's an Austrian passport to him with a different name saying that he lives in Saudi Arabia.

02:07:57.753 --> 02:07:57.993
[UNKNOWN]: Right.

02:07:58.153 --> 02:08:00.334
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, there's so many things wrong with it.

02:08:00.654 --> 02:08:01.975
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:08:02.335 --> 02:08:03.076
[UNKNOWN]: Wow, OK.

02:08:03.736 --> 02:08:13.140
[UNKNOWN]: So why do you have a passport under a different name for a different country and it's nationality for residence in Saudi Arabia?

02:08:15.918 --> 02:08:18.359
[UNKNOWN]: We start to learn about who this person actually was.

02:08:18.399 --> 02:08:21.279
[UNKNOWN]: He's presented it as this socialite billionaire.

02:08:21.299 --> 02:08:23.100
[UNKNOWN]: I don't think it was a billionaire.

02:08:23.140 --> 02:08:25.060
[UNKNOWN]: He cried a lot of money, but I don't think it was a billionaire.

02:08:25.360 --> 02:08:26.400
[UNKNOWN]: Certainly not the heat-earned.

02:08:28.381 --> 02:08:35.122
[UNKNOWN]: This is the first evidence that he's connected to something much bigger than what he presents as.

02:08:35.862 --> 02:08:37.603
[UNKNOWN]: And this is in the ID report.

02:08:37.623 --> 02:08:39.703
[UNKNOWN]: This is in the Epstein files release.

02:08:39.823 --> 02:08:44.244
[UNKNOWN]: OK. Is there any context around this or explanation or it's just in there?

02:08:44.710 --> 02:08:53.356
[UNKNOWN]: This is taken as part of the evidence that was released in connection with the raid on the Manhattan Town Home.

02:08:54.036 --> 02:08:57.218
[UNKNOWN]: So this was pulled out of a safe in his Manhattan apartment.

02:08:57.799 --> 02:09:01.861
[UNKNOWN]: Does that report or do those files give any amplifying info?

02:09:01.901 --> 02:09:05.564
[UNKNOWN]: Or it's just this was found and there's no other bookings on it.

02:09:05.664 --> 02:09:06.644
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, none that I found.

02:09:06.924 --> 02:09:13.729
[UNKNOWN]: Have you ever seen or heard any explanation from any government entity in regards to how or why this would exist?

02:09:14.177 --> 02:09:28.567
[UNKNOWN]: Um, his lawyers said that he gave a sort of an instant explanation as you have never called it it was his lawyers gave the explanation that this was used is sort of like a novelty item where it wasn't used for any kind of actual purpose.

02:09:28.587 --> 02:09:35.031
[UNKNOWN]: It was kept as this novelty item for accepted his stamp Senate.

02:09:35.051 --> 02:09:35.292
[UNKNOWN]: Right.

02:09:37.233 --> 02:09:37.473
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:09:37.513 --> 02:09:39.354
[UNKNOWN]: So they offered this mundane explanation, but no

02:09:40.195 --> 02:09:43.618
[UNKNOWN]: but this wasn't found until after he will just say disappeared.

02:09:43.998 --> 02:09:47.001
[UNKNOWN]: This was a found before he disappeared.

02:09:47.061 --> 02:09:48.923
[UNKNOWN]: So this was part of the war.

02:09:48.943 --> 02:09:50.664
[UNKNOWN]: Now this was almost in terms of timing.

02:09:50.704 --> 02:09:51.725
[UNKNOWN]: It was probably a matter of months.

02:09:51.765 --> 02:09:52.826
[UNKNOWN]: I'm nearly contemporaneous.

02:09:53.707 --> 02:09:59.432
[UNKNOWN]: But this was the arrest as part of the search warrant that was performed to incident his arrest.

02:09:59.975 --> 02:10:06.599
[UNKNOWN]: And because he's gone before anything actually went to trial, this isn't dissected in a court.

02:10:06.939 --> 02:10:07.599
[UNKNOWN]: Right, at all.

02:10:07.920 --> 02:10:09.040
[UNKNOWN]: And that could never happen.

02:10:10.061 --> 02:10:12.602
[UNKNOWN]: Because if he went to trial, it goes to discovery.

02:10:13.363 --> 02:10:14.703
[UNKNOWN]: And this was before the files came out.

02:10:15.504 --> 02:10:20.987
[UNKNOWN]: And discovery and criminal discovery, the plaintiff's in the defendist would surface everything.

02:10:21.487 --> 02:10:27.291
[UNKNOWN]: They would bring out financial records, logs, associates, people that he'd worked with now,

02:10:30.941 --> 02:10:36.444
[UNKNOWN]: Everything that they would never want out would come out during criminal discovery and in the public trial.

02:10:36.784 --> 02:10:38.284
[UNKNOWN]: So we could have never gone to trial.

02:10:38.424 --> 02:10:42.246
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, this is for sure a red flag.

02:10:42.306 --> 02:10:43.507
[UNKNOWN]: What else do you have?

02:10:43.947 --> 02:10:52.171
[UNKNOWN]: So this is the first one and there's again a bunch on there and so I don't want to go through them all.

02:10:52.191 --> 02:10:54.592
[UNKNOWN]: I'm going to bring you some of the highlights, some of the big ones.

02:10:55.772 --> 02:10:56.813
[UNKNOWN]: So I'm going to give you

02:10:59.309 --> 02:11:01.091
[UNKNOWN]: Let's see if I got two pieces of paper here.

02:11:02.273 --> 02:11:06.317
[UNKNOWN]: So I'm plump, show these to the camera, I'm plumped up these two pieces of legal paper here.

02:11:10.623 --> 02:11:12.185
[UNKNOWN]: Did you go through a sear school?

02:11:12.485 --> 02:11:12.765
[UNKNOWN]: I did.

02:11:13.987 --> 02:11:15.308
[UNKNOWN]: Did you go through the evasion part?

02:11:15.669 --> 02:11:15.989
[UNKNOWN]: Oh yeah.

02:11:16.810 --> 02:11:17.331
[UNKNOWN]: Good time.

02:11:18.533 --> 02:11:21.614
[UNKNOWN]: I guess it depends on what you catch the two does a good time.

02:11:22.714 --> 02:11:27.035
[UNKNOWN]: I look back fondly on it, while I was going through it, I didn't particularly enjoy it.

02:11:28.275 --> 02:11:31.176
[UNKNOWN]: What I'm showing you here is Epstein's Avision Plan.

02:11:32.436 --> 02:11:32.696
[UNKNOWN]: Really?

02:11:33.296 --> 02:11:36.777
[UNKNOWN]: So this is something that doesn't get hardly any coverage.

02:11:36.957 --> 02:11:40.157
[UNKNOWN]: And it's astounding to me that no one's covering this.

02:11:40.437 --> 02:11:41.618
[UNKNOWN]: Was this also in his head?

02:11:41.678 --> 02:11:41.918
[UNKNOWN]: Yes.

02:11:42.298 --> 02:11:43.298
[UNKNOWN]: This was in his cell.

02:11:43.838 --> 02:11:44.278
[UNKNOWN]: Oh, really?

02:11:44.898 --> 02:11:47.139
[UNKNOWN]: So I'm going to contextualize this document

02:11:51.192 --> 02:11:57.116
[UNKNOWN]: leading up to this, Epstein met with his lawyers for 12 hours per day, allegedly his lawyers.

02:11:58.177 --> 02:12:04.102
[UNKNOWN]: I think the real lawyers in the room, but I also think there could be other people too, but he definitely met with his lawyers up to 12 hours per day.

02:12:05.843 --> 02:12:11.247
[UNKNOWN]: At the end of these meetings and before he allegedly kills himself,

02:12:12.685 --> 02:12:20.929
[UNKNOWN]: For 12 hours a day, they construct the last will in testament and put everything into a trust.

02:12:20.949 --> 02:12:25.892
[UNKNOWN]: $577 million in the 1953 trust, named over his birth year.

02:12:26.932 --> 02:12:33.976
[UNKNOWN]: So it's meaning with these lawyers, any restructures is in entire financial estate right before you allegedly dies.

02:12:35.257 --> 02:12:37.638
[UNKNOWN]: These documents are on legal paper.

02:12:41.175 --> 02:12:49.279
[UNKNOWN]: I believe that these documents were written while he's with these lawyers as he's preparing to evade.

02:12:49.639 --> 02:12:57.823
[UNKNOWN]: Now you're probably asking like many people do, all right Ryan, why would he leave his evasion plan in his cell?

02:12:58.903 --> 02:13:00.944
[UNKNOWN]: And my answer is a few things.

02:13:01.144 --> 02:13:03.265
[UNKNOWN]: One, he has terrible opposite.

02:13:03.285 --> 02:13:06.847
[UNKNOWN]: He was talking about trafficking kids over Gmail, right?

02:13:08.345 --> 02:13:08.805
[UNKNOWN]: Is it care?

02:13:09.226 --> 02:13:10.968
[UNKNOWN]: Two, he's already gotten one sweet heart deal.

02:13:11.788 --> 02:13:18.855
[UNKNOWN]: And two thousand seven when he was trying to be, I was hoping they were trying to prosecute him for sex trafficking in Florida.

02:13:19.616 --> 02:13:22.138
[UNKNOWN]: So he knows he's gonna sneak out of there.

02:13:22.779 --> 02:13:27.803
[UNKNOWN]: And the third is, this is a fuck you to everybody.

02:13:29.365 --> 02:13:31.247
[UNKNOWN]: It's a huge fuck you to everyone.

02:13:31.647 --> 02:13:33.509
[UNKNOWN]: Here it is, and you can't do anything about it.

02:13:34.843 --> 02:13:35.904
[UNKNOWN]: Can you make sense of this?

02:13:35.924 --> 02:13:41.387
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, for me, it's difficult to kind of ascertain what most of it actually means.

02:13:41.607 --> 02:13:44.989
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, it seems larger, like a bunch of scribbling.

02:13:45.009 --> 02:13:46.430
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, I can make out some of the words.

02:13:46.470 --> 02:13:52.553
[UNKNOWN]: But do you get a just of to kind of read it readers, digest, summarize the plan, what it is?

02:13:52.853 --> 02:13:53.173
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:13:54.393 --> 02:14:06.976
[UNKNOWN]: I won't walk you through every scribble on here about a little walk you through some of the highlights, the big ones that, because I actually don't think all scribbles on here when I can even read to, I think, or a relevant, but I'm going to walk you through why this is an invasion plan.

02:14:08.516 --> 02:14:14.057
[UNKNOWN]: The first thing that stands out is in the middle, top of the page is the word red notice.

02:14:15.218 --> 02:14:17.438
[UNKNOWN]: I should know the red notice, so for

02:14:18.893 --> 02:14:24.903
[UNKNOWN]: For those listening, a red notice is a interpol notice for a fugitive that goes out worldwide to policing agencies.

02:14:26.406 --> 02:14:32.196
[UNKNOWN]: Now, why is a guy who's about to take his own life worried about a fugitive notice?

02:14:35.268 --> 02:14:36.248
[UNKNOWN]: that doesn't make sense.

02:14:37.209 --> 02:14:54.996
[UNKNOWN]: I guess I would ask is there any part of you that thinks or has considered that this would be a wild goose chase a decoy where like this is all just total BS and none of it's accurate but it was left intentionally to do that not the opposite but something totally different.

02:14:55.536 --> 02:15:02.439
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah for sure there are there's always the case that could this this could be misinformation and disinformation.

02:15:04.220 --> 02:15:14.967
[UNKNOWN]: Um, I do wait that in my analysis of this document, it could be left to deliberately behind for us to look at this and think that we've got this clue and he's pulling a fast one and it's not anything on here.

02:15:15.448 --> 02:15:30.178
[UNKNOWN]: What does make me feel like this is something that is likely to hold weight is operationally, these are the things that someone would go through to try to figure out how to escape.

02:15:31.931 --> 02:15:33.492
[UNKNOWN]: so the first it says red notice up there.

02:15:34.593 --> 02:15:37.435
[UNKNOWN]: I'm going to walk your attention down to the middle right of the page.

02:15:37.555 --> 02:15:39.077
[UNKNOWN]: Do you see that compound on the right side?

02:15:39.617 --> 02:15:39.797
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:15:40.458 --> 02:15:42.499
[UNKNOWN]: So what does that look like to you?

02:15:43.400 --> 02:15:48.724
[UNKNOWN]: It looks like an airplane hanger and airport and a semi trailer with pallets all around it next to it.

02:15:48.944 --> 02:15:49.204
[UNKNOWN]: Right.

02:15:49.384 --> 02:15:49.665
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:15:50.125 --> 02:15:52.007
[UNKNOWN]: So it also says I'm Brad on it.

02:15:52.187 --> 02:15:52.327
[UNKNOWN]: Hmm.

02:15:53.511 --> 02:15:56.532
[UNKNOWN]: There's an airport, two hours from there called Bradley International Airport.

02:15:56.792 --> 02:16:02.234
[UNKNOWN]: This would be a great choice for someone who wants to get out without going to LaGuardia or JFK.

02:16:03.275 --> 02:16:09.937
[UNKNOWN]: So above this airport, it says jet versus prop or jet US prop.

02:16:10.517 --> 02:16:14.499
[UNKNOWN]: So I don't know if that is a consideration, is the jet US property?

02:16:14.739 --> 02:16:21.322
[UNKNOWN]: That comes with its own considerations if it's flying, leaving the country on a jet

02:16:23.662 --> 02:16:30.468
[UNKNOWN]: it says jet versus prop like could be a prop plane that he's flying regionally on, I don't know.

02:16:30.868 --> 02:16:38.174
[UNKNOWN]: But it indicates that he intends to leave possibly from his airport from some air conveyance and then go where.

02:16:39.221 --> 02:16:45.444
[UNKNOWN]: Above that, it says Q and SA, so some people look at that as a cutter and Saudi Arabia.

02:16:45.744 --> 02:16:48.826
[UNKNOWN]: We already know it has the Saudi Arabian connections.

02:16:48.866 --> 02:16:51.567
[UNKNOWN]: To the left, he has a map, it looks like it could be Cyprus.

02:16:53.949 --> 02:16:59.491
[UNKNOWN]: It looks pretty close to Cyprus, it's a little drawing of what looks like a country.

02:17:00.892 --> 02:17:02.273
[UNKNOWN]: As you continue to walk up the page,

02:17:04.288 --> 02:17:15.748
[UNKNOWN]: There are different clues on here that further indicate his intent to solve problems during the course of the vision.

02:17:16.782 --> 02:17:25.971
[UNKNOWN]: So at the top he's got a question about blackmail and dollars next to it, he's got guards beneath that.

02:17:26.932 --> 02:17:33.799
[UNKNOWN]: So if you're going to escape you got to worry about guards if you've got blackmail money, you've got to figure out how to get to those people so you can get money.

02:17:35.780 --> 02:17:43.382
[UNKNOWN]: Speaking of those people, it says Mara Benita, which was, I believe, the judge in his 2007 case.

02:17:44.162 --> 02:17:50.904
[UNKNOWN]: So that's an open question why that's written on there, but you can tell he's thinking about sort of legal processes and what's happened historically.

02:17:51.484 --> 02:17:54.345
[UNKNOWN]: Benita, it says gangsters, do it that what you will.

02:17:55.926 --> 02:18:01.147
[UNKNOWN]: These are pieces of evidence that are completely at odds with someone who's wanted to take their life.

02:18:04.642 --> 02:18:08.464
[UNKNOWN]: The other piece is the location that I overlooked a second ago.

02:18:08.484 --> 02:18:10.565
[UNKNOWN]: It says Nigeria next to Q and essay.

02:18:11.366 --> 02:18:19.930
[UNKNOWN]: So we for sure know that he's written down these locations as he's thinking about this plane, which has written directly beneath it.

02:18:19.990 --> 02:18:27.034
[UNKNOWN]: So does that indicate he's trying to figure out how to find a country to hide away in for a while.

02:18:28.175 --> 02:18:32.357
[UNKNOWN]: I think that's the best guess and that connects with his call to his girlfriend the night before.

02:18:34.069 --> 02:18:35.150
[UNKNOWN]: Who was this girlfriend at the time?

02:18:35.170 --> 02:18:40.056
[UNKNOWN]: So he had this girlfriend at her name, slips my mind, I should know her name.

02:18:40.537 --> 02:18:41.378
[UNKNOWN]: You can look up her name.

02:18:42.680 --> 02:18:43.801
[UNKNOWN]: He has this girlfriend at the time.

02:18:44.562 --> 02:18:49.267
[UNKNOWN]: And he makes a phone call from the shower area

02:18:51.470 --> 02:19:13.256
[UNKNOWN]: present on a legal line that's it's supposed to be for law here so it's protected by turning client privilege so you can't record it and he tells the person that's supervising this phone call this calling his mother well his mother's been dead for a year so he's not calling his mom he makes this phone call to this New York area code this mail picks up the mail then it patches the call through to Bellarooce

02:19:14.991 --> 02:19:24.621
[UNKNOWN]: a woman picks up and talks you for 20 minutes and he tells her after they talk about life in prison and just sort of make small talk about I think like literature and some things.

02:19:25.242 --> 02:19:30.127
[UNKNOWN]: He tells her hey this is going to take longer than I thought and I might not be able to talk to you for a month.

02:19:32.412 --> 02:19:33.153
[UNKNOWN]: And that ends the call.

02:19:33.553 --> 02:19:35.894
[UNKNOWN]: So it's recorded, but you can't use it in.

02:19:36.374 --> 02:19:40.437
[UNKNOWN]: It came up in a turning proffer and the OIG report this conversation.

02:19:41.397 --> 02:19:55.004
[UNKNOWN]: And so it was not, the call itself was not recorded, but there was someone that was standing there that has recounted this phone call, how we got on the phone, who we spoke to as a supervisor in the Metropolitan Correctional Center.

02:19:55.485 --> 02:19:56.805
[UNKNOWN]: And then there was some,

02:19:59.392 --> 02:20:04.276
[UNKNOWN]: effort made to contact this person to see if they are willing to make a statement and they were not.

02:20:05.577 --> 02:20:12.363
[UNKNOWN]: In terms of how he was able to make that call is that odd for him to have been able to use that phone or is that normal?

02:20:12.663 --> 02:20:13.684
[UNKNOWN]: It violates protocol.

02:20:13.704 --> 02:20:26.013
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know if it was odd to violate protocol in that person, like if some prisoners had some sort of special rights that were not rights as there are, some sort of special treatment that were at odds with what the prison should allow.

02:20:28.730 --> 02:20:34.675
[UNKNOWN]: a unrecorded call not to your attorney to some person in Belarus, for example, right.

02:20:34.815 --> 02:20:39.238
[UNKNOWN]: The redacted section down towards the bottom, I assume, that the US government redacted that.

02:20:39.699 --> 02:20:40.139
[UNKNOWN]: That's right.

02:20:40.159 --> 02:20:41.100
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, so that's redacted.

02:20:41.180 --> 02:20:42.881
[UNKNOWN]: Why didn't redact this whole document?

02:20:42.901 --> 02:20:50.988
[UNKNOWN]: I have my theories about, but beneath that redaction, it says G and the meaning that says computer.

02:20:52.438 --> 02:20:55.779
[UNKNOWN]: Dash, PB, question mark, question mark, V. I.

02:20:56.539 --> 02:21:04.581
[UNKNOWN]: My best read on that is he called Galane G. And then computer, Palm Beach, question mark, or Virgin Islands.

02:21:05.382 --> 02:21:09.523
[UNKNOWN]: So he's thinking about Galane, some computer, somewhere in Palm Beach, or Virgin Islands.

02:21:09.963 --> 02:21:11.543
[UNKNOWN]: And he doesn't notorious scriblar.

02:21:11.763 --> 02:21:16.145
[UNKNOWN]: So I think it's pretty safe to say that this is his handwriting and this is his scribbles.

02:21:18.285 --> 02:21:20.286
[UNKNOWN]: But the really interesting piece for this document.

02:21:21.325 --> 02:21:22.326
[UNKNOWN]: It's on the second page.

02:21:22.946 --> 02:21:27.629
[UNKNOWN]: Before you get into that, what is the word with the question mark right below the redacted box, do you know?

02:21:28.109 --> 02:21:28.590
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know.

02:21:29.971 --> 02:21:30.571
[UNKNOWN]: Can you read that?

02:21:31.051 --> 02:21:37.235
[UNKNOWN]: I'm depart maybe, or I can't tell what it is, but anyway, sorry, go ahead.

02:21:37.976 --> 02:21:41.238
[UNKNOWN]: And that's the other piece of why I find this document to be incredible.

02:21:41.558 --> 02:21:48.763
[UNKNOWN]: If you were to create a misinformation, you think you make it a little bit more legible.

02:21:49.283 --> 02:21:49.483
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:21:50.710 --> 02:21:54.474
[UNKNOWN]: Well, I guess if he knows what he wrote, then maybe it doesn't matter.

02:21:54.514 --> 02:21:57.558
[UNKNOWN]: But okay, sorry.

02:21:57.578 --> 02:21:59.840
[UNKNOWN]: So the second page you said is even more interesting.

02:22:00.481 --> 02:22:04.365
[UNKNOWN]: The second page is also helps answer your question.

02:22:04.385 --> 02:22:07.048
[UNKNOWN]: The top is complaining about something he's having a bad day.

02:22:08.330 --> 02:22:09.932
[UNKNOWN]: Something about kept me in a...

02:22:11.273 --> 02:22:16.296
[UNKNOWN]: I think that's locked, shower cell for one hour or so, something bad happens in the shower.

02:22:16.336 --> 02:22:22.600
[UNKNOWN]: It's got, I think he's trying to say, burnt food, giant bugs, no fun.

02:22:22.720 --> 02:22:26.562
[UNKNOWN]: He's just sort of complaining at the top part of this page.

02:22:26.822 --> 02:22:29.343
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know why he felt the need to write that down, but he did.

02:22:30.244 --> 02:22:37.268
[UNKNOWN]: If you flip it over at the top, it says jail out equals 10.

02:22:37.408 --> 02:22:38.589
[UNKNOWN]: Do you see that?

02:22:38.909 --> 02:22:39.129
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:22:40.415 --> 02:22:44.199
[UNKNOWN]: What does it say above that can you tell I can tell FLD year.

02:22:44.779 --> 02:22:45.740
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, it looks like FLD.

02:22:45.760 --> 02:22:57.772
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know what that means JL out equals 10 And on August 10th 2019 deadoral life he was out of that cell.

02:22:59.193 --> 02:23:01.976
[UNKNOWN]: What does it say below that nothing at all

02:23:03.890 --> 02:23:05.151
[UNKNOWN]: No, I can't tell.

02:23:05.171 --> 02:23:06.871
[UNKNOWN]: Can you read any more of that?

02:23:07.211 --> 02:23:07.591
[UNKNOWN]: I can't.

02:23:07.952 --> 02:23:16.355
[UNKNOWN]: And I'm really, I'm very reticent to speculate, unless I can for sure read it, and there's some things on here that I just don't know what he's trying to write.

02:23:16.975 --> 02:23:23.237
[UNKNOWN]: And there's two more redacted sections, then it says what 926 Something BB.

02:23:23.797 --> 02:23:26.038
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, 926, B, and that's maybe an R

02:23:29.177 --> 02:23:29.918
[UNKNOWN]: and then boosts.

02:23:30.358 --> 02:23:33.881
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know, and then a BB beneath it.

02:23:34.241 --> 02:23:40.005
[UNKNOWN]: Who would have been, maybe you don't know, do you know who would have been responsible for actually redacting, what's redacted them?

02:23:40.285 --> 02:23:41.586
[UNKNOWN]: This is an interesting question.

02:23:42.206 --> 02:23:45.869
[UNKNOWN]: Redactions are fascinating to me because I believe that there is not

02:23:48.932 --> 02:24:01.460
[UNKNOWN]: uniformity in how this is being done and I don't know if it's because of sloppiness or lack of coordination or if it's done because we have people that actually take their oath to our constitution seriously.

02:24:02.401 --> 02:24:08.525
[UNKNOWN]: So reductions are done by FBI and DOJ lawyers and special agents.

02:24:09.566 --> 02:24:13.568
[UNKNOWN]: So these are people who have been assigned this information to perform reductions on.

02:24:13.849 --> 02:24:15.330
[UNKNOWN]: There are millions of documents.

02:24:16.203 --> 02:24:24.347
[UNKNOWN]: And so they're not going to be able to even have a sophisticated way to do this that doesn't involve extremely time-intensive levels of review.

02:24:24.907 --> 02:24:31.591
[UNKNOWN]: There are people who have been assigned to a reductions that this is not their normal thing that they do.

02:24:33.231 --> 02:24:35.673
[UNKNOWN]: So then it leaves a couple of possibilities, okay?

02:24:35.793 --> 02:24:42.856
[UNKNOWN]: So are they actually able to redact all these and go through levels of review in the time from Congress gave them?

02:24:42.876 --> 02:24:43.957
[UNKNOWN]: And then I don't think that's the case.

02:24:45.086 --> 02:24:55.890
[UNKNOWN]: My read on the redactions is that some of these things have been allowed to be in here because there are people in the inside who are not okay with this cover up.

02:24:58.851 --> 02:25:11.275
[UNKNOWN]: If you redact everything in there that could possibly show what the truth is, you have to have complete solidarity among all the people that are actually sitting on the computer

02:25:14.800 --> 02:25:15.740
[UNKNOWN]: all of this information.

02:25:16.101 --> 02:25:17.301
[UNKNOWN]: And I don't think they have that.

02:25:18.302 --> 02:25:29.406
[UNKNOWN]: My guess is that there are FBI agents and DOJ lawyers who take their oath to the Constitution seriously and things like this get through.

02:25:33.608 --> 02:25:37.510
[UNKNOWN]: Because if you're really trying to do the cover up and this is true, why let this entire document through it all?

02:25:37.950 --> 02:25:38.170
[UNKNOWN]: Right.

02:25:39.279 --> 02:25:53.608
[UNKNOWN]: Well, I mean, there was a portion of, I think, the presidential campaign that, if my memory serves me correct, that was kind of hinging on, figuring this out and releasing the files, and, you know, I know that that's been

02:25:54.488 --> 02:25:59.532
[UNKNOWN]: retracted a little bit is that no, it was never actually a campaign point where it sure seemed like it was.

02:25:59.812 --> 02:26:10.359
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, or at least it was talked about a lot, you know, and especially the first few months of of the current administration being in office, there was a lot of talk.

02:26:10.379 --> 02:26:18.345
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, they even brought in all those influencers to the White House and handed them these binders with, I'm assuming some of this was in there, maybe all of it.

02:26:19.265 --> 02:26:25.830
[UNKNOWN]: Um, why go to all that trouble and emphasize it so much and then dismiss it so quickly afterwards.

02:26:25.870 --> 02:26:27.731
[UNKNOWN]: Do you have any perspective on that?

02:26:28.632 --> 02:26:29.613
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, all that was theater.

02:26:30.593 --> 02:26:32.975
[UNKNOWN]: I think all that was just theater like, oh, here you go.

02:26:32.995 --> 02:26:37.198
[UNKNOWN]: We'll get all these influencers and people to come up here and hold up these books.

02:26:37.258 --> 02:26:39.200
[UNKNOWN]: None of this was in those binders that I'm aware of.

02:26:40.201 --> 02:26:45.223
[UNKNOWN]: I don't think any of this came out until the actual files themselves were released by Congress because Congress forced it.

02:26:45.683 --> 02:26:50.846
[UNKNOWN]: People like Massey coming in there and saying, release it because of the XD files transparency act.

02:26:53.187 --> 02:27:04.792
[UNKNOWN]: So all of these documents and a lot of the things that have been released that are posing these big question marks are all released in the files and they're all in the IG report.

02:27:04.932 --> 02:27:05.312
[UNKNOWN]: That's right.

02:27:05.792 --> 02:27:09.194
[UNKNOWN]: What if anything do you have that the IG report does not have?

02:27:10.887 --> 02:27:12.488
[UNKNOWN]: So this is not in the IG report.

02:27:17.132 --> 02:27:21.256
[UNKNOWN]: He's next to, but they're very interesting.

02:27:21.476 --> 02:27:26.941
[UNKNOWN]: So I don't have a color printer, and I had to rush out the door.

02:27:27.061 --> 02:27:27.902
[UNKNOWN]: This should be in color.

02:27:27.922 --> 02:27:31.324
[UNKNOWN]: So I'm going to show this file and then I can contextualize it.

02:27:34.167 --> 02:27:35.268
[UNKNOWN]: So there's this YouTuber.

02:27:36.405 --> 02:27:37.425
[UNKNOWN]: You ever watch King of the Hill?

02:27:37.826 --> 02:27:38.006
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:27:38.426 --> 02:27:39.606
[UNKNOWN]: So there's Rusty Shackleford.

02:27:39.626 --> 02:27:40.687
[UNKNOWN]: Remember Rusty Shackleford?

02:27:40.707 --> 02:27:41.887
[UNKNOWN]: So that's his YouTube handle.

02:27:42.528 --> 02:27:47.410
[UNKNOWN]: And I've talked about this before, and I've brought Rusty Shackleford and people were like, that's King of the Hill.

02:27:47.430 --> 02:27:49.071
[UNKNOWN]: I'm like, yeah, I know.

02:27:49.091 --> 02:27:51.852
[UNKNOWN]: I'm not saying it was Rusty Shackleford from King of the Hill that did this.

02:27:52.372 --> 02:27:53.613
[UNKNOWN]: That was his YouTube handle.

02:27:53.633 --> 02:27:54.513
[UNKNOWN]: That's guy that did this.

02:27:55.153 --> 02:27:59.155
[UNKNOWN]: So this guy flies this drone over the little St. James, so Epstein Island.

02:27:59.515 --> 02:28:03.817
[UNKNOWN]: He goes, and this is after 2019, and this is pre-public AI.

02:28:03.897 --> 02:28:05.038
[UNKNOWN]: Now the government probably had AI.

02:28:06.158 --> 02:28:17.465
[UNKNOWN]: This is pre-public access to large language models that can be used to manipulate video and this was even before the Will Smith eating spaghetti that looked absolutely absurd.

02:28:17.485 --> 02:28:18.886
[UNKNOWN]: This is prior to that.

02:28:19.487 --> 02:28:21.068
[UNKNOWN]: And he takes this and you can still see this.

02:28:21.108 --> 02:28:22.569
[UNKNOWN]: We link this on our website.

02:28:23.669 --> 02:28:27.752
[UNKNOWN]: This guy flies the stone for a while over little saying James.

02:28:28.632 --> 02:28:30.694
[UNKNOWN]: And then he flies it over to about the middle of the island.

02:28:36.523 --> 02:29:02.908
[UNKNOWN]: and it just sits there for a second and this guy on the side by side leans out and looks up and we get this still of this person who's a manorism's build hair color complexion looks like abstine now i can't say for sure it's him because i don't have the ability to do that no one does but this is a very meaningful piece of information that is in public liable

02:29:04.786 --> 02:29:07.327
[UNKNOWN]: channels that people can go look at and make their own conclusion.

02:29:08.047 --> 02:29:23.114
[UNKNOWN]: So this was not in the OIG report or in the files themselves, but it further corroborates this belief that you love that saw alive and this individual people can make their own decision about.

02:29:25.134 --> 02:29:27.215
[UNKNOWN]: This is not in the IG report, correct?

02:29:28.196 --> 02:29:28.996
[UNKNOWN]: You said you had another one.

02:29:29.756 --> 02:29:30.437
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, so

02:29:35.879 --> 02:29:39.001
[UNKNOWN]: One of those photos is his mugshot.

02:29:41.663 --> 02:29:51.030
[UNKNOWN]: The other photo is taken by the New York Post of Epstein on the gurney leaving the Metropolitan Cractional Center.

02:29:53.612 --> 02:29:57.055
[UNKNOWN]: The earlobe and the trages

02:29:59.150 --> 02:30:05.895
[UNKNOWN]: have a different looks to them between these two years, as well as the bridge of the nose.

02:30:06.635 --> 02:30:11.739
[UNKNOWN]: Now when you die does your face change for sure, does it change that much in a matter of hours?

02:30:13.240 --> 02:30:13.440
[UNKNOWN]: No.

02:30:14.861 --> 02:30:22.507
[UNKNOWN]: So why does Epstein alive and his mugshot from the Metropolitan Correctional Center and his just criminal proceedings in the bookings?

02:30:22.527 --> 02:30:24.868
[UNKNOWN]: So his face that we can

02:30:28.854 --> 02:30:29.054
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:30:29.914 --> 02:30:33.216
[UNKNOWN]: And that one of the rights taken by the New York Post, you can find both of these in both of those sources.

02:30:33.916 --> 02:30:36.077
[UNKNOWN]: That's not the same nose in the same ear.

02:30:37.438 --> 02:30:37.758
[UNKNOWN]: Why?

02:30:40.259 --> 02:30:50.163
[UNKNOWN]: We do know for sure that the FBI released a, there's a memo released from the FBI internal memo, saying that they used a,

02:30:51.982 --> 02:30:59.010
[UNKNOWN]: sheets and boxes to create a decoy body for the media to follow leaving the Metropolitan Correctional Center.

02:31:00.152 --> 02:31:00.973
[UNKNOWN]: This doesn't look like that.

02:31:01.233 --> 02:31:01.974
[UNKNOWN]: That's not what that is.

02:31:02.752 --> 02:31:07.937
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, that's a body for sure, like you're not making that silhouette and that image with sheets and boxes.

02:31:08.177 --> 02:31:08.437
[UNKNOWN]: Right.

02:31:08.758 --> 02:31:17.526
[UNKNOWN]: So there's conflicting things going on here with him leaving and who it wasn't the girl in the FBI says, well, we use sheets and boxes to create a decoy.

02:31:17.846 --> 02:31:20.809
[UNKNOWN]: So admittedly, they're using a decoy of some kind.

02:31:21.570 --> 02:31:23.952
[UNKNOWN]: And then they're saying it was covered up, oh, well, this is...

02:31:25.678 --> 02:31:35.362
[UNKNOWN]: not actually him and the real one is going over to where they're taking him after these living the cell that will not all the media to follow him.

02:31:36.182 --> 02:31:37.383
[UNKNOWN]: That's not what's happening here though.

02:31:37.923 --> 02:31:53.410
[UNKNOWN]: So that's a meaningful piece of information because both of those sources are verifiable and the nose and the ear are biometric markers that you can't just create out of thin air unless you're using advanced prosthetics and masks and things.

02:31:54.650 --> 02:32:03.077
[UNKNOWN]: So, the last piece of information that we really want to look at all of it, but Nick McKinley is

02:32:06.083 --> 02:32:20.317
[UNKNOWN]: been helpful in this and he helped create a statistical model that showed what would actually mathematically be required for the cameras to fail the footage to go missing the roommate to be taken out.

02:32:20.397 --> 02:32:24.521
[UNKNOWN]: All of the anomalies that happen inside the cell and in the jail writ large.

02:32:25.963 --> 02:32:30.627
[UNKNOWN]: What mathematically would have to happen for this to be true?

02:32:31.028 --> 02:32:39.697
[UNKNOWN]: So take out of this sort of subjective analysis of looking at earlobes and noses into mathematical realm for identifying.

02:32:41.390 --> 02:32:57.338
[UNKNOWN]: How many variables there are and how many of those can be looked at as definitive variables in all the things that went wrong in that cell, the ones that are the biggest ones and then compound them for these two occur all at the same time.

02:32:58.988 --> 02:33:01.129
[UNKNOWN]: What are the odds of this and it's astronomical.

02:33:01.289 --> 02:33:05.531
[UNKNOWN]: I'm going to say you probably have a better chance when in power ball than Yeah, for that to happen.

02:33:06.051 --> 02:33:07.792
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, multiple times over.

02:33:07.932 --> 02:33:12.594
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, you probably got shot when in the power ball more than one which he did actually when in that crazy.

02:33:12.634 --> 02:33:16.196
[UNKNOWN]: What do you make of that I mean to me it just adds another layer of

02:33:17.887 --> 02:33:23.332
[UNKNOWN]: What, you know, to the whole thing is it, and it was like 30 million in an Oklahoma or something, right?

02:33:23.392 --> 02:33:26.415
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, it wasn't some crazy amuse of significant amount.

02:33:26.475 --> 02:33:27.296
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, it was real money.

02:33:27.596 --> 02:33:31.360
[UNKNOWN]: And in an Oklahoma, yeah, I mean, like that doesn't even begin to make sense.

02:33:31.460 --> 02:33:32.320
[UNKNOWN]: How does that happen?

02:33:32.340 --> 02:33:32.601
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know.

02:33:32.621 --> 02:33:33.482
[UNKNOWN]: So it was all that fake?

02:33:33.802 --> 02:33:34.903
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I don't know.

02:33:35.243 --> 02:33:35.624
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know.

02:33:37.005 --> 02:33:44.031
[UNKNOWN]: What was been formally charged with and did he get fined or, I guess, what was the repercussion that came of that?

02:33:44.271 --> 02:33:46.133
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, he got charged with trespassing and they dropped it.

02:33:46.153 --> 02:33:46.874
[UNKNOWN]: That was it.

02:33:46.894 --> 02:33:47.755
[UNKNOWN]: So no fine nothing.

02:33:47.895 --> 02:33:48.095
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:33:48.215 --> 02:33:51.958
[UNKNOWN]: Well, have you talked to any of the victims?

02:33:52.719 --> 02:33:53.480
[UNKNOWN]: I have.

02:33:54.020 --> 02:33:54.200
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:33:54.321 --> 02:33:54.981
[UNKNOWN]: I'm curious.

02:33:55.181 --> 02:33:56.342
[UNKNOWN]: What do they have to say?

02:33:58.523 --> 02:33:59.624
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, that's a great question.

02:34:00.704 --> 02:34:05.727
[UNKNOWN]: This belief that he left that Saul live is not a fringe belief among victims.

02:34:07.028 --> 02:34:07.829
[UNKNOWN]: They believe this.

02:34:07.849 --> 02:34:10.530
[UNKNOWN]: Now, I'm not going to speak universally for all victims.

02:34:11.111 --> 02:34:12.512
[UNKNOWN]: How many of you talk to you?

02:34:12.552 --> 02:34:14.853
[UNKNOWN]: I've talked to three personally myself.

02:34:14.953 --> 02:34:21.597
[UNKNOWN]: And then I have a friend who I've worked with in the countertraffing space for a long time, who has threw her talk to a bunch more.

02:34:22.858 --> 02:34:25.799
[UNKNOWN]: And she has relayed this to me from them.

02:34:26.540 --> 02:34:33.983
[UNKNOWN]: I've tried to speak with them directly, and I encourage any to speak with me directly who want to, but I can understand caution or reserves if they don't want to.

02:34:34.343 --> 02:34:42.747
[UNKNOWN]: But the ones I've spoken to also have this belief, and the ones that my colleague has spoken to said that many share this belief.

02:34:43.487 --> 02:34:49.750
[UNKNOWN]: And among the people who are somehow either geographically or relationally

02:34:52.951 --> 02:35:00.557
[UNKNOWN]: people in the island victims, they, many believe that he's loved that soul life and maybe still alive today.

02:35:00.577 --> 02:35:02.078
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:35:02.178 --> 02:35:08.042
[UNKNOWN]: So I guess I would say kind of where are we or you at now in terms of sifting through all this?

02:35:08.062 --> 02:35:15.567
[UNKNOWN]: You've raised a lot of red flags, anomalies, good points, statistical anomalies that would indicate

02:35:17.467 --> 02:35:22.668
[UNKNOWN]: a further or deeper level of suspicion, where do you go from here with all of this?

02:35:24.048 --> 02:35:25.729
[UNKNOWN]: This is why we created the reward program.

02:35:26.049 --> 02:35:27.709
[UNKNOWN]: We looked at this and said, no way.

02:35:27.969 --> 02:35:28.709
[UNKNOWN]: I make you mad.

02:35:28.969 --> 02:35:40.991
[UNKNOWN]: You know, you look at it and you think, if this child trafficker who compromised our institutions through blackmail campaigns for decades, I mean, maybe goes back five or more presidential

02:35:46.168 --> 02:35:47.028
[UNKNOWN]: What do you do with that?

02:35:47.408 --> 02:35:48.668
[UNKNOWN]: Do you just accept it?

02:35:48.768 --> 02:35:49.709
[UNKNOWN]: And we just couldn't accept it.

02:35:49.769 --> 02:35:54.409
[UNKNOWN]: We just said, this deserves further effort.

02:35:55.170 --> 02:36:04.231
[UNKNOWN]: And so a part of it involves ongoing investigative effort to put then part of it involves creating something operational to solicit further truth from people who have insider knowledge.

02:36:05.011 --> 02:36:10.992
[UNKNOWN]: And we're not going to be able to probably, unless someone is just exceptionally generous, get this up to rewards for justice numbers.

02:36:11.772 --> 02:36:13.713
[UNKNOWN]: But we wanted to give someone enough money

02:36:15.353 --> 02:36:37.544
[UNKNOWN]: looks at this and says, okay, I'm willing to come forward and it's not going to be an associate, it's not going to be his billionaire buddies, it's not going to make enough difference to them for the dollar amount that's there, but the gardener, the housekeeper, the medical professional, the security, the people who know, he love that saw alive, I saw him, and I'm going to come forward with that information.

02:36:38.024 --> 02:36:41.326
[UNKNOWN]: We want to incentivize them to break that trust and

02:36:43.066 --> 02:36:48.129
[UNKNOWN]: give us the truth about what happened to Epstein after August of 2019?

02:36:48.309 --> 02:36:50.190
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, what is that now?

02:36:50.850 --> 02:36:51.290
[UNKNOWN]: 54,000.

02:36:51.310 --> 02:37:06.398
[UNKNOWN]: To put the shoe on the other foot or almost maybe play devil's advocate, if I think if I, and it's difficult to be fair to look at it objectively, right, because of all the things that you mentioned.

02:37:07.358 --> 02:37:20.850
[UNKNOWN]: I am curious, though, on the other side of the coin, let's say the amount of people that would have to be in cohoots and stay quiet and not be motivated by money or fear or whatever.

02:37:21.010 --> 02:37:30.639
[UNKNOWN]: There's also a pretty significant number of people who would have to fall into that category that are all willing to go along with that for this to be pulled off, too, no?

02:37:32.900 --> 02:37:34.781
[UNKNOWN]: because the guards, right?

02:37:35.141 --> 02:37:36.981
[UNKNOWN]: I think you could get him out of the jail with three people.

02:37:37.261 --> 02:37:37.781
[UNKNOWN]: Three people.

02:37:38.362 --> 02:37:41.423
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I think you can get him out of jail with just a few people.

02:37:41.583 --> 02:37:42.763
[UNKNOWN]: I think you keep that really small.

02:37:42.943 --> 02:37:45.824
[UNKNOWN]: I think you could further compartmentalize who knows what.

02:37:46.504 --> 02:37:49.665
[UNKNOWN]: So some people may have a piece of it, but never enough to actually make a difference.

02:37:50.485 --> 02:37:52.606
[UNKNOWN]: And then you sphere to get the others in line.

02:37:52.981 --> 02:38:11.646
[UNKNOWN]: Because I understand the fear of thing, but even a one guard or one facility employee that either cracks or slips up or whatever, even something as simple as I was approached in this guy threatened me, like there hasn't been a single one of those even.

02:38:13.887 --> 02:38:17.588
[UNKNOWN]: If you were to, I guess, prioritize the anomalies as

02:38:19.529 --> 02:38:26.694
[UNKNOWN]: It kind of the most influential or maybe critical is a better word to use for it to have been pulled off.

02:38:27.014 --> 02:38:32.758
[UNKNOWN]: Have you done that where you could say like, this is the most critical thing where if this doesn't happen, none of it does.

02:38:32.798 --> 02:38:34.980
[UNKNOWN]: I know to a certain extent kind of all of them are that way.

02:38:35.915 --> 02:38:55.196
[UNKNOWN]: my point in the line of questioning is have those people been vetted who would have been let's say you keep that number at three where you really could do it with only three people who are those three people that would have had to have been part of it to actually get him out of there and how hard have they been looked out.

02:38:55.316 --> 02:38:55.917
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah for sure.

02:38:56.858 --> 02:39:02.308
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, a problem with this is you don't get access to those people very easily, right?

02:39:02.348 --> 02:39:03.991
[UNKNOWN]: So how do you incentivize them to come to you?

02:39:05.053 --> 02:39:07.818
[UNKNOWN]: Now people on the inside you could do it with

02:39:10.223 --> 02:39:33.466
[UNKNOWN]: really just one person who can get him out of that cell into a trip van and then leave and we see that in the forechand post which we cover on our site where someone observes a trip van that's unaccounted for or come into the metropolitan correctional center of that night to get him out and so in an ideal world I want to talk to the person who observed this where that trip van went.

02:39:33.906 --> 02:39:34.146
[UNKNOWN]: All right.

02:39:35.346 --> 02:39:41.969
[UNKNOWN]: There's limitations to private investigation that you've got your right and left limits that you can butt up against.

02:39:42.109 --> 02:39:42.309
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:39:43.069 --> 02:39:46.190
[UNKNOWN]: So the incentive then becomes them coming to us.

02:39:47.170 --> 02:39:55.373
[UNKNOWN]: And if we can't get ahold of them, we want them to have something meaningful on the other end if they're willing to disclose that information.

02:39:57.465 --> 02:40:10.115
[UNKNOWN]: Well, so for the small handful of people that would have had to have contributed, I mean and I guess also to be fair, like people escape from prison on their own all the time, you know, nobody's help.

02:40:10.595 --> 02:40:16.100
[UNKNOWN]: So I'm certainly not naive and again, I'm just trying to see it from all sides or play tables advocate, but the

02:40:17.160 --> 02:40:29.545
[UNKNOWN]: I guess are you familiar with or know anything about any of those people that either could or would have had to have been like We don't know who those people are with their names are with their backgrounds like none of that has been public.

02:40:29.605 --> 02:40:36.888
[UNKNOWN]: We do know the guards names and we do know the name of the individual who created the 4chan post, right?

02:40:36.908 --> 02:40:38.248
[UNKNOWN]: But they've gone completely silent.

02:40:38.268 --> 02:40:41.670
[UNKNOWN]: The guards are actually initially prosecuted for falsifying their logs.

02:40:42.590 --> 02:40:50.958
[UNKNOWN]: And then after that, I've got a completely silent and there's nothing that has come out publicly about them after their deferred prosecution agreements.

02:40:51.698 --> 02:40:54.040
[UNKNOWN]: So, those people are out there.

02:40:54.461 --> 02:40:55.121
[UNKNOWN]: They exist.

02:40:55.782 --> 02:41:00.566
[UNKNOWN]: The other people that you can look for are the ones who would have seen him after he's got out.

02:41:01.227 --> 02:41:03.049
[UNKNOWN]: To verify that that's the case.

02:41:03.989 --> 02:41:04.330
[UNKNOWN]: I think,

02:41:05.935 --> 02:41:10.118
[UNKNOWN]: After he'd left, he had a network of people who were extremely loyal to him.

02:41:11.219 --> 02:41:17.624
[UNKNOWN]: His property manager in the Virgin Islands, for example, had little Saint James, extremely loyal.

02:41:17.644 --> 02:41:25.530
[UNKNOWN]: He paid for her schooling for her kids, gave her every opportunity, financially, to succeed there.

02:41:25.550 --> 02:41:26.730
[UNKNOWN]: You can see that from the files.

02:41:27.671 --> 02:41:31.954
[UNKNOWN]: And for that reason, she was always very loyal to him all the way up into the end.

02:41:36.138 --> 02:41:40.132
[UNKNOWN]: are going to have the true believers, and then the people who are

02:41:42.352 --> 02:41:43.373
[UNKNOWN]: kind of on the outside.

02:41:43.413 --> 02:41:57.401
[UNKNOWN]: And we saw this with some of the people who were like security support or contractors at the island or people who went out there for some purpose that's unrelated to being a direct associate of him.

02:41:58.061 --> 02:41:59.822
[UNKNOWN]: Those are the ones that are going to have these clues.

02:42:00.883 --> 02:42:07.426
[UNKNOWN]: Those are the ones that are going to have a piece of information because getting the grand slam would be great if someone came and said here's how he did it.

02:42:07.687 --> 02:42:08.907
[UNKNOWN]: Here's A to B.

02:42:09.047 --> 02:42:09.328
[UNKNOWN]: Here's

02:42:10.268 --> 02:42:12.630
[UNKNOWN]: everything that was done to go to that cell and where he went afterwards.

02:42:12.930 --> 02:42:27.262
[UNKNOWN]: That's less likely than us having this long-term commitment to justice and truth and using a reward program as the mechanism for that to last a decade or more and gradually get information from people who have a little piece of it.

02:42:27.782 --> 02:42:28.783
[UNKNOWN]: And we're starting to see some of that.

02:42:29.023 --> 02:42:30.264
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:42:31.245 --> 02:42:33.126
[UNKNOWN]: So everything that minus those two

02:42:38.430 --> 02:42:55.642
[UNKNOWN]: Or the files for the files from an investigation standpoint the assume it was the DOJ that concluded from all of this that it was suicide But that was concluded when do you remember that was concluded by the medical examiner?

02:42:55.982 --> 02:43:02.166
[UNKNOWN]: Okay, so the medical examiner looked at him and said his death is consistent with

02:43:05.188 --> 02:43:17.660
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, with suicide, the medical examiner is at odds with the private medical examiner that said it looks more like it is consistent with strangulation, which would be murder or homicide, right?

02:43:19.980 --> 02:43:28.652
[UNKNOWN]: I believe that's deliberately constructed as a false narrative from day one, where we all feel for it, because you're only good in those two options, like I talked about, the third option being that you'll have to sell life.

02:43:28.933 --> 02:43:29.133
[UNKNOWN]: Right.

02:43:29.694 --> 02:43:35.442
[UNKNOWN]: As a distract with arguing over whether or not it was murder or suicide, so you don't even consider the third option.

02:43:35.742 --> 02:43:45.468
[UNKNOWN]: So what we all did, right, the initial examiner was hired by his brother, or the private examer.

02:43:45.588 --> 02:43:47.049
[UNKNOWN]: The private examiner was Harbeth's brother.

02:43:47.069 --> 02:43:54.034
[UNKNOWN]: The initial examiner was from the New York, she's a New York medical examiner.

02:43:54.334 --> 02:43:54.614
[UNKNOWN]: Okay.

02:43:55.775 --> 02:44:03.420
[UNKNOWN]: Many background on either of those medical examiners in terms of anything that would pop up in their background that may cause problems.

02:44:05.813 --> 02:44:16.199
[UNKNOWN]: both of them were Jewish and Epstein was a Jewish guy that was well connected in Jewish circles, so you could make the argument that they would be sympathetic to helping especially his brother.

02:44:17.159 --> 02:44:19.320
[UNKNOWN]: That would be the common thread that I can pull on there.

02:44:22.602 --> 02:44:37.249
[UNKNOWN]: So that was fairly early on, I mean it was probably by 2020 or before it had been concluded by those two individuals and kind of the general consensus investigation-wise that he had killed himself.

02:44:37.429 --> 02:44:38.269
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, this is right after.

02:44:38.850 --> 02:44:39.030
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:44:39.290 --> 02:44:40.910
[UNKNOWN]: So fast forward several years.

02:44:43.072 --> 02:45:01.970
[UNKNOWN]: And I could be mistaken, but I thought, I think, recollection-wise, that both cash Patel and Dan Bongino were pretty conspiracy theory in their perspective on what happened, what didn't happen, how it happened, et cetera.

02:45:02.750 --> 02:45:10.155
[UNKNOWN]: Once they got into positions of, you know, running the FBI and Banji, you know, special assignment.

02:45:10.375 --> 02:45:13.998
[UNKNOWN]: Both of their tunes changed pretty drastically and awful quick.

02:45:14.918 --> 02:45:24.024
[UNKNOWN]: Did that come across your radar in a way that contributed to your hypothesis at all, or is that just something that you throw your hands up at?

02:45:24.044 --> 02:45:25.865
[UNKNOWN]: I love about both, right?

02:45:29.307 --> 02:45:54.097
[UNKNOWN]: Look at what happened with all three, with Trump, Patell, Agino, the initially began by saying these files are going to get released, we're going to get to the bottom of it, we're going to find out what happened here, we're going to really dig in here and then about

02:45:59.969 --> 02:46:13.858
[UNKNOWN]: Why was Pam Bondi seemingly coached on talking points to distract when she was presenting on this to Congress and bringing up the Dow being over 50,000?

02:46:14.579 --> 02:46:16.080
[UNKNOWN]: That was clearly a talking point.

02:46:16.100 --> 02:46:23.465
[UNKNOWN]: She was given, talking about everything great is, here's, to distract, to hide, this was not their position before it.

02:46:23.485 --> 02:46:26.447
[UNKNOWN]: Now where they just dishonest before and trying to get into office, I don't know.

02:46:27.368 --> 02:46:28.268
[UNKNOWN]: I don't fully understand it.

02:46:28.388 --> 02:46:37.853
[UNKNOWN]: It does feel like there's a hidden hand that has changed their position and said, this is what you will publicly state now.

02:46:38.413 --> 02:46:48.898
[UNKNOWN]: And if you don't or else, I don't know, I don't fully understand the coercion or the mechanism by which they were forced to change their worldview or if they did it voluntarily.

02:46:49.198 --> 02:46:52.639
[UNKNOWN]: But those are the same people that campaign for those positions.

02:46:53.359 --> 02:46:54.220
[UNKNOWN]: What do you feel about that?

02:46:55.092 --> 02:47:00.635
[UNKNOWN]: Similarly, I mean, it's enough for me to kind of scratch my head and think, because I agree.

02:47:00.675 --> 02:47:09.941
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, all three of them seemed like they were on the war path to figure out what happened and they were going to let us know and justice will be served and you just wait till we get in there.

02:47:10.001 --> 02:47:23.469
[UNKNOWN]: And, you know, again, I can see, I mean, there's a lot of things that all politicians say that sound great during the campaign that makes you, if you believe them, want to vote for them because you want to see that come to fruition.

02:47:24.950 --> 02:47:31.891
[UNKNOWN]: To see all three of them have that about face, you know, for my perspective, there's the, okay, well, what do you know that, that we don't?

02:47:33.672 --> 02:47:50.855
[UNKNOWN]: For my perspective, it's hard to believe that there are things that they Found out or or I guess were Realized uncovered, you know, any secret or classified information that that they're now privy to that completely changes their mind

02:47:52.095 --> 02:47:58.457
[UNKNOWN]: Is that possible, I suppose, what doesn't make any sense to me is why any of that would be classified.

02:47:58.997 --> 02:48:01.218
[UNKNOWN]: Like this isn't a government operation.

02:48:02.118 --> 02:48:10.820
[UNKNOWN]: You know, Mrs. a private civilian who was either killed left or was murdered in his cell that has a lot of connections to the government.

02:48:10.840 --> 02:48:15.822
[UNKNOWN]: But I don't know why any of that should or needs to be redacted.

02:48:15.882 --> 02:48:20.263
[UNKNOWN]: That to me is the biggest red flag of all of this is the redaction.

02:48:21.565 --> 02:48:26.120
[UNKNOWN]: Like, look at Manson tapes, Ed Geen stuff, I mean, like,

02:48:27.550 --> 02:48:43.201
[UNKNOWN]: any high profile, even the thing that's going on in the news right now, the chicken flora that strangled her kids or whatever, like every stone has been uncovered, at least from what it seems, like I don't see any documents with black boxes of red action on them.

02:48:43.942 --> 02:48:54.690
[UNKNOWN]: So why is there so much red action and things not being communicated to us in terms of the investigation in this and this only?

02:48:55.350 --> 02:48:55.971
[UNKNOWN]: I could be wrong.

02:48:56.031 --> 02:49:00.776
[UNKNOWN]: Maybe there are a bunch of private individual investigations that have a ton of redacted stuff.

02:49:00.916 --> 02:49:02.637
[UNKNOWN]: I'm unaware of any of those.

02:49:03.278 --> 02:49:06.341
[UNKNOWN]: That to me is the biggest thing that doesn't make any sense.

02:49:07.502 --> 02:49:12.747
[UNKNOWN]: And to be fair, like I haven't followed it to a hundredth of probably the degree you have.

02:49:13.388 --> 02:49:17.451
[UNKNOWN]: But from what I've seen, I mean seeing something as simple as the footage.

02:49:18.367 --> 02:49:35.356
[UNKNOWN]: sections of time missing that you know how okay here here's the footage it's like well where's this what's not in there it's like what what do you mean it's not in there yeah we're not a camera failed like yeah same with Tyler Robinson footage on top of the the roof of the Charlie Kirk thing like oh yeah my

02:49:36.700 --> 02:49:40.401
[UNKNOWN]: My body cam turned off the second I got on the roof, I mean, it's like, come on.

02:49:40.421 --> 02:49:44.161
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, either you're that dumb, or you think we're that dumb, they're both unacceptable.

02:49:44.221 --> 02:50:01.525
[UNKNOWN]: So, yeah, to me, it just doesn't make any sense, and there've been no good explanations, and a lot of, you know, trying to just shove it under the rug and move on from it, which, to me, just further makes it, or makes me speculate that there's more to the story.

02:50:01.545 --> 02:50:02.665
[UNKNOWN]: The problem is, is that,

02:50:03.666 --> 02:50:27.207
[UNKNOWN]: It's just like what do you do about it, you know, and I know we'll get into the next part of the story where we actually went to the island for a brief time, but that's the thing that troubles me the most, is the people who are in these positions that are supposed to instill confidence in American society as it relates to the justice system are doing the exact opposite by pretty much every way that they've handled this.

02:50:28.937 --> 02:50:31.999
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I completely agree, and it erodes our trust in our institutions.

02:50:32.200 --> 02:50:36.343
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I mean, you feel like it's a lost cause.

02:50:36.403 --> 02:50:41.447
[UNKNOWN]: And like, you know, there's a class system for justice, for sure.

02:50:43.108 --> 02:50:45.329
[UNKNOWN]: Is there anything at this point that would change your mind?

02:50:45.790 --> 02:50:46.370
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, for sure.

02:50:46.390 --> 02:50:47.231
[UNKNOWN]: I'd love to be wrong.

02:50:47.851 --> 02:50:48.552
[UNKNOWN]: I don't want to be right.

02:50:49.473 --> 02:50:49.753
[UNKNOWN]: It doesn't.

02:50:51.080 --> 02:51:08.863
[UNKNOWN]: As if you'll good to look at this information and think that the number one pedophile got out of our most secure present that houses some of the criminals that they've hunted down drug warlords and kingpens got out of that and is free somewhere.

02:51:09.083 --> 02:51:09.363
[UNKNOWN]: It's like

02:51:10.375 --> 02:51:12.756
[UNKNOWN]: It's a bad feeling, I would love to be wrong.

02:51:12.996 --> 02:51:15.377
[UNKNOWN]: If someone came to me and said, here's the proof.

02:51:15.497 --> 02:51:16.958
[UNKNOWN]: Here's the proof, my wrong.

02:51:17.098 --> 02:51:22.981
[UNKNOWN]: I would shut it all down, we'd donate all of the money to we fight monsters, which is my buddy Ben's organization.

02:51:23.421 --> 02:51:25.102
[UNKNOWN]: If we're wrong, it all goes to him anyway.

02:51:25.122 --> 02:51:26.803
[UNKNOWN]: And that's our 501c3 fallback.

02:51:27.703 --> 02:51:29.564
[UNKNOWN]: So I would actually love to be wrong about it.

02:51:30.025 --> 02:51:31.065
[UNKNOWN]: The problem is I don't think I am.

02:51:31.085 --> 02:51:32.546
[UNKNOWN]: I think it's a...

02:51:33.809 --> 02:51:57.981
[UNKNOWN]: Most likely that he left that cell alive and so if someone were to prove that to me it would be through triple blind DNA evidence Yeah, I agree I am curious to him about the little saint James Island excursion Yes, we went to little saint James in April of this year And for context, can you overview the island structure of what he owned what he did known where it always and all that for people?

02:51:58.411 --> 02:52:07.818
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, there are two islands in the Virgin Islands that are a south of St. Thomas on the east side.

02:52:08.818 --> 02:52:11.100
[UNKNOWN]: One of them is Greater St. James, one of them is Little St. James.

02:52:11.920 --> 02:52:18.445
[UNKNOWN]: FCene Island, as it's known, is Little St. James, and that's smaller, not as you'd expect, than Greater St. James.

02:52:19.466 --> 02:52:20.566
[UNKNOWN]: And he owned,

02:52:22.167 --> 02:52:22.588
[UNKNOWN]: both of these.

02:52:23.428 --> 02:52:31.111
[UNKNOWN]: And they were sold later on to a private owner that came out of private equity and even deck off.

02:52:33.232 --> 02:52:38.895
[UNKNOWN]: Little Saint James Island is the perfect place to do a blackmail operation.

02:52:39.215 --> 02:52:40.716
[UNKNOWN]: If you want to do a blackmail operation,

02:52:43.055 --> 02:52:46.337
[UNKNOWN]: It is private, secure, it's a beautiful place.

02:52:46.458 --> 02:52:47.778
[UNKNOWN]: Lots of people would want to go there.

02:52:48.379 --> 02:52:53.583
[UNKNOWN]: It's in a cool area when you're there and you're looking out over the ocean.

02:52:53.603 --> 02:53:08.593
[UNKNOWN]: It makes you really understand why people would want to go hang out with this guy who would fly you out there, put you on his plane, put you on a helicopter, put you on his boat, bring you out there to hang out with these elite researchers and politicians and celebrities.

02:53:08.954 --> 02:53:10.375
[UNKNOWN]: I understand why someone would

02:53:11.555 --> 02:53:13.036
[UNKNOWN]: agree to go there, right?

02:53:13.316 --> 02:53:16.938
[UNKNOWN]: But the first time you go there and you see what actually is happening there You don't need to go back.

02:53:17.398 --> 02:53:24.722
[UNKNOWN]: There's no reason the Bill Clinton should have been on the lead to express flight logs Like whatever it is 19 times.

02:53:24.762 --> 02:53:29.145
[UNKNOWN]: I don't remember the number, but he went all the time So

02:53:31.473 --> 02:53:38.074
[UNKNOWN]: We create the reward program and do it ourselves to further investigating this and you can't investigate something and not go there.

02:53:38.955 --> 02:53:44.256
[UNKNOWN]: And part of our investigation uncovered some interesting things about the continued management of the island.

02:53:44.896 --> 02:53:51.017
[UNKNOWN]: One of the things that we went there for is to further investigate it, announce the reward offer locally when we're there.

02:53:51.157 --> 02:53:57.419
[UNKNOWN]: And then announce the reward offer to people who want to also care about this issue.

02:53:57.719 --> 02:53:58.419
[UNKNOWN]: It's meaningful to them.

02:53:59.279 --> 02:54:18.131
[UNKNOWN]: So we set out there and we went to the little Saint James Island and I went with Ben Owen, who runs, we fight monsters and he helps people out of trafficking and addiction and great guy and if we're wrong about any of this all from money goes to his organization and we charred a boat from St. John and their drove ourselves on down to little Saint James.

02:54:19.332 --> 02:54:20.953
[UNKNOWN]: What did you see when you got there?

02:54:21.813 --> 02:54:22.914
[UNKNOWN]: It's exactly what it looks like.

02:54:22.974 --> 02:54:23.354
[UNKNOWN]: I mean they've,

02:54:24.538 --> 02:54:29.804
[UNKNOWN]: white washed the temple literally, they painted it white so that building that was the blue and white up there on the hill.

02:54:30.625 --> 02:54:36.052
[UNKNOWN]: That building has been repainted since then, but it's exactly what the pictures look like, or that place.

02:54:36.072 --> 02:54:37.814
[UNKNOWN]: It's gorgeous, it sits out in the ocean, and

02:54:40.717 --> 02:54:43.759
[UNKNOWN]: has a little bit of infrastructure built up on it.

02:54:43.799 --> 02:54:56.308
[UNKNOWN]: It's got some paths for go-carts or not go-carts, golf carts, golf carts, drive people around on, but then there's the housing structures in the place where he would live.

02:54:56.348 --> 02:54:57.489
[UNKNOWN]: It's accessible to get to.

02:54:57.970 --> 02:55:03.854
[UNKNOWN]: It's a 15-minute boat ride from St. John, so it's even less from St. Thomas.

02:55:05.096 --> 02:55:24.948
[UNKNOWN]: did you have any trouble getting to it like where they're security or anything like that trying to prevent you from or did you just came right up on a boat pulled up alongside a peer and got off and walked on straight up to it we jumped off on the beach initially we were just going to stay on the on the beach because there's something called the open shoreline laws in the U.S. Virgin Islands.

02:55:26.048 --> 02:55:29.131
[UNKNOWN]: Where you can go on to the beach for any place down there.

02:55:29.151 --> 02:55:31.012
[UNKNOWN]: It's up to some distance, right?

02:55:31.512 --> 02:55:36.416
[UNKNOWN]: And so that was our plan and We decided to go up to the temple and then they chased us away.

02:55:37.037 --> 02:55:38.078
[UNKNOWN]: So you weren't there along?

02:55:38.658 --> 02:55:40.219
[UNKNOWN]: No, we were there for 20 minutes or less.

02:55:40.499 --> 02:55:44.863
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, we were there only island for probably 20 minutes or less.

02:55:45.143 --> 02:55:47.505
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, could you ballpark about how big it is?

02:55:54.414 --> 02:56:00.176
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know, I mean, is it miles?

02:56:00.196 --> 02:56:01.416
[UNKNOWN]: No, not miles.

02:56:02.456 --> 02:56:03.837
[UNKNOWN]: I could see it being a mile end-to-end.

02:56:03.857 --> 02:56:05.937
[UNKNOWN]: I couldn't see the far end from where I was.

02:56:07.198 --> 02:56:17.261
[UNKNOWN]: But based on how far I ran from one end to closer to the middle, I would guess that that was 600 meters maybe.

02:56:19.081 --> 02:56:20.862
[UNKNOWN]: And then you continue to the other side.

02:56:20.882 --> 02:56:20.922
[UNKNOWN]: So

02:56:23.709 --> 02:56:45.478
[UNKNOWN]: maybe not too far from a mile, especially because it sort of is this weird shape that is almost like not, let's suppose to describe it, it's weirdly shaped so the island has places where on some ends it's longer than others, so I don't know the actual distance between those two points.

02:56:45.578 --> 02:56:46.539
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, maybe about a mile.

02:56:46.559 --> 02:56:47.359
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, maybe so.

02:56:47.799 --> 02:57:00.990
[UNKNOWN]: Do you recall roughly about how many structures were on it that you saw I only saw a few structures So they had the temple up on one side, which is what everyone calls it on and they actual purpose of that building People call it the temple.

02:57:01.550 --> 02:57:03.032
[UNKNOWN]: It's the iconic building with the dome.

02:57:03.692 --> 02:57:05.213
[UNKNOWN]: Then there was some sacrifice.

02:57:05.634 --> 02:57:06.174
[UNKNOWN]: Maybe so.

02:57:06.735 --> 02:57:07.015
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah

02:57:08.787 --> 02:57:17.595
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, they did some weird stuff there for sure, but there's the temple, then there's living facilities, and then there's an area that they called the dungeon.

02:57:19.056 --> 02:57:20.337
[UNKNOWN]: Is it what it is called?

02:57:20.417 --> 02:57:27.043
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, it's a concrete structure in the side of the hill there where they threw my buddy bin after they hogtied him and kidnapped him.

02:57:28.000 --> 02:57:29.260
[UNKNOWN]: Well, let's hear about that.

02:57:29.340 --> 02:57:33.041
[UNKNOWN]: So security approaches you guys are taking pictures and checking the place out.

02:57:34.682 --> 02:57:42.524
[UNKNOWN]: I am curious was it a parent like what nationality the security guys were like what were they wearing?

02:57:42.564 --> 02:57:45.965
[UNKNOWN]: What were they were the carrying weapons like all that kind of stuff?

02:57:46.400 --> 02:57:54.506
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, so there was initially a golf cart that approaches and it's got one individual on it.

02:57:54.566 --> 02:58:02.111
[UNKNOWN]: Black guy, younger, maybe maybe in his 30s, who comes up to the temple.

02:58:02.652 --> 02:58:09.537
[UNKNOWN]: And then it's followed by a second golf cart, the purchase up with two more guys on it, also looks like him.

02:58:09.557 --> 02:58:13.539
[UNKNOWN]: I think some of them were speaking Creole, so patience.

02:58:14.588 --> 02:58:20.934
[UNKNOWN]: And then there's a third golf cart that approaches, or maybe it was a side-by-side, but it was like a golf cart side-by-side.

02:58:21.494 --> 02:58:29.681
[UNKNOWN]: And that had a woman on it who was the daughter of the island manager.

02:58:31.423 --> 02:58:33.825
[UNKNOWN]: And she also was like the other three.

02:58:33.845 --> 02:58:36.708
[UNKNOWN]: And so there was four people there that encountered us as we were leaving.

02:58:36.848 --> 02:58:37.648
[UNKNOWN]: How are they dressed?

02:58:38.669 --> 02:58:40.351
[UNKNOWN]: Casually kind of island casual.

02:58:45.146 --> 02:58:45.326
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

02:58:45.626 --> 02:58:50.110
[UNKNOWN]: And were the super confrontational first or was it more inquisitive?

02:58:50.290 --> 02:58:55.755
[UNKNOWN]: It was inquisitive until the woman showed up and then she was directing them to basically capture us.

02:58:55.795 --> 02:58:56.936
[UNKNOWN]: And we were like, no way.

02:58:57.837 --> 02:58:58.738
[UNKNOWN]: We're going back to the boat.

02:58:58.778 --> 02:59:02.841
[UNKNOWN]: And so we work our way back down to the beach.

02:59:03.101 --> 02:59:04.863
[UNKNOWN]: We are through some thick brush.

02:59:05.563 --> 02:59:08.366
[UNKNOWN]: Go down to the beach and I look back

02:59:12.449 --> 02:59:27.759
[UNKNOWN]: They're pretty close and so we have to make a final swim and so we swim back to the boat and as I'm getting back to the boat I see that my buddy is starting to make it to the water and Ben gets grabbed by the other three and then the woman starts to go back over to him and so our options then are

02:59:29.140 --> 02:59:41.902
[UNKNOWN]: to go physically, release bin, which would be not what we signed up for, knowing that they could take him in for trespassing, and that's probably what would be the most likely situation as they're going to.

02:59:42.342 --> 02:59:47.603
[UNKNOWN]: Detain him, they're going to give him over trespassing, he's going to have to pay a fine or something like that, and then he's going to be cut loose.

02:59:47.983 --> 02:59:57.145
[UNKNOWN]: That's not what happened in reality, and if we had known that, which we couldn't have, we would have acted differently, but we didn't expect them to halve time kidnab been.

02:59:58.272 --> 03:00:00.193
[UNKNOWN]: So you guys got back on the boat?

03:00:01.193 --> 03:00:02.974
[UNKNOWN]: Yes, so I got back on the boat.

03:00:03.174 --> 03:00:07.176
[UNKNOWN]: And he's so we're making, we're all making the swim one at a time as we get back to the water.

03:00:07.956 --> 03:00:11.417
[UNKNOWN]: And as I'm climbing on the boat, I see CrossFit paid off.

03:00:11.597 --> 03:00:13.298
[UNKNOWN]: That CrossFit paid off, man, yeah, brother.

03:00:14.798 --> 03:00:21.201
[UNKNOWN]: So the swim runs, swim events were getting their money is worth that day.

03:00:21.221 --> 03:00:24.662
[UNKNOWN]: And we're running down the hill and these teas, I've got these sandals on that are,

03:00:27.284 --> 03:00:34.272
[UNKNOWN]: old Velcro sandals and bound in over this vegetation and my feet got all chewed up and stuff.

03:00:34.732 --> 03:00:45.885
[UNKNOWN]: But across it paid off and I get back to the boat and climbing in and Ben couldn't make the last swim safely so he sat down and we thought

03:00:48.369 --> 03:01:11.670
[UNKNOWN]: we could go like pull him away and we don't know what that's going to happen then it's a confrontation and then it's we're back on this island if we were told to leave and then that's dangerous and you know we don't want to make this a bigger thing that it is it's most likely that they're just going to hold him they're going to have the cops pick him up he's going to catch a misdemeanor trespassing he's going to pay a $50 fine recall today right instead what they do

03:01:13.292 --> 03:01:15.193
[UNKNOWN]: is two things happen at once.

03:01:15.373 --> 03:01:19.215
[UNKNOWN]: We start to get a boat pursuit where their security boat starts to chase us.

03:01:19.976 --> 03:01:26.239
[UNKNOWN]: And then as that's happening, they bind bins, legs, and his hands bind his back and start threatening to push him in the water.

03:01:26.439 --> 03:01:28.620
[UNKNOWN]: And you can't see any of those.

03:01:28.700 --> 03:01:29.981
[UNKNOWN]: You guys are evading.

03:01:30.661 --> 03:01:31.442
[UNKNOWN]: He's wrapped up.

03:01:31.482 --> 03:01:32.962
[UNKNOWN]: Did you see him get wrapped up?

03:01:33.022 --> 03:01:34.843
[UNKNOWN]: No, notice he was not there anymore.

03:01:34.863 --> 03:01:36.945
[UNKNOWN]: When I've lost all Ben, he was sitting down.

03:01:38.222 --> 03:01:42.446
[UNKNOWN]: and they, the three men were being pretty polite with him.

03:01:42.927 --> 03:01:44.728
[UNKNOWN]: Like I don't think these guys were not in charge.

03:01:45.329 --> 03:01:57.281
[UNKNOWN]: This woman was, and she was telling them later on what to do, and this is where this standard operating procedure that used before started to come in, that they used on other people that had come to this island.

03:01:58.449 --> 03:02:03.953
[UNKNOWN]: And then we meanwhile are evading first one boat in the second boat.

03:02:04.073 --> 03:02:08.596
[UNKNOWN]: And so we're going on a boat evasion through the Virgin Islands, which in hindsight was kind of fun.

03:02:09.677 --> 03:02:10.897
[UNKNOWN]: But we're kind of bowled.

03:02:11.338 --> 03:02:13.459
[UNKNOWN]: I had this rental boat that was

03:02:17.366 --> 03:02:20.248
[UNKNOWN]: like it is like a durable and flatable kind of thing.

03:02:20.728 --> 03:02:22.349
[UNKNOWN]: So it's not meant for boat chases.

03:02:22.489 --> 03:02:26.071
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, it's got like a little like 10 horsepower trolling.

03:02:26.091 --> 03:02:26.351
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

03:02:26.371 --> 03:02:30.173
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, it was beefier than that, but it was not meant for a version.

03:02:30.494 --> 03:02:31.654
[UNKNOWN]: You know, it wasn't a sweet boat.

03:02:31.994 --> 03:02:32.955
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

03:02:33.075 --> 03:02:34.136
[UNKNOWN]: So did they catch you then?

03:02:35.096 --> 03:02:38.700
[UNKNOWN]: They called up to us about the time that we're pulling back into the marina, okay.

03:02:38.920 --> 03:02:48.449
[UNKNOWN]: So they make this big scene at the marina and then we drop the boat back off, pay the gas, leave it in great condition, and tell them hey, we're leaving.

03:02:49.050 --> 03:02:56.217
[UNKNOWN]: And then they pursuished through the town right there and started looking for us and checking for us in different places.

03:02:56.297 --> 03:02:59.100
[UNKNOWN]: So we go into a bar,

03:03:00.898 --> 03:03:06.420
[UNKNOWN]: and order around a drink, sit there like tourists, and can watch them going to the different places looking inside.

03:03:07.261 --> 03:03:11.623
[UNKNOWN]: So we all split up, change clothes, go to a different bar, and then meet up later.

03:03:12.303 --> 03:03:18.846
[UNKNOWN]: And then this bar is elevated, and we tell the waitress, hey, not for nothing, but here's what's going on.

03:03:19.526 --> 03:03:20.406
[UNKNOWN]: What's the best way to leave?

03:03:20.466 --> 03:03:25.389
[UNKNOWN]: And our only options were either the ferry or helicopter.

03:03:25.909 --> 03:03:27.910
[UNKNOWN]: And so we were into helicopter and flew back out

03:03:29.670 --> 03:03:32.851
[UNKNOWN]: So Ben's still wrapped up and you have no idea what's going on.

03:03:33.011 --> 03:03:33.211
[UNKNOWN]: Right.

03:03:33.391 --> 03:03:40.113
[UNKNOWN]: So we realized when we're on the boat, we can do nothing for Ben from there.

03:03:40.493 --> 03:03:45.515
[UNKNOWN]: Our only other options to go back on that island and start some trouble.

03:03:45.955 --> 03:03:53.857
[UNKNOWN]: So we thought, okay, what we're going to do, we're going to get out of here and we're going to go pick up Ben after he's detained and he'll be fine.

03:03:55.358 --> 03:03:56.058
[UNKNOWN]: In hindsight,

03:03:57.333 --> 03:04:03.823
[UNKNOWN]: I agree that was our only option, and we felt good about that at the time, but it felt bad to leave been behind, felt terrible.

03:04:04.544 --> 03:04:11.334
[UNKNOWN]: When I picked Ben back up, I went down to where we got him, and ultimately, I said, man, man.

03:04:12.835 --> 03:04:13.696
[UNKNOWN]: I couldn't have done anything.

03:04:13.996 --> 03:04:17.078
[UNKNOWN]: There's nothing that I could have done that would have not been like a legitimate felony.

03:04:17.218 --> 03:04:21.220
[UNKNOWN]: If I go back on that island and start fighting people to pull you out of there, right?

03:04:21.260 --> 03:04:24.582
[UNKNOWN]: You shouldn't be held any, you can't hold someone for trespassing.

03:04:24.883 --> 03:04:25.943
[UNKNOWN]: Like that's against the law.

03:04:25.983 --> 03:04:27.104
[UNKNOWN]: You can't do that, right?

03:04:27.324 --> 03:04:30.346
[UNKNOWN]: But even though they're breaking the law, if I go on there, I escalated this.

03:04:30.666 --> 03:04:31.607
[UNKNOWN]: Is it illegal?

03:04:31.727 --> 03:04:32.327
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, I don't know.

03:04:32.347 --> 03:04:37.470
[UNKNOWN]: Like if somebody comes on my property in my house, I can't hog tie them and wait for the cops to get there.

03:04:37.550 --> 03:04:40.192
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, they tried to say that they affected a citizens arrest.

03:04:41.124 --> 03:04:50.618
[UNKNOWN]: But they hogtied him through a dungeon where he's starting to dehydrate and then assault the Tim while he's bound.

03:04:53.662 --> 03:04:56.306
[UNKNOWN]: If someone's trespassing and they go to leave,

03:04:57.445 --> 03:05:04.212
[UNKNOWN]: You're supposed to let them leave, as special as they're going to leave, he's physically trying to be compliant, right?

03:05:05.073 --> 03:05:08.756
[UNKNOWN]: So he goes to leave and they don't let him, which is what they got jammed up for.

03:05:08.776 --> 03:05:10.839
[UNKNOWN]: So I said this as much to him.

03:05:10.859 --> 03:05:13.822
[UNKNOWN]: I said, man, demand, I had no other option.

03:05:13.942 --> 03:05:20.128
[UNKNOWN]: And we operate on the assumption that you were going to be just fine because they're just going to call the cops and they're going to get picking away.

03:05:20.868 --> 03:05:23.491
[UNKNOWN]: Did he have any heartburn with how to have it?

03:05:23.531 --> 03:05:25.813
[UNKNOWN]: Man, Ben is a super smart cat.

03:05:26.353 --> 03:05:27.454
[UNKNOWN]: He is super smart.

03:05:27.494 --> 03:05:30.357
[UNKNOWN]: He looked at me and he said, this is the best thing that could have possibly happened.

03:05:30.697 --> 03:05:32.159
[UNKNOWN]: Because he thinks three moves ahead.

03:05:32.839 --> 03:05:39.305
[UNKNOWN]: So from when you guys run at the helicopter, how long did it take you to get him back and how exactly did you do it?

03:05:39.325 --> 03:05:40.246
[UNKNOWN]: Did you call the police?

03:05:40.306 --> 03:05:41.848
[UNKNOWN]: Or how did you go about it?

03:05:41.868 --> 03:05:42.148
[UNKNOWN]: We did.

03:05:42.188 --> 03:05:43.669
[UNKNOWN]: We called the police for arrest reports.

03:05:44.453 --> 03:05:45.994
[UNKNOWN]: And we only got nervous when there weren't any.

03:05:46.314 --> 03:05:47.635
[UNKNOWN]: And it was really just a bureaucratic thing.

03:05:47.655 --> 03:05:52.878
[UNKNOWN]: They were just not able to connect the picking him up with him being in the jail.

03:05:53.438 --> 03:05:55.979
[UNKNOWN]: But he makes a phone call from the jail.

03:05:56.019 --> 03:05:56.760
[UNKNOWN]: And I come up there.

03:05:57.220 --> 03:06:00.502
[UNKNOWN]: And this dude is sitting in the special victims unit.

03:06:00.942 --> 03:06:03.524
[UNKNOWN]: He's not handcuffed.

03:06:03.544 --> 03:06:06.645
[UNKNOWN]: He's just sitting there chatting it up with this sergeant.

03:06:07.626 --> 03:06:10.668
[UNKNOWN]: Having a conversation in the special victims unit.

03:06:12.652 --> 03:06:18.795
[UNKNOWN]: and I sit down, I expect him to be actually in custody and he's not, and I said, what happened?

03:06:19.075 --> 03:06:26.799
[UNKNOWN]: And he said, listen, I come in and I tell them what happened and they ask me, okay, do you want to get a formal statement?

03:06:27.099 --> 03:06:29.440
[UNKNOWN]: And he says, I mean, not really.

03:06:30.161 --> 03:06:32.462
[UNKNOWN]: And they look at him and they say, you were kidnapped.

03:06:34.348 --> 03:06:47.333
[UNKNOWN]: hogtied assaulted and you don't want to give a formal statement about this and he catches on like oh they want me to give a formal statement so he gives a formal statement and comes to learn that this is the second time at least that they've done this.

03:06:48.174 --> 03:07:01.519
[UNKNOWN]: They did this previously and got jammed up for it because other people went to the island and they stripped them naked hogtied them and they got in legal proceedings for doing this once before already.

03:07:01.763 --> 03:07:07.487
[UNKNOWN]: So how long was he in their custody like that for hours?

03:07:08.508 --> 03:07:15.513
[UNKNOWN]: So they hug time, they rough him up, they call the virgin ion police, they come and pick him up and take him back to the police station.

03:07:15.894 --> 03:07:17.815
[UNKNOWN]: It's unclear who called the virgin ion police.

03:07:18.376 --> 03:07:20.477
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know yet who made that phone call.

03:07:22.178 --> 03:07:26.842
[UNKNOWN]: It could have been one of the leadership, it could have been one of these Haitian guys.

03:07:28.083 --> 03:07:29.284
[UNKNOWN]: We're still unclear on that.

03:07:30.140 --> 03:07:32.881
[UNKNOWN]: So you guys took the helicopter to the bigger island?

03:07:33.121 --> 03:07:33.441
[UNKNOWN]: We did.

03:07:33.981 --> 03:07:35.542
[UNKNOWN]: And then start working it back.

03:07:36.342 --> 03:07:38.682
[UNKNOWN]: And is that where he showed up as the bigger island?

03:07:38.882 --> 03:07:40.003
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, he was on the bigger island.

03:07:40.283 --> 03:07:40.523
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

03:07:40.643 --> 03:07:41.923
[UNKNOWN]: So he was at St. Thomas.

03:07:41.943 --> 03:07:42.463
[UNKNOWN]: Okay.

03:07:42.484 --> 03:07:43.404
[UNKNOWN]: And I went down and picked him up.

03:07:43.984 --> 03:07:45.444
[UNKNOWN]: So you guys flew to St. Thomas.

03:07:45.704 --> 03:07:47.885
[UNKNOWN]: The police picked him up and take him to St. Thomas.

03:07:47.965 --> 03:07:48.165
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

03:07:49.025 --> 03:07:54.507
[UNKNOWN]: From the time that you guys bailed on the boat until you got him back about how long was that?

03:07:55.777 --> 03:07:59.661
[UNKNOWN]: So that was in the morning, and we didn't get back until the evening, so it was six or seven hours.

03:08:00.161 --> 03:08:00.782
[UNKNOWN]: So same day.

03:08:00.982 --> 03:08:01.723
[UNKNOWN]: Yes, same day.

03:08:03.524 --> 03:08:10.851
[UNKNOWN]: Did you get anything from that island that you had wanted to or anything that's actionable for what you're trying to uncover?

03:08:11.291 --> 03:08:12.092
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, absolutely.

03:08:12.292 --> 03:08:18.638
[UNKNOWN]: We learned the manager of this island, the biggest takeaway is the manager of this island is the same person that was there for,

03:08:19.924 --> 03:08:25.887
[UNKNOWN]: All of Epstein's tenure on that island, when she was there together, yeah, our anrad regas us her name.

03:08:26.068 --> 03:08:27.208
[UNKNOWN]: That was the woman in the golf curve.

03:08:27.428 --> 03:08:30.950
[UNKNOWN]: That was the woman she was on the second boat in the pursuit.

03:08:31.070 --> 03:08:32.491
[UNKNOWN]: The first boat was a security guy.

03:08:33.192 --> 03:08:34.612
[UNKNOWN]: The second boat and was on.

03:08:34.893 --> 03:08:38.835
[UNKNOWN]: So by the time we go back to the Marina, there was two boats that had caught up to us.

03:08:39.266 --> 03:09:05.203
[UNKNOWN]: Who was the woman in the golf cart that confronted you the daughter of Anne of Anne okay yeah, and so Anne has has been the manager of that island for decades Or yes years at least and she's in the files 23,000 times and we could not have known this but for going there she's still running this island she was there for all of Epstein recent years that were there she managed

03:09:06.878 --> 03:09:13.384
[UNKNOWN]: flights coming in, she managed logistics, she managed everything, security related for that island.

03:09:13.404 --> 03:09:19.129
[UNKNOWN]: So if you have a secret keeper, you have someone that knows where all the skeletons are buried, it's a hand-rod regas.

03:09:19.349 --> 03:09:21.751
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

03:09:21.951 --> 03:09:25.915
[UNKNOWN]: Who bought the island and have you looked into that firm at all?

03:09:26.515 --> 03:09:29.137
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, it's a, it's a, it got him Stephen deck off.

03:09:29.906 --> 03:09:47.400
[UNKNOWN]: who's this New York private equity guy there's a lot of ties to both islands that's unclear uh... no mention of him in the logs at all no it seems to be a arm's distance agreement or arm's assistance purchase i can't find anything that directly has tied them

03:09:47.956 --> 03:10:00.664
[UNKNOWN]: Do you know if anything is being done with that island other than it's now privately owned by somebody at arms distance and there's nobody on it or are there things going on because that's where Is it that's the island where that drone footage was taken.

03:10:00.704 --> 03:10:01.124
[UNKNOWN]: That's right.

03:10:01.225 --> 03:10:04.647
[UNKNOWN]: That's what's really strange to us and part of the reason we went down there.

03:10:05.888 --> 03:10:09.330
[UNKNOWN]: Initially that island in the press releases was stated to be

03:10:18.489 --> 03:10:22.670
[UNKNOWN]: There's no permits pulled, there's no structures built, there's no demolition, nothing's changed.

03:10:22.890 --> 03:10:23.070
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

03:10:23.670 --> 03:10:42.294
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, it does seem odd, just trying to think of, like, if you put yourself in Epstein shoes, going back to that island seems like about the worst place you could go for all those reasons, like there's gonna be people trying to go there, even if it's like some weird psycho-tourism thing.

03:10:43.107 --> 03:11:06.498
[UNKNOWN]: like that that seems like about the last place that you would you would want to go back to to me did you have a different thought process on that or is that hiding in plain sight because it's the worst place that's why I'm going to go there I think it's one of the safest places you could have gone yeah because imagine if you had I just showed you what looked like drone footage some guy put out drone footage to the world

03:11:08.105 --> 03:11:09.966
[UNKNOWN]: no one did anything, no one believed him.

03:11:11.287 --> 03:11:17.931
[UNKNOWN]: Because it's steps, so it means steps removed from what people perceive as a reasonable claim until you've seen the evidence.

03:11:18.611 --> 03:11:22.054
[UNKNOWN]: You have to first believe that he's alive and you have a second belief that he'd go to that island.

03:11:22.094 --> 03:11:22.314
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

03:11:22.874 --> 03:11:25.396
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, it's the classic hiding and plain sight kind of thing.

03:11:25.636 --> 03:11:25.836
[UNKNOWN]: Yes.

03:11:29.478 --> 03:11:42.647
[UNKNOWN]: All right, so kind of coming back full circle is to why it still matters, where you started where we're at now and kind of what are the next steps for where you're at, what's the next play.

03:11:43.207 --> 03:11:51.753
[UNKNOWN]: I first started out just to show people this evidence, I want people to make their own conclusions, don't take my word for it, I want people to go in and look at the evidence.

03:11:52.653 --> 03:11:57.397
[UNKNOWN]: from the files and the store that it tells and they make their own conclusions and they're free of disagree with me.

03:11:57.517 --> 03:11:58.217
[UNKNOWN]: Plenty of people do.

03:11:58.538 --> 03:12:00.159
[UNKNOWN]: It's one of the people that I respect disagree with me.

03:12:00.699 --> 03:12:01.940
[UNKNOWN]: I don't think that they're correct.

03:12:02.401 --> 03:12:03.161
[UNKNOWN]: I think that I'm right.

03:12:03.201 --> 03:12:04.923
[UNKNOWN]: I don't enjoy being right about this.

03:12:05.663 --> 03:12:13.890
[UNKNOWN]: But I wanted people to make their own conclusions where they can look at it themselves and they can say, okay, right, I don't agree with where I end, but this is, there's some smoke here.

03:12:14.330 --> 03:12:19.314
[UNKNOWN]: And there's a lot of other people that look at it and say, this is unreal that this is in the files.

03:12:21.255 --> 03:12:30.882
[UNKNOWN]: Clearly, telling a story that's very different than you're getting anywhere else, which is another signal to me that it's not contented with in good faith.

03:12:31.102 --> 03:12:31.303
[UNKNOWN]: Right?

03:12:32.003 --> 03:12:33.104
[UNKNOWN]: So, where is it now?

03:12:35.546 --> 03:12:39.289
[UNKNOWN]: That was the first step, is to put that out there, and the second step is to run the reward program.

03:12:40.340 --> 03:12:44.523
[UNKNOWN]: And so we're running this reward program where people can message us on natively on the platform.

03:12:44.543 --> 03:12:46.084
[UNKNOWN]: They can send us encrypted information.

03:12:46.245 --> 03:12:49.147
[UNKNOWN]: If they know this, we're the only people that are able to look at it.

03:12:49.967 --> 03:12:50.648
[UNKNOWN]: There's not even log in.

03:12:50.708 --> 03:12:56.573
[UNKNOWN]: It's just done through encryption tools that allow people to submit information securely.

03:12:56.593 --> 03:13:03.578
[UNKNOWN]: The other option is they can submit a tip via secure drop, which is a secure portal for submitting information on the dark web.

03:13:03.598 --> 03:13:06.220
[UNKNOWN]: So we will continue to run the reward program.

03:13:06.240 --> 03:13:09.302
[UNKNOWN]: People are still donating to it and growing the reward pool.

03:13:10.163 --> 03:13:14.365
[UNKNOWN]: which is amazing to watch because a lot of people will believe in this and they've contributed in fact our award pool.

03:13:14.385 --> 03:13:20.207
[UNKNOWN]: And so we're going to keep growing that as a long-term commitment to this campaign.

03:13:22.248 --> 03:13:24.008
[UNKNOWN]: And then we're going to see what tips keep coming forward.

03:13:24.048 --> 03:13:28.530
[UNKNOWN]: People send us information that we're digging into that's really interesting.

03:13:29.170 --> 03:13:32.331
[UNKNOWN]: And we're going to see what we get out of it and keep growing it down.

03:13:32.591 --> 03:13:33.892
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

03:13:34.412 --> 03:13:36.733
[UNKNOWN]: I want to preface this next statement

03:13:39.834 --> 03:13:42.435
[UNKNOWN]: have all of the empathy in the world for all of them.

03:13:42.776 --> 03:13:56.623
[UNKNOWN]: I can't begin to put myself in that position, especially when it happens at such a young age and the mental impacts of fear, of retribution and all of the things like a sympathetic to that.

03:13:58.324 --> 03:13:59.805
[UNKNOWN]: But I'm also curious,

03:14:02.097 --> 03:14:21.406
[UNKNOWN]: you know why I don't even know if I want to say why but I would love to see at least one of them you know or a bunch come out and and even be willing to expose you know that the connections that were made or I guess I would ask maybe even have there been any that have divulged

03:14:22.166 --> 03:14:44.673
[UNKNOWN]: any of the potential redacted pieces of information that have come to light and again like I get why why they wouldn't and maybe that selfish of me to even say hey I wish you guys would do something that I can't even imagine doing so I'm not naive to maybe that sounds terrible but it's just that it's such a frustrating thing to know that all the stuff has been redacted there are

03:14:45.472 --> 03:14:49.937
[UNKNOWN]: God knows how many victims out there that could piece some of these together.

03:14:49.977 --> 03:14:55.644
[UNKNOWN]: Do you have any context or were kind of perspective on why that's not happened?

03:14:55.684 --> 03:15:00.069
[UNKNOWN]: Is it all because of the fear of there are examples of it?

03:15:00.329 --> 03:15:03.273
[UNKNOWN]: It is happening a good example is co-conspirators.

03:15:04.230 --> 03:15:21.094
[UNKNOWN]: There are victim groups who have forced Congress and these oversight committees to really examine these co-conspirators, like Les Wexner and Epstein's finance years and the people that he moved money with and the people who went to the island.

03:15:22.654 --> 03:15:30.116
[UNKNOWN]: A lot of redactions in the files are co-conspirators, names, email addresses, communications,

03:15:31.669 --> 03:15:38.806
[UNKNOWN]: And I admire these survivors for putting themselves out there and insisting on the unredaction of these co-conspirators.

03:15:38.886 --> 03:15:41.712
[UNKNOWN]: And so guys like Massey that read their names from the House floor,

03:15:43.443 --> 03:15:59.302
[UNKNOWN]: are advancing this investigation still and even recently in the last week, I figure which when it was, which one of his co-conspirators it was, but a bunch of survivors in the last, last month maybe, are,

03:16:03.035 --> 03:16:29.807
[UNKNOWN]: pushing the oversight committees that are looking into this to name some of these additional conspirators from the House for unredactor names, say them on the into the congressional record, and force Congress to do what the FBI has fully abdicated themselves from, which is using your investigative authority to continue to advance the Epstein investigation into his living associates.

03:16:33.505 --> 03:16:39.429
[UNKNOWN]: with the exception of a very small number of Congress people, the victims are leading this.

03:16:40.810 --> 03:16:44.873
[UNKNOWN]: To your knowledge, have any of the victims divulged any of the co-conspirator names?

03:16:47.034 --> 03:16:58.162
[UNKNOWN]: I can't say this victim divulged this co-conspirator aside from the ones that are really well-known like Virginia Grafray coming forward and saying Prince Andrew, right?

03:16:58.202 --> 03:16:58.882
[UNKNOWN]: There's examples

03:17:04.362 --> 03:17:06.544
[UNKNOWN]: some that have come forward and talked about Trump.

03:17:06.904 --> 03:17:23.897
[UNKNOWN]: It's hard to separate what is single and what's noise with those because it's so politically charged and you even know if you're reading this true, but there are people that have come out and named names in both when this happened and recently.

03:17:24.686 --> 03:17:25.746
[UNKNOWN]: and nothing has happened.

03:17:25.766 --> 03:17:26.486
[UNKNOWN]: No, that happened.

03:17:26.526 --> 03:17:32.208
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, I guess Prince Andrew got in jammed up and it was arrested.

03:17:32.328 --> 03:17:35.748
[UNKNOWN]: So I guess as far as American co-considering in Americano.

03:17:36.688 --> 03:17:46.110
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, do you have any background or can shed any light on why nobody has been charged or arrested with any of this?

03:17:46.270 --> 03:17:49.791
[UNKNOWN]: Do you mean if you got in that answer from anybody and all the digging you've done?

03:17:50.411 --> 03:17:52.692
[UNKNOWN]: Well, I think it's as simple as the compromise goes all the way

03:17:55.096 --> 03:17:59.260
[UNKNOWN]: So, we know that Epstein and Trump were associates.

03:17:59.700 --> 03:18:03.443
[UNKNOWN]: To me, that's not a valid excuse though, you know.

03:18:03.463 --> 03:18:14.233
[UNKNOWN]: So if you press that with any of, I mean, and I don't know who all you've talked to within the government investigation wise, but have you asked anybody as to why,

03:18:14.953 --> 03:18:36.945
[UNKNOWN]: why nobody has been I mean nobody has been charged not there's not been a single arrest from any of these files and there's a ton of names that are in there that are redacted and nobody's been charged there's countless victims there's all these you know verifiable proof of crimes being committed against minors nobody's been arrested why

03:18:42.272 --> 03:18:45.415
[UNKNOWN]: I don't think the people that arrest them would be the FBI, right?

03:18:45.655 --> 03:18:47.997
[UNKNOWN]: It's federal crimes that we're talking about.

03:18:48.918 --> 03:18:51.981
[UNKNOWN]: They're state authorities that could do it, too, I guess, in some of these places.

03:18:53.222 --> 03:18:58.727
[UNKNOWN]: But the FBI is an executive institution.

03:19:00.069 --> 03:19:06.995
[UNKNOWN]: And so if you don't have the buy-in at the executive level, or worse, you have direct

03:19:12.337 --> 03:19:16.741
[UNKNOWN]: direct requirements to not investigate and cover it up.

03:19:17.761 --> 03:19:18.462
[UNKNOWN]: Who's left to do it?

03:19:19.423 --> 03:19:25.267
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, and maybe it's as simple as, you know, because there are a lot of amazing FBI agents.

03:19:25.427 --> 03:19:30.111
[UNKNOWN]: You know, I mean, there's a lot of amazing, amazing agents in every facet of the government.

03:19:30.151 --> 03:19:35.175
[UNKNOWN]: And typically the lower the more amazing they are, you know, the higher they get, the more compromised.

03:19:36.495 --> 03:20:05.822
[UNKNOWN]: uh... in what happened and maybe that's that's the thing is that the people are are in the position to to squash it are doing that in the people who who wouldn't do it aren't high enough of on the chain to to break rank and and whatever it just mean whistleblown is a thing like that that happens often i it's a little surprising to me that not a single FBI agent has whistleblown publicly you know and maybe they haven't been mainstream media squash me i've not seen anything

03:20:06.642 --> 03:20:13.103
[UNKNOWN]: There have been a bunch who have left the agency since the Epstein files.

03:20:13.864 --> 03:20:33.468
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know directly what their involvement is, but one of the problems for a whistleblower is that they're going to have to bring this to Congress, and Congress has been it's going to have to provide the oversight over the I and the DOJ, and they've already shown

03:20:35.392 --> 03:20:37.193
[UNKNOWN]: to do anything with the Epstein files.

03:20:37.213 --> 03:20:40.754
[UNKNOWN]: And so whistleblowers, probably look at this and think, well, what could I do anyway?

03:20:40.794 --> 03:20:41.954
[UNKNOWN]: I'm just going to ruin my career.

03:20:43.955 --> 03:20:44.775
[UNKNOWN]: I agree with you.

03:20:44.856 --> 03:20:47.096
[UNKNOWN]: I've got a lot of friends with the FBI agents, and they're great people.

03:20:47.336 --> 03:20:47.977
[UNKNOWN]: They're awesome.

03:20:48.537 --> 03:20:54.739
[UNKNOWN]: Like, they've great track records of surgar country.

03:20:54.799 --> 03:20:57.820
[UNKNOWN]: And I think that's probably true for most FBI agents.

03:20:57.840 --> 03:20:58.921
[UNKNOWN]: They're great people.

03:20:58.981 --> 03:21:00.241
[UNKNOWN]: And DOJ, DOJ lawyers.

03:21:00.601 --> 03:21:02.142
[UNKNOWN]: Their friends are DOJ lawyers, they're amazing.

03:21:03.691 --> 03:21:07.472
[UNKNOWN]: But there's a group of people within both those organizations that are squashing this.

03:21:07.772 --> 03:21:09.652
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

03:21:10.233 --> 03:21:14.474
[UNKNOWN]: So your theory as of us sitting here is that he walked out of that cell.

03:21:14.514 --> 03:21:14.894
[UNKNOWN]: That's right.

03:21:15.754 --> 03:21:18.735
[UNKNOWN]: Do you have a theory as to who who orchestrated it?

03:21:22.295 --> 03:21:23.156
[UNKNOWN]: This is theoretical.

03:21:23.236 --> 03:21:26.076
[UNKNOWN]: So I'm now moving beyond what the evidence shows in the speculation.

03:21:26.236 --> 03:21:28.257
[UNKNOWN]: But I'm going to build based that speculation on

03:21:31.667 --> 03:21:33.588
[UNKNOWN]: What the evidence shows.

03:21:33.868 --> 03:21:50.997
[UNKNOWN]: What we do know for sure is he had intelligence connections from not only our intelligence agencies, but also the Mossad, extracting someone out of a friendly facility can't be that hard.

03:21:51.938 --> 03:21:54.619
[UNKNOWN]: That's not a hard thing to do in terms of operations, right?

03:21:55.119 --> 03:21:59.562
[UNKNOWN]: Getting someone out of a friendly facility, all you got to do is get them past.

03:22:00.506 --> 03:22:04.149
[UNKNOWN]: a few cameras that went off get him into a trip van that's unmarked.

03:22:05.010 --> 03:22:05.410
[UNKNOWN]: They're gone.

03:22:06.151 --> 03:22:07.292
[UNKNOWN]: That's not a hard operation.

03:22:07.932 --> 03:22:10.274
[UNKNOWN]: Now covering it up, like that's more complex, right?

03:22:11.095 --> 03:22:13.517
[UNKNOWN]: But getting an out without anyone seeing it was not a hard thing to do.

03:22:13.657 --> 03:22:14.278
[UNKNOWN]: I don't think that...

03:22:15.635 --> 03:22:24.960
[UNKNOWN]: an extraction of that nature from a U.S. facility is one that is particularly complex.

03:22:25.500 --> 03:22:34.704
[UNKNOWN]: So my best guess is that he was so tied in politically, that

03:22:35.945 --> 03:22:46.920
[UNKNOWN]: the combination of political will and co-conspirator will to not have an alive defendant publicly, but to privately keep him alive.

03:22:48.077 --> 03:22:55.662
[UNKNOWN]: Combined with his connection to intelligence agencies, who could perform this kind of thing, made it easy.

03:22:56.063 --> 03:22:57.924
[UNKNOWN]: This was not hard to get him out of that jail.

03:22:58.244 --> 03:23:02.867
[UNKNOWN]: Do you have a singular entity that you feel is responsible for doing that?

03:23:03.127 --> 03:23:05.229
[UNKNOWN]: I couldn't say without it feeling negligent saying it.

03:23:07.891 --> 03:23:11.853
[UNKNOWN]: One thing that I've kind of thought of a few times as we're talking about it.

03:23:13.354 --> 03:23:17.695
[UNKNOWN]: Provided all of what we're saying is fact is is fact.

03:23:17.735 --> 03:23:27.818
[UNKNOWN]: I'm not necessarily disputing that it's just You know, kind of promising it with that is that What would be the point of keeping him alive instead of having him killed?

03:23:29.878 --> 03:23:30.799
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, we thought about this so

03:23:33.811 --> 03:23:35.752
[UNKNOWN]: Publicly, it's best to have a dead defendant.

03:23:36.732 --> 03:23:40.274
[UNKNOWN]: Everyone thinks he's dead, and criminal proceedings stop.

03:23:40.294 --> 03:23:40.774
[UNKNOWN]: It's over.

03:23:41.594 --> 03:23:43.995
[UNKNOWN]: All of his co-conspirators can breathe a sigh of relief.

03:23:45.496 --> 03:23:49.458
[UNKNOWN]: Privately, you keep him alive because it would be negligent for him not to have a dead man switch.

03:23:50.598 --> 03:23:55.080
[UNKNOWN]: You gotta think he's been doing this blackmail operation since you could put pictures on a floppy disk.

03:23:56.572 --> 03:24:05.820
[UNKNOWN]: This is a multi-decade operation that's used pictures and videos to get compromising information on the world's most powerful people.

03:24:06.080 --> 03:24:11.505
[UNKNOWN]: We know this because it's cameras were wired up in both as island and as a town home in Zoro Ranch and Everworlds.

03:24:13.785 --> 03:24:25.410
[UNKNOWN]: So assuming that he does have this multi-decade blackmail operation, if we can assume that, he's going to have a large body of video and image information.

03:24:26.150 --> 03:24:27.391
[UNKNOWN]: That's your insurance policy.

03:24:28.011 --> 03:24:33.233
[UNKNOWN]: If you're running a blackmail operation at his level and you don't have that, it's just negligence.

03:24:33.253 --> 03:24:34.274
[UNKNOWN]: That's just pure negligence.

03:24:34.894 --> 03:24:37.495
[UNKNOWN]: Why would you, I don't think he would have gotten where he is without it.

03:24:37.695 --> 03:24:38.215
[UNKNOWN]: Exactly.

03:24:38.695 --> 03:24:41.276
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, you have to be able to keep the squeeze on people.

03:24:41.796 --> 03:24:44.077
[UNKNOWN]: Hey, man, like, what you do with that kid?

03:24:44.097 --> 03:24:46.178
[UNKNOWN]: Well, you don't want that get now.

03:24:46.238 --> 03:24:46.578
[UNKNOWN]: Do you?

03:24:46.738 --> 03:24:49.819
[UNKNOWN]: Well, I need you to go do this thing for me or vote this way or whatever.

03:24:50.599 --> 03:24:52.540
[UNKNOWN]: So he's got to use that historically.

03:24:52.580 --> 03:24:56.021
[UNKNOWN]: It's got to be protected, and it's got to be backed up in multiple places.

03:24:58.547 --> 03:25:01.549
[UNKNOWN]: If you're him, you know you've got that, that's your out.

03:25:01.649 --> 03:25:03.691
[UNKNOWN]: If anything bad up, she's already arrested once.

03:25:04.492 --> 03:25:08.755
[UNKNOWN]: So do you know you've got to have something in your back pocket to play in case it happens again?

03:25:08.955 --> 03:25:09.816
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

03:25:09.956 --> 03:25:12.337
[UNKNOWN]: Where does Galane Maxwell fit into all of this?

03:25:12.618 --> 03:25:23.146
[UNKNOWN]: Both kind of throughout the entire process from what you've uncovered and what's going on with her now being somebody who probably has the keys to a lot of that stuff.

03:25:23.166 --> 03:25:27.189
[UNKNOWN]: Do you know where everything is at with her case and all that?

03:25:27.969 --> 03:25:30.692
[UNKNOWN]: that's one that people other people follow up more closely than I do.

03:25:30.712 --> 03:25:32.534
[UNKNOWN]: That one's weird.

03:25:33.996 --> 03:25:35.438
[UNKNOWN]: I don't know what I think about Galane.

03:25:38.361 --> 03:25:39.883
[UNKNOWN]: I think that she was probably his handler.

03:25:41.432 --> 03:25:42.593
[UNKNOWN]: That's my best real and galane.

03:25:43.113 --> 03:25:44.954
[UNKNOWN]: Her father was connected directly to the Mossad.

03:25:46.134 --> 03:25:48.456
[UNKNOWN]: So, I mean, she's in prison right now, right?

03:25:49.636 --> 03:25:54.459
[UNKNOWN]: Do you know what's going on with charges and where everything is out with her procedurally?

03:25:55.419 --> 03:25:57.220
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, they released this video of her in prison.

03:25:57.240 --> 03:25:58.040
[UNKNOWN]: Did you see this?

03:25:59.001 --> 03:26:00.442
[UNKNOWN]: They released a video of her in prison.

03:26:02.143 --> 03:26:05.587
[UNKNOWN]: Where she's directly facing the camera, she's wearing present clothing.

03:26:06.748 --> 03:26:07.949
[UNKNOWN]: It does not look like her.

03:26:08.130 --> 03:26:10.532
[UNKNOWN]: That woman is not her, whoever they showed that video of.

03:26:11.073 --> 03:26:13.215
[UNKNOWN]: Her nose is different, her facial features are different.

03:26:14.256 --> 03:26:18.481
[UNKNOWN]: And I, on some level, can't bring myself to go down that rabbit hole.

03:26:20.083 --> 03:26:21.024
[UNKNOWN]: There are people that do.

03:26:22.108 --> 03:26:28.550
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, it does seem like that can or could be an important piece of the puzzle, though.

03:26:28.930 --> 03:26:41.894
[UNKNOWN]: But I would assume if we're making the assumption that all of the things that you mentioned about Epstein and the treasure trove of Intel he has, let's assume that that's accurate.

03:26:43.215 --> 03:26:47.220
[UNKNOWN]: She would have all the access to that same level of information.

03:26:47.360 --> 03:26:59.255
[UNKNOWN]: So there's part of me that wonders, well, you know, okay, if it's not her, where is she or who is it or why all the political theater, why not have her killer self on paper too, you know?

03:26:59.596 --> 03:27:01.118
[UNKNOWN]: Right, because obviously they don't care.

03:27:02.653 --> 03:27:10.335
[UNKNOWN]: You know, if we think we're being fooled or not, because they obviously don't, so why, why even go through all of that?

03:27:10.555 --> 03:27:16.556
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, why even keep her there and do this theater in this game, it's something we have no control over.

03:27:16.596 --> 03:27:19.337
[UNKNOWN]: We can't go in that facility and see, okay, is this going?

03:27:19.677 --> 03:27:20.577
[UNKNOWN]: Is this really her?

03:27:20.637 --> 03:27:22.277
[UNKNOWN]: I'm no way of actually being able to do that.

03:27:22.357 --> 03:27:25.418
[UNKNOWN]: So, in absence of that, we just have to accept that that's her in jail.

03:27:26.178 --> 03:27:31.520
[UNKNOWN]: have you gone through the charges and the evidence in her case?

03:27:31.820 --> 03:27:43.846
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, so it's interesting that she was charged with sex trafficking, which requires buyers, none of those people have ever surfaced or been charged.

03:27:45.226 --> 03:27:46.547
[UNKNOWN]: So she committed this crime to

03:27:50.362 --> 03:27:52.523
[UNKNOWN]: So this is the outcome that you expect in a cover-up, right?

03:27:52.603 --> 03:27:59.566
[UNKNOWN]: So this is the initial best evidence of the cover-up in the executive branch, both in the FBI and the DOJ.

03:27:59.646 --> 03:28:04.067
[UNKNOWN]: You have a sex trafficker at the state or local level that gets charged with this.

03:28:04.427 --> 03:28:10.490
[UNKNOWN]: The next thing you look at is proving that something of value was exchanged for a commercial sex act.

03:28:11.370 --> 03:28:13.492
[UNKNOWN]: Well, that's the definition.

03:28:13.792 --> 03:28:18.596
[UNKNOWN]: So if something evaluates exchange for a commercial sex act, you have to show what was exchanged money.

03:28:19.657 --> 03:28:20.358
[UNKNOWN]: That's the most common.

03:28:20.758 --> 03:28:24.081
[UNKNOWN]: Someone paid money to have sex with a child.

03:28:24.481 --> 03:28:29.426
[UNKNOWN]: You show that and prove it in court and you're able to satisfy the definition of sex trafficking.

03:28:30.827 --> 03:28:31.968
[UNKNOWN]: This has not been done with Golan.

03:28:33.282 --> 03:28:41.086
[UNKNOWN]: They have not been able to show who these people were that paid for or sex or something a value was exchanged for sex with children.

03:28:43.387 --> 03:28:59.814
[UNKNOWN]: So this was the most early evidence, in my opinion, of the extent of this cover up, because in a normal human trafficking investigation, that is essential to proving the elements of sex trafficking.

03:29:01.732 --> 03:29:02.453
[UNKNOWN]: And none of it's there.

03:29:02.593 --> 03:29:03.113
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, it's not there.

03:29:03.133 --> 03:29:07.296
[UNKNOWN]: Do you know where it's out in the process, she's been charged or no?

03:29:07.817 --> 03:29:13.301
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I think she was, I want to say she's convicted, I haven't kept up with Galane as closely.

03:29:13.481 --> 03:29:13.661
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

03:29:13.801 --> 03:29:15.803
[UNKNOWN]: Okay.

03:29:16.063 --> 03:29:16.563
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

03:29:17.084 --> 03:29:19.285
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, we could spend a week talking about it.

03:29:19.366 --> 03:29:22.088
[UNKNOWN]: But what happened, I asked you that I should have.

03:29:22.708 --> 03:29:23.709
[UNKNOWN]: I think you covered it, man.

03:29:23.729 --> 03:29:25.651
[UNKNOWN]: I think you beat that dead work.

03:29:25.671 --> 03:29:26.972
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah, I think you covered it all.

03:29:27.052 --> 03:29:28.753
[UNKNOWN]: It's the whole thing.

03:29:28.994 --> 03:29:30.535
[UNKNOWN]: Yeah.

03:29:31.115 --> 03:29:32.156
[UNKNOWN]: It's fascinating stuff.

03:29:32.196 --> 03:29:50.032
[UNKNOWN]: I mean, both your career and the extensive research and investigation stuff you've done on all the Epstein file stuff and Man, I just I can't thank you enough for coming and sharing all that and appreciate your service to the country and in a host of capacities and continuing to do so.

03:29:50.559 --> 03:29:51.920
[UNKNOWN]: Well, really enjoyed being here.

03:29:51.980 --> 03:29:53.061
[UNKNOWN]: Thanks a lot for having me on.

03:29:53.081 --> 03:29:54.523
[UNKNOWN]: I really enjoyed this conversation.

03:29:54.823 --> 03:29:57.465
[UNKNOWN]: And the questions that you asked, how much thought that you put into them.

03:29:57.526 --> 03:30:01.349
[UNKNOWN]: So I'm thrilled to have been able to sit here with you for the last little bit.

03:30:01.709 --> 03:30:04.152
[UNKNOWN]: Well, thank you much for the viewer slash listener.

03:30:04.172 --> 03:30:04.973
[UNKNOWN]: I hope you enjoyed it.

03:30:05.013 --> 03:30:06.834
[UNKNOWN]: If you didn't, you can choke yourself.

03:30:07.054 --> 03:30:09.096
[UNKNOWN]: And until next time, this is Mike Drop.